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Abstract 
 
The comparison of persons is pervasive in social judgement and human 
decision making and yet its neural substrate is poorly explored. Using functional 
magnetic resonance imaging we investigated the brain activities of participants 
comparing other persons with each other (other vs. other comparison - OOC) 
and with themselves (self vs. other comparison - SOC) as regards 
psychological (intelligence) and physical (height) characteristics. We found that 
the comparison of these two person characteristics differ in their neural 
activation patterns in the OOC as well as in the SOC with higher activity 
increases for intelligence than height comparison in several areas in medial 
frontal and orbitofrontal cortex and posterior cingulate cortex suggesting that 
their activation scales with the demand on person comparison. The person 
comparison network strikingly overlaps the one commonly described for the 
classic theory of mind tasks. We interpret this overlap as indicating perspective 
taking common to person comparison and theory of mind. Furthermore, we 
suggest that the neural differences between the SOC and the OOC especially in 
the dorsal part of the medial frontal cortex rely on the different degree of the self 
involved in the two types of comparisons. The results additionally suggest that 
the decision directions of self-relevant comparisons, especially in the 
intelligence comparison of the SOC, resulted in differences in the activation of 
the medial frontal cortex, which also relies on differences in the reward 
anticipation and self-relatedness of these decisions. 
 
 
  Introduction 
 
8 
1. Introduction 
 
Human beings are social beings: we spend our time with friends, and we live 
together in villages and cities with thousands, even millions of fellow human 
beings. Most of us work together with other people. We interact with others 
nearly every day, we are at war with one another, we perform contests at work, 
sports, and in other fields and of course, we compare other persons with each 
other and other persons with ourselves. The list of interactions between human 
beings is endless. Therefore, it is not astonishing that these interactions are in 
the focus of interest in several areas such as economics, sports, and of course 
psychology. In the last decades, the basics of social cognition processes and 
their neural correlates constituted a key issue in social psychology. One of 
these social cognition processes concerns social comparisons. We behave and 
decide on the basis of judgements we make in social comparisons in our daily 
life. Every day we compare ourselves with other people and pass judgements 
for "is she/he taller/fitter/stronger/more intelligent/better/richer... than I am, or 
am I taller/fitter/stronger/more intelligent/better/richer... than the other?". These 
kinds of decisions bear an important influence on our behaviour and our 
interaction with other people. For example, even decisions about our own 
marriage are influenced by the people we compare ourselves with (Titus, 1980). 
Social comparison can provide a reference frame for our own opinions. 
Although social comparisons are used in our daily life and are in the focus of 
research, little is known about their neural substrates. 
Social comparison is an umbrella term referring to all processes through which 
people come to know themselves or others by evaluating their own attitudes, 
abilities, and beliefs in comparison with another person or with a group of 
others, for example a peer group. For extracting information about the attitudes, 
abilities or beliefs of other persons for social comparison processes, we have to 
draw inferences about potentially intelligent beliefs, intentions, and attitudes of 
one or more persons and take their perspective into account. Taking the 
perspective of others into account is a specific human ability termed mentalizing  Introduction 
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or Theory of Mind (ToM). Furthermore, a judgement based on a social 
comparison process requires a decision making process.  
This doctoral thesis deals with the neural similarities and differences in specific 
social comparison processes. In particular, we are interested in neural 
differences in the comparison of physical and psychological person 
characteristics. Our person comparisons include the comparison of body height 
as a physical person characteristic and the comparison of intelligence as a 
psychological person characteristic. We were moreover interested in neural 
differences resulting from the differing involvement of the self in these social 
comparison processes. We performed three experiments using functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) to investigate the neural correlates of 
person comparison tasks. FMRI is a non-invasive magnetic resonance imaging 
technique of the brain that relies on intrinsic changes in hemoglobin 
oxygenation  and blood flow to functioning areas of the brain. A short 
explanation of the blood-oxygen-level dependent signal (BOLD) can be found in 
Excursus box 1. 
In the following parts of the introduction the social comparison processes and 
the related processes such as decision making and ToM and their neural 
correlates will be described in more detail. Furthermore, the neural correlates of 
processes in which the self and others are included will be characterized. The 
introduction will close upon the foci of interest of the three experiments. 
  Introduction 
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Excursus 1: blood-oxygen-level dependent signal (BOLD) 
Every time when nerve cells are firing they consume energy in form of glucose and oxygen. 
Because of having no internal reserves for these energy sources in the nerve cells, it is 
necessary to supply them with glucose and oxygen, quickly. The more nerve cells are firing 
the more the demand on energy source is increasing. A complex regulation mechanism of 
the blood vessel compensates this demand. The particular details of this mechanism are 
still unknown. Because of a vascular dilatation in the surrounding of the activated neurons 
more oxygenic blood is delivered than to inactive neurons (see Figure 1). This process is 
called hemodynamic response and has a latency of about 5-6 sec. The variation of the 
blood flow and the oxygen saturation of the blood have influences on the local magnetic 
field, because oxygenated or deoxygenated blood have different magnetic properties 
(Hemoglobin is diamagnetic when oxygenated but paramagnetic when deoxygenated). 
These changes in magnetic fields can be detected with fMRI.  
With simultaneous measurements of electroencephalography and BOLD could be shown, 
that the subliminal fluctuations of local field potentials show higher correlations with BOLD 
than the firing rate of the neurons with the BOLD (Logothetis, Pauls, Augath, Trinath & 
Oellermann, 2001). This is seen as a verification that BOLD is an indirect measurement of 
neural activity.  
 
Figure 1: Schematic diagram of the appearance of the BOLD-signal. TOP: BOLD-characteristics 
and firing rate, BOTTOM: (1): inactive neuron with normal amount of glucose and oxygen, (2): active 
neuron – glucose and oxygen were spent - shortfall refilled from the blood circulation, (3): Because of 
vascular dilatation more blood and therefore more glucose and oxygen is delivered in the immediate 
surrounding of the active neuron, which refills the deficit, (4): neuron is again in inactive state with 
normal amount of glucose and oxygen.  Introduction 
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1.1 Social comparison 
 
As mentioned above, social comparison is a term referring to the process 
through which people come to know themselves by evaluating their own 
attitudes, abilities, and beliefs in comparison with others. Two explanations shall 
first be provided for a better understanding of the further text. First, two 
directions of social comparisons can be defined: upward and downward 
comparison. Upward comparison means that people compare themselves with 
others having higher parameter values concerning the content of the 
comparison, while downward comparison describes a comparison with people 
having lower parameter values. Second, in his meta analysis Van Overwalle 
(2009) divided social processes into two major types of mental inferences: (1) 
inferences of transitory states (goals and intentions) which are more perceptual 
and directly related to the observed behaviour of others and (2) inferences of 
enduring characteristics (personality traits and social scripts), which requires a 
more mature mentalizing capacity.  
The next section will deliver a detailed description of theories of social 
comparison processes, which are relevant for the comparison tasks in our three 
experiments, will be given. Subsequently, results of neuroimaging studies are 
presented which investigated the involvement of brain areas in social 
comparison processes and dealing with social information.  
 
1.1.1 Theories of social comparison processes 
The term “social comparison” was first used by Leon Festinger (1954). He also 
developed the first systematic theory of social comparison processes in groups. 
This theory is based on his previous work and theory regarding the power of 
groups and how individuals use groups to fulfill the information which is needed 
to evaluate their opinions and abilities.  
Festinger’s (1954) theory of social comparison processes includes 5 
hypotheses:  Introduction 
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1. In the first hypothesis Festinger (1954) postulated the existence of a 
drive in every human organism to evaluate its own opinions and abilities. 
2.  In the second hypothesis he claimed that people evaluate their opinions 
and abilities by comparison with the opinions and abilities of others 
whenever objective, non-social means are not available.  
3. Thirdly,  he  postulated  that the tendency to compare oneself with another 
specific person decreases as the difference between her/his opinion or 
ability and one’s own increases. Accordingly, the person with the closest 
opinion or ability to one’s own will be chosen for comparison. If no such 
person is available, meaning that all other possibly comparable persons 
have a very divergent opinion or ability, a person will not be able to make 
a subjectively precise evaluation of their own opinion or ability. 
Festinger (1954) made four derivations based on his first three 
hypotheses. He deduced that … 
a.  if the opinions/abilities of the person that we compare ourselves with 
are close to our opinions/abilities, the subjective evaluation of 
opinions/abilities will be stable. 
b.  if the opinions/abilities of the person to compare with are somewhat 
different from one's opinions/abilities, a tendency to change one's 
opinions/abilities will exist. 
c.  people do not tend to compare themselves with others who have 
different opinions/abilities than one's own. 
d.  if discrepancies exist in the group concerning the opinions/abilities, 
members of the group will act to reduce the discrepancy. 
4.  In a fourth hypothesis, the author postulated the existence of an upward 
drive so that people tend to improve their own abilities. This upward drive 
is largely absent in opinions. 
5. Finally, Festinger (1954) hypothesized the existence of non-social 
constraints which make it difficult or even impossible to change one’s 
ability (but not opinions).  Introduction 
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Festinger (1954) postulated that the most important reason why we perform 
social comparisons is to get an as accurate as possible feedback about our own 
opinions and abilities. In the following years Schachter (1959) extended 
Festinger's theory to emotional states. For example, he postulated that people 
are more likely to affiliate when made fearful and that the link between fear and 
affiliation was partly the result of social comparison processes (Schachter, 
1959). Additionally, our motivations influence the direction of social 
comparisons and decisions. Wheeler (1962) postulated that upward 
comparisons are preferred if a person has a high level of motivation and if a 
person believes to be closer in rank to a person above them than to a person 
below them. 
Human beings do not only search for accurate information about themselves 
but also for information to improve their self-esteem. In this case, social 
comparisons in downward directions are preferred. For example, if we compare 
ourselves with a person who performs worse in sports than we do, we will show 
a tendency to think that we are good at sports. Thornton and Arrowood (1966) 
were the first to define two different motivations of social comparisons - self-
evaluation and self-enhancement. This means that individuals use social 
comparisons to improve or develop their own abilities by getting self-relevant 
information for self-improvement. For example, social comparisons in upward 
directions enable us to get information for self-improvement (Mussweiler, 2006). 
This means that social comparison processes seem to be strategic and 
deliberative processes. However, social comparison can also be spontaneous, 
it can appear without any motives in social interactions and it can lie outside 
conscious awareness (Mussweiler, 2006). Mussweiler and Rueter (2003) 
suggested that people may simply compare themselves with those whom they 
routinely compare with. This tendency may save cognitive resources, thus it 
would be consistent with the cognitive efficiency principle (Mussweiler, Rueter, 
& Epstude, 2006). 
Social cognition broadly includes the cognitive processes used to understand 
and store information about other persons. This information comprises facts 
about the self, interpersonal norms, scripts, and procedures to navigate through 
the social world efficiently. If one wants to receive these kinds of information, it  Introduction 
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is necessary to extract, understand, and predict the behavioural motives and 
stable dispositions of oneself and other persons and/or groups. In doing so, 
forming trait judgements of others is a helpful tool. Such trait judgements are 
drawn from a vast array of previous experience, general knowledge, and 
subjective inferences (Hastie & Park, 1986; Wyer, Srull, & Gordon, 1984). 
Furthermore, they are critically shaped by comparisons of the target person with 
other people (Damisch, Mussweiler, & Plessner, 2006; Dunning & Hayes, 1996; 
Herr, 1986; Higgins & Lurie, 1983). People’s fundamental propensity to process 
social information in a comparative manner has always played a prominent role 
in social psychological theory and research, especially in research on person 
judgement (Festinger, 1954; Herr, 1986; Higgins & Stangor, 1988). Person 
judgements reflect the implications of judgement-relevant knowledge about the 
person. Hence, these informational judgements can be distinguished from 
experimental comparisons which are directly based on sensory inputs (Strack, 
1992). It is not possible to use all judgement-relevant knowledge for such 
informational judgements, because on the one hand not all information will be 
present in certain situations and on the other hand the process will take a very 
long time. However, social judgements are even performed spontaneously 
(Mussweiler & Bodenhausen, 2002). Higgins (1996) postulated that the degree 
to which a particular knowledge unit influences a given judgement depends on 
its accessibility. Human judgements about personal qualities often involve 
comparison processes, as research has shown (Dunning et al., 1996; Festinger, 
1954; Mussweiler, 2003). In order to answer questions like “How intelligent is 
Eric Kandel?” people spontaneously use comparison standards to form a 
judgement (Mussweiler, Rueter, & Epstude, 2004; Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris, 
1995). In this respect, a statement like “Kandel is very intelligent” essentially 
means “Kandel is more intelligent than most of the people coming to my mind 
right now”. Similarly, characterizing oneself as intelligent implies that one is 
more intelligent than others, thus the statement is inherently comparative 
(Huttenlocher & Higgins, 1971). 
In general, comparative evaluations involve three major stages: standard 
selection, target-standard comparison and evaluation. For the stage of standard 
selection three different mechanisms are described in the literature. Standard 
selections may be influenced by conversational inferences (e.g. Grice, 1975;  Introduction 
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Schwarz, 1994), by the level of accessibility in memory (e.g. Herr, 1986; Wilson, 
Houston, Etling & Brekke, 1996) and are perhaps guided by normative concerns 
for selecting a relevant or diagnostic standard (Festinger, 1954). 
Once a standard has been selected, it is necessary to determine the particular 
features of the standard and the target the comparison will be based upon. This 
feature selection drives the evaluation consequences of the comparison. For 
example if we compare ourselves with Michael Ballack concerning athletic 
skills, we may evaluate our skills as poor, but if we compare ourselves with 
Michael Ballack with regard to academic skills, we may evaluate our skills as 
high. In contrast, we would probably evaluate our academic skills as poor and 
our athletic skills as high when comparing ourselves with Albert Einstein. But 
what happens in the stage of the standard-target comparison? Mussweiler 
(2003) proposed a model for the selective accessibility process (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2: The selective accessibility process (according to Mussweiler, 2003) 
 
As explained above for a comparison, judges have to obtain judgement-relevant 
knowledge about the target and the standard.   Introduction 
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In a first step in the selective accessibility process, judges engage a quick 
holistic assessment of the target and the standard in which only a small number 
of features are used to determine whether both are similar or dissimilar in 
general. Based on the outcome of this initial holistic assessment, two different 
hypothesis-testing mechanisms assumingly take place. Mussweiler (2003) 
assumed that if the holistic assessment indicates that the target and the 
standard are similar, judges will engage in a process of similarity testing and 
test the hypothesis that the target is similar to the standard. In contrast, if the 
holistic assessment indicates that the target and the standard are dissimilar, 
judges will engage in a process of dissimilarity testing and test the hypothesis 
that the target is dissimilar from the standard. According to relevant literature, 
once a hypothesis is selected it is often tested by focusing on hypothesis-
consistent evidence (Klayman & Ha, 1987; Snyder & Swann, 1978; Trope & 
Bassok, 1982; Trope & Liberman, 1996). For the selective accessibility process 
this means that the mechanism of similarity testing selectively increases the 
accessibility of standard-consistent target knowledge, whereas dissimilarity 
testing selectively increases the accessibility of standard-inconsistent target 
knowledge (Mussweiler, 2003). Furthermore, the author claimed that this 
suggests that the default evaluative consequence of similarity testing is 
assimilation, whereas dissimilarity testing typically leads to contrast. 
In summary, Leon Festinger (1954) developed the first social comparison 
theory, which was extended and changed several times in the following years. 
Furthermore, social judgements are performed even spontaneously (Mussweiler 
et al., 2002), they include comparison processes and depend on the 
accessibility of stored and understood knowledge which is necessary for the 
comparison (Higgins, 1996). This information concerns the self, interpersonal 
norms, scripts and procedures to navigate through the social world efficiently. 
Comparative evaluations involve three major stages: standard selection, target-
standard comparison and evaluation. Standard selections may be influenced by 
conversational inferences, by the level of accessibility in memory, and they may 
be guided by normative concerns to select a relevant or diagnostic standard. 
Mussweiler (2003) proposed a model for the selective accessibility process for 
standard-target comparisons postulating a first quick holistic assessment of 
standard and target, followed by two alternative similarity or dissimilarity  Introduction 
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comparison processes, depending on the first assessment. The default 
evaluative consequence of similarity testing is assimilation, whereas 
dissimilarity testing typically leads to contrast. 
 
1.1.2 Neural substrates of social comparison 
Regardless of its remarkable psychological importance, little is known about the 
neural substrates of person comparison. Which brain regions might contribute 
to comparative person judgements? First, person comparisons necessarily have 
to be based on semantic person knowledge. Thus, person comparisons should 
activate those regions that represent semantic person knowledge. Studies 
investigating the neural representation of abstract person-based knowledge 
(e.g., Mason, Banfield & Macrae, 2004; Mitchell, Heatherton, & Macrae, 2002) 
found activation of the medial frontal cortex (MFC) for this type of knowledge. 
Second, person comparisons may differ from non-comparative person 
judgements in that they call on neural resources that are involved in comparison 
processes. Here, the question is whether different types of person comparisons 
call on different neural resources. For example, do comparisons on physical or 
psychological dimensions rely on the same neural mechanisms? If different 
kinds of comparisons draw on similar neural activation patterns, one might 
assume that brain regions involved in comparing inanimate objects on 
dimensions such as luminance, size or numerical value, i.e. regions along the 
intraparietal sulcus (Cohen-Kadosh et al., 2005; Pinel, Piazza, Le Bihan, & 
Dehaene, 2004) might also be involved in person comparisons. Alternatively, 
one might assume that comparative judgements and their neural representation 
are organized along basic content domains into a social and non-social realm. 
In fact, comparisons in the social realm might be a special case. 
Social comparisons are often based on characteristics of the own body (e.g. 
comparing ourselves with other people concerning body height or weight). 
When Participants had to compare their own body (active self-comparison 
condition) or their own home (control comparison condition) with other images 
and had to rate the level of anxiety that they experienced while exposed to the 
stimuli, self-comparison activated the lateral fusiform gyrus on both sides, the  Introduction 
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right inferior parietal lobule, the right lateral prefrontal cortex, and the left 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (Friederich et al., 2007). 
Judgements in social comparison processes involve reward anticipation 
processes. For example, rating oneself as richer or more intelligent than 
another can be more satisfying than the opposite decision direction. Reward 
specific activations in social comparison tasks were found in left and right 
occipital cortex, left and right angular gyrus, left and right ventral striatum, 
precuneus (PCun), and two distinct areas in medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC) 
(Fliessbach et al., 2007). The brain activity in ventral striatum increased with the 
ratio of subjects’ rewards. Furthermore, posterior regions and orbitofrontal 
regions showed higher activation in cases getting a higher or a lower reward 
than another person. The differential activation in response to the relative 
payment conditions shows an immediate impact of contextual social information 
on ventral striatal responses (Fliessbach et al., 2007). 
Van Overwalle (2009) showed in his meta-analysis that the MFC is involved in 
trait inferences, judgements about close others, social scripts, self reference, 
and interactive games. The dorsal part of the MFC is involved in trait inferences 
of others especially in tasks requiring enduring traits about actors on the basis 
of single trait words, sentences, and short stories, whereas the ventral part of 
MFC is involved in self-reference and trait inferences about close others 
(familiar people like relatives, friends, etc.) and the self. Knowledge on social 
scripts involves both parts of the MFC (Van Overwalle, 2009). Owing to the high 
degree of interconnectivity of the MFC with several brain areas including the 
dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex, the superior temporal sulcus (STS), the 
tempoparietal junction, and other brain areas, the MFC has to handle the neural 
input. This may contribute to the capacity of the MFC to implement more 
abstract inferences (e.g., Amodio & Frith, 2006). Moreover, neurons in the MFC 
are oriented to time and they fire over extended periods of time (Huey, Krueger, 
& Grafman, 2006). The authors suggested that the MFC serves the integration 
of social information over time. 
In summary, the MFC plays an important role in social comparison. The MFC 
suggestedly serves the integration of social information and handles neural 
input from the dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex, the STS, and the tempoparietal  Introduction 
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junction. The dorsal part of the MFC is involved in trait inferences of others 
especially in tasks requiring enduring traits about actors based on single trait 
words, sentences, and short stories, whereas the ventral part of MFC is 
involved in self-reference and trait inferences about close others (familiar 
people like relatives, friends, etc.) and the self, and in evaluative judgements of 
famous names. Furthermore, the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and ventral striatum 
were described as reward-specific areas in social comparison tasks and a 
network including the lateral fusiform gyrus on both sides, the right inferior 
parietal lobule, the right lateral prefrontal cortex, and the left ACC were active in 
the slim-body self comparison. 
 
1.2 The "Self" 
 
In social comparison processes, especially when we compare ourselves with 
other people, the self plays an important role, for instance if self-knowledge and 
self-reference is required. This paragraph presents a short overview of 
definitions of the self (1.2.1) and an overview of the neural substrates of the self 
(1.2.2). 
 
1.2.1 Definitions of the self 
The self is a major construct in philosophy as well as in psychology. In 
psychology, the self refers to the cognitive representation of one's identity. 
William James (1890) was the first in modern psychology to postulate the 
distinction between the self as "I", the subjective knower, and the self as "Me", 
the object that is known. James (1890) divided the self into a physical self, a 
mental self, and a spiritual self. The view of the self has changed several times 
since the first definition suggested by James in 1890. One of the current views 
on the self was described by Damasio (1999). He proposed three levels of self-
processing: The proto-self, the core self and the autobiographical self. The 
recent definitions are very similar to James’ definition (1890).  The proto-self of 
Damasio (1999) is associated with sensory and motor domains and 
corresponds with James’ physical self (1890). The concept of the mental self  Introduction 
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(James, 1890) is more or less in accordance with the core self of Damasio 
(1999) - representing the awareness of being the owner of a thought process 
and being able to act on the content of this process - and the minimal self 
(Gallagher, 2000; Gallagher & Frith, 2003) - which is characterized by 
distinguishing between a sense of agency and a sense of ownership for action. 
Furthermore, the spiritual self suggested by James (1890) corresponds to the 
autobiographical self (Damasio, 1999), reflecting the memory domain, and the 
narrative self (Gallagher, 2000; Gallagher et al., 2003) representing the link 
between past, present and future events. In other definitions of the self, the 
concept refers to other domains: the emotional self (Fossati, Hevenor, Graham 
et al., 2003; Fossati, Hevenor, Lepage et al., 2004), the spatial self (Vogeley & 
Fink, 2003; Vogeley et al., 2004), the facial self (Keenan, Wheeler, Gallup, & 
Pascual-Leone, 2000; Keenan, Nelson, O'Connor, & Pascual-Leone, 2001; 
Keenan, Wheeler, Platek, Lardi, & Lassonde, 2003), the verbal or interpreting 
self (Turk, Heatherton, Macrae, Kelley, & Gazzaniga, 2003) and the social self 
(Frith & Frith, 1999, 2003). 
 
1.2.2 Neural correlates of the self 
In the last decade, social cognitive neuroscience has investigated different 
aspects of the neural correlates of the self such as self-referential processes, or 
self-relevance (processes concerning stimuli that are experienced as strongly 
related to one’s own person) and self-description processes respectively. 
Recent research has delineated a network of brain areas involved in 
representing the self: medial frontal areas (Craik et al., 1999; Frith et al., 1999; 
Kelley et al., 2002; Vogeley et al. 2001), medial parietal areas including the 
posterior cingulated cortex (PCC), PCun (Craik et al., 1999; Johnson et al., 
2002; Kelley et al., 2002; Kircher et al., 2000), and secondary somatosensory 
areas including the bilateral insula (Kircher et al., 2000; Seger, Stone & Keenan, 
2004). 
Particularly the MFC was found in various kinds of studies investigating the self. 
The MFC is involved in first-person-perspective which is necessary but not 
sufficient for self-consciousness (Vogeley et al., 2003) and in tasks where  Introduction 
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subjects had to evaluate the extent to which a series of personality 
characteristics were self-descriptive (Macrae, Moran, Heatherton, Banfield & 
Kelly, 2004). The authors could show that the activation of the MFC could 
predict the memory performance and judgements of self-relevance. Several 
subregions of the MFC like the ventral, dorsal and posterior parts and the ACC 
show task specific activation in relation to their different involvement of the self. 
For instance, self-referential processes where subjects had to pronounce 
judgements on adjectives targeting the self vs. the other person yielded in 
activation of the ventral and dorsal anterior MFC (D’Argembeau et al., 2007). 
Self-related processes where subjects had to reflect about their own personal 
qualities (Modinos, Ormel & Aleman, 2009) and processes of adopting the other 
person’s perspective showed more activation in the posterior dorsal MFC 
(D’Argembeau et al., 2007). An interaction between perspective taking and self-
referential processes was found in the left dorsal MFC. The authors suggested 
that this region may be involved in decoupling one’s own from other people’s 
perspectives on the self. Another study investigating self-referential judgements 
in comparison to other judgements also found selective activation in the anterior 
ventral MFC (Kelley et al., 2002). The authors suggested that self-referential 
processing is functionally dissociable from other forms of semantic processing 
within the human brain. Another subregion in the center of the MFC, the ACC, 
showed higher activation in self- and other-relevance judgements than in case 
judgements (Kelley et al., 2002) and it proved to be involved in decisions about 
psychological trait adjectives (Kircher et al., 2000), viewing one's own face 
(Kircher et al., 2000) and self-related processes (Modinos, Ormel & Aleman, 
2009). 
Besides the MFC, other areas such as the insula (Ins), the PCC and the 
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) were found to be activated in similar tasks. The 
Ins plays an important role in self-reflection (Modinos, Ormel & Aleman, 2009) 
and in viewing one's own and other familiar faces (Kircher et al., 2000), 
whereas the PCC engaged activation in self-referential processing in 
comparison to other judgements (Kelley et al., 2002). The TPJ is involved in first 
person perspective and it is crucial for the coding of the self as embodied and 
as spatially situated within the human body (Arzy, Thut, Mohr, Michel & Blanko, 
2006). The TPJ has also been shown to code for several aspects of self- Introduction 
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processing, such as agency, self–other distinction, and mental own-body 
imagery (Maguire et al., 1998; Zacks, Rypma, Gabrieli, Tversky & Glover, 1999; 
Ruby & Decety, 2001; Vogeley et al., 2003; Blanke & Arzy, 2005). Samson, 
Apperly, Chiavarino, and Humphrey (2004) have shown that damages in the left 
TPJ cause selective deficits in judging the contents of others’ beliefs. 
Seger et al. (2004) investigated the neural correlates of judgements of ones 
own preferences with judgements of another person’s preferences. Participants 
had to make decisions on food names (self - whether he or she liked the food; 
other - whether a specific friend liked the food, or letter - whether there were 
more than two vowels in the food name). In comparison to the letter task, the 
self and other comparisons activated medial areas of frontal and parietal lobes 
and the bilateral Ins. When contrasting the two decision types (self and other) 
the superior medial parietal areas revealed a higher activation in the self 
condition, whereas activation was higher in the inferior medial parietal and left 
lateral frontal areas in the other condition. 
In addition to the involvement of the self, our experience in a specific domain 
influences the neural activation pattern in self-descriptive judgements in this 
domain. Lieberman, Jarcho, and Satpute (2004) found different neural 
correlates for high- and low experience domain judgements. In this study 
participants with experience in different domains (soccer and acting) made self-
descriptive judgements about words. They had to indicate if a word did or did 
not describe them. When subjects had to pronounce high-experience domain 
judgements a network including ventromedial prefrontal cortex, nucleus 
accumbens (NAcc), amygdala (AMG) and lateral temporal cortex showed 
activity. In low-experience domain judgements, only the lateral prefrontal cortex 
was differentially activated. 
In a meta-analysis Northoff et al. (2006) summarized the social cognitive 
neuroscience studies investigating the self. The authors assumed self-
referential processing to be at the core of what is called the self. They claimed 
that self-referential processing accounts for distinguishing stimuli related to 
one’s own self from those that are not relevant to one’s own concerns. Based 
on the results of their meta-analysis, the authors suggested a model of 
functional specialization within the cortical midline structures (CMS). The  Introduction 
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authors divided the CMS into ventral, dorsal and posterior subregions 
postulating specific involvements of these subregions in self-referential 
processes. Ventral subregions of the CMS including medial orbitofrontal cortex, 
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, and the sub- and pregenual part of the ACC 
are connected with the AMG, the striatum, the NAcc, all primary exteroceptive 
sensory modalities, and subcortical regions (midbrain and brain stem). Northoff 
et al. (2006) postulated that the ventral part of the CMS is involved in linking 
extero- or interoceptive stimuli with respect to their self-relatedness and 
therefore could be involved in coding the self-relatedness of stimuli thereby 
representing them as self-referential. The dorsal subregion of the CMS 
including the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and the supragenual ACC have 
been shown to be connected especially with the lateral prefrontal cortex. The 
authors suggested that the dorsal subregion of the CMS could be implicated in 
processes of reappraisal and evaluation of self-related stimuli. Finally the 
posterior subregion of the CMS including the PCC, the retrosplenial cortex, and 
the medial parietal cortex are densely connected with the hippocampus 
implicated in encoding and retrieving autobiographical memory. The authors 
postulated that the posterior CMS are centrally implicated in putting self-
referential stimuli within a temporal context (medial parietal cortex also in spatial 
context) linking them to past self-referential stimuli. Northoff et al. (2006) stated 
that parts of the proposed model (especially for the posterior CMS) have to be 
further investigated with appropriately designed studies. 
Damasio’s theory (1999) tries to explain the interaction between the areas 
found in the studies investigating the self. He claimed that the proto-self is non-
conscious, represents the current state of the organism and includes the medial 
parietal cortex, the Ins, and the secondary somatosensory cortices. 
Furthermore, he stated that the core self consists of a transient, conscious 
representation of events currently involving the organism. According to Damasio 
(1999), the core self is related to activations in the cingulate cortex (CC), the 
thalamus, and the superior colliculi. At last, the author postulated that the 
autobiographical self represents the past experience of the organism and is 
supported by activation of medial and lateral temporal areas by retrieving the 
relevant memories and representing them in core consciousness. The 
postulated activation in the ACC of the core self in Damasios theory is  Introduction 
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consistent with the opinion of Frith et al. (1999), who claimed that medial frontal 
areas represent mental states. 
In summary, the several regions of the MFC are involved in tasks concerning 
the self (for example, in tasks requiring self-knowledge, self-other relevant 
judgements and self-reference). Depending on the tasks, different combinations 
of other areas were activated in addition to the MFC. Tasks requiring first-
person perspective involved medial parietal areas and the TPJ, while self-other 
comparison additionally involved medial parietal areas and the Ins. High self-
descriptiveness additionally involved NAcc, AMG, and lateral temporal areas. 
The activation in the MFC also differed in respect to the task. The more dorsal 
parts of the MFC were activated in processes of reappraisal and evaluation of 
self-related stimuli, whereas the more ventral parts of the MFC were involved in 
coding the self-relatedness of stimuli thereby representing them as self-
referential. The posterior parts of the MFC are involved in tasks including self-
referential stimuli. 
 
1.3 Neural correlates of "Others" and Theory of Mind 
 
When comparing people, particularly on psychological characteristics like 
intelligence, participants have to draw inferences about potentially intelligent 
beliefs, intentions, and attitudes of the other persons and take their perspective 
into account. Hence, they try to understand other people’s behaviour in terms of 
their mental states – which is a specific human ability termed mentalizing or 
ToM reasoning (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). The concomitant brain activation 
would be expected in the neural network responsible for ToM (Gallagher et al., 
2003; Saxe, 2006), including bilateral TPJ, the PCun, and especially the MFC. 
Past research has demonstrated that these areas are activated when 
participants try to explain and predict other people’s behaviour based on the 
observation of their intentional actions (Brunet, Sarfati, Hardy-Bayle, & Decety, 
2000; Fletcher et al., 1995; Gallagher et al., 2000; Saxe & Kanwisher 2003; 
Saxe & Wexler, 2005; Walter et al., 2004; Buckner & Carroll, 2007). For 
example, Saxe et al. (2003) showed that the BOLD response in ToM areas (e.g.  Introduction 
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TPJ) was higher when reading stories about mental states of a character 
relative to non-social control stories. These authors claimed that the TPJ is 
generally involved in reasoning about another’s mind. Such mentalizing is also 
likely to be at play in person comparisons, the more so when they concern 
psychological rather than physical characteristics. 
Researchers in the domain of social cognitive neuroscience have pointed out 
several brain areas that support various aspects of social interaction and 
representation of others (Uddin, Kaplan, Molnar-Szakacs, Zaidel, & Iacoboni, 
2005; Iacoboni, 2006; Mitchell et al., 2002). A Network including MFC, ACC, 
and PCun has been associated with self-processing (Northoff & Bermpohl, 
2004) and social cognition (Schilbach et al., 2006). As mentioned above, social 
comparison could entail mentalizing in tasks involving the self and others and 
their mental states respectively. It is therefore not surprising that the neural 
correlates of tasks involving mentalizing and thus the self overlap. For instance, 
Mitchell, Macrae, and Banaji (2006) examined how perceivers make mental 
state inferences when the other is similar to oneself or dissimilar from oneself. 
Whereas mentalizing about a similar other engaged a region of ventral MFC 
linked to self-referential thought, mentalizing about a dissimilar other engaged a 
more dorsal subregion of MFC. The authors claimed that perceivers could use 
knowledge about themselves to infer the mental states of others and that this 
process might be a basic principle of social comparison processes. Also, 
evaluative judgements of famous names revealed greater activation in the 
dorsomedial and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex than non-evaluative judgements 
(Cunningham, Johnson, Gatenby, Gore, & Banaji, 2003).  
For self-referential processes of mentalizing about particular individuals, it was 
shown that the ventral MFC is suppressed when self-reflections follow either an 
initial reflection about self or a judgement of a similar but not a dissimilar other 
(Jenkins, Macrae, & Mitchell, 2008). The authors suggested that thinking about 
the mind of another person may strongly rely on references to one’s own mental 
characteristics. Gallagher et al. (2003) postulated that the MFC is the unique 
neural substrate of reasoning about representational mental states. However, 
Saxe (2006) claimed that the MFC is not specifically recruited for reasoning and 
showed that two subregions (dorsal and ventral part) of the MFC are implicated  Introduction 
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in distinct components of social cognition. The ventral MFC is involved in 
emotional perspective taking, sympathy, and emotional empathy. The dorsal 
MFC is implicated in monitoring the actions of others, sensations, and 
personalities, in monitoring one's own social responses and representing 
shared or collaborative attention and goals (Saxe, 2006). Furthermore, the 
dorsal MFC is also involved in judgements that combine both self and other 
(Ochsner et al., 2005) and it also plays a role in triadic attention (relation 
between me, you, and it). For example, the dorsal MFC is selectively activated 
while subjects play a game against another human being, versus against a 
computer (Rilling, Sanfey, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2004). The authors 
suggested that the players probably experienced greater triadic engagement 
while playing against a human opponent.  
Social emotions constitute other aspects of mentalizing: social interactions with 
other people are always emotionally connected, and we see and hear people 
expressing their emotions. Mentalizing helps us to identify the emotions of other 
people. Shamay-Tsoory, Tibi-Elhanany, and Aharon-Peretz (2007) investigated 
neural activation patterns of social emotions (envy or gloating), which reflect 
one’s assessment of the consequences of the other’s fortune. Identifying such 
social competitive emotions is thought to be related to perspective-taking 
abilities and ToM. The authors found in lesions studies that the ventral MFC is 
involved in understanding social competitive emotions. While the recognition of 
gloating (a positive emotion) was impaired in patients with lesions in the left 
ventral MFC and additionally in the inferior parietal lobule, the recognition of 
envy (a negative emotion) was more impaired in patients with lesions in the 
right ventral MFC. 
Nevertheless, mentalizing has its limits. Studies of brain lesions (Wood, 
Knutson, & Grafman, 2005) and autism (Frith et al., 1999) supported the 
hypothesis that the capacity to mentalize depends on cognitive brain 
mechanisms that are potentially dedicated specifically to social reasoning. 
In summary, a network of the MFC, the PCC, and the TPJ was found for ToM. 
The dorsal MFC is involved in monitoring others’ actions, sensations, and 
personalities, in monitoring one's own social responses and representing 
shared or collaborative attention and goals, combining self and others, and in  Introduction 
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judgements of similar others. By contrast, the ventral MFC is involved in 
emotional perspective taking, sympathy and emotional empathy, and in 
judgements of dissimilar others. 
 
1.4 Common neural substrates 
 
The medial frontal areas and the medial parietal areas were found to be 
involved in social comparisons (see 1.2), ToM (see 1.3) and in the default mode 
network (a network of brain areas that are active when human beings are 
awake but not focused on the outside world). It has been well documented that 
the ventral and dorsal MFC, the PCun, and the posterior lateral cortices have a 
high baseline metabolic activity when individuals are left to think to themselves 
undisturbed. These regions show a decrease in activation during cognitive tasks 
and goal-directed behaviours. Hence, these areas are thought to represent a 
‘default-mode’ of brain function and are characterized by coherent neuronal 
oscillations at a rate lower than 0.1 Hz). 
With respect to the overlap of activation in medial frontal and parietal areas, 
Buckner et al. (2007) conducted a meta-analysis comparing the activation 
networks of tasks concerning future perspectives, episodic memory, ToM, 
navigation, and default mode network, finding that they share similar brain 
regions especially in the MFC and the posterior cingulated cortex. All these 
processes rely on memory systems, because past experiences serve as the 
foundation for alternative perspective taking and thinking about the future. 
Hence, the authors postulated that all these processes are best understood as 
part of a larger class of functions that enables flexible forms of self-projection. 
In a current meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies using activation likelihood 
estimation, Spreng, Mar, and Kim (2009) have shown further correspondences 
between autobiographical memory, prospection, navigation, ToM, and default 
mode. In addition to the regions (the medial-temporal lobes, medial parietal 
regions, and the TPJ) found in the meta-analysis of Buckner at al. (2007), 
Spreng et al. (2009) also found that the lateral prefrontal cortex (which 
potentially serves to maintain and manipulate information held online) and the  Introduction 
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occipital cortex (mental imagery processes) are involved in this common 
network. Furthermore, Spreng et al. (2009) showed that the lateral temporal 
regions are involved in autobiographical memory, prospection, and ToM. The 
authors ascribed this further functional correspondence in the lateral temporal 
regions to involvement of these regions in autobiographical memory, ToM, 
default mode, and prospection. Spreng et al. (2009) found similar neural 
activation patterns for autobiographical memory and ToM in the ventrolateral 
and medial prefrontal cortex, the PCun, posterior cingulate, and retrosplenial 
cortex, the medial-temporal region, the AMG, and regions from the TPJ, down 
the STS, and middle temporal gyrus (MTG) to the temporal poles. Hence the 
authors deduced that autobiographical memory and ToM require meta-
representational abilities and therefore knowledge of the past self in relation to 
the present rememberer. The authors also named evolutionary reasons for 
believing that autobiographical memory and ToM should be functionally bound. 
Additionally, they argued that evolution is driven by social selection pressure 
and that complex social processes needed for social selection like perspective 
taking require the ability to remember specific social encounters and the 
changing social conditions which are mainly part of the autobiographical 
memory. The common neural activation pattern of autobiographical memory 
and ToM were interpreted as evidence that ToM, reasoning and 
autobiographical recollection are engaged during story processing (Spreng et 
al., 2009). Spreng et al. (2009) claimed that the involvement of the medial-
temporal lobe in the core network may reflect mnemonic or relational processes 
and the construction of coherent scenes, events, and mental models. 
In summary a core network including the MFC, medial-temporal lobes, medial 
parietal regions, the TPJ (Buckner et al., 2007), the lateral prefrontal cortex, and 
the occipital cortex (Spreng et al., 2009) were found to be activated in 
autobiographical memory, prospection, navigation, ToM, and default mode. As 
described above, most of these brain areas (the MFC, the TPJ, and the PCC) 
were also found to be activated in social comparison processes (1.1.2) and 
processes including the involvement of the self (1.2.2). 
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1.5 Decision making 
 
In this paragraph decisions in general and their neural substrates (1.5.1) as well 
as decisions under uncertainty (1.5.2) will be described. 
Decision making is the cognitive process of selecting one of two or more 
alternatives on the likelihood and potential value of possible outcomes. Nearly 
all decision making processes end in a final choice like an action or an opinion. 
The decision can either be easy, deciding on what to eat, or difficult, such as 
ethical or moral decisions. Many decisions can have important social 
consequences, while others may have a more limited impact on our everyday 
life. In cases where we have to decide on the basis of what we are actually 
seeing, feeling, hearing etc. we make perceptual decisions. For example: We 
have to decide if a person who comes across is a stranger or our boss and 
connect this decision with an appropriate action like greeting in a very friendly 
manner, just greeting or ignoring. Decisions can be based on the identification 
of the correct response, which is intrinsic to the external situation and is actor-
independent (veridical decision making). On the other hand decisions can be 
actor-centered and guided by the actor’s priorities (adaptive decision making). A 
prediction of the expected outcome or consequence of the decision that is as 
accurate as possible is critical for all kinds of decision making. Optimal 
decisions can be made if all necessary information for the decision is available, 
but many decisions must be made with limited information, which are known as 
decisions under uncertainty (psychology) or with risk (economics).  
In social comparison tasks, no matter whether we compare other persons with 
each other or other persons with ourselves, we give a judgement in one or the 
other direction. This means that we decide that one person has a higher or 
lower value concerning the content of the comparison. While a decision that one 
number is higher than another is definite, the decision that one person is more 
intelligent than another is ambiguous, because normally we do not have an 
exact value for the intelligence of a person. In this case we have to estimate the 
intelligence on the basis of what we know about the person, but we cannot be 
absolutely sure about it. Hence, we decide under uncertainty.  Introduction 
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Schall (2001) supposed a difference between choices and decisions. In Schall’s 
(2001) point of view, people are choosing when someone has to perform an 
action to reach a goal or desire because of being confronted with one or more 
alternatives. Choices refer to the final commitment to one alternative whereas 
decisions refer to the consideration about the alternatives. When confronted 
with familiar alternatives you can choose one of them, but when you are 
confronted with new alternatives you first have to understand them, the 
differences between them and the relations of the alternatives to your own 
goals, desires, and preferences, then you can decide which alternative you 
want. Consequently, decisions require more effort, they take more time, require 
attention and deliberation, and are more error prone than simple choices. 
Rettinger and Hastie (2001) showed that the cover story of a decision making 
experiment influenced both the strategy and mental representations, by 
influencing the information processing that underlies the decision process. The 
authors conducted an experiment in which the same basic decision problem 
was presented with different cover stories (legal traffic tickets, academic course 
grades, stock market investments, and casino gambling). The expected values 
of the decisions were the same in all conditions. The authors defined several 
strategies on self-reports of participants: numerical strategies like numerical 
calculation, avoiding the worst (security), choosing the favourite (high 
aspiration) and narrative strategies like regret-focused, emotion-focused, 
morality-focused, and story construction. The authors showed that numerical 
calculations are used in all four story conditions but the other strategies vary 
systematically, for example morality-focused strategies were used in the legal 
traffic ticket condition but not in the gambling task condition and avoiding the 
worst was mostly used in the gambling condition.  
 
1.5.1 Neural correlates of decision making 
Recent research has delineated a number of brain areas involved in decision 
making processes: the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) (e.g. Kim & 
Shadlen, 1999; Heekeren, Marrett, Bandettini, & Ungerleider, 2004), the MFC 
including ACC (e.g. Manes et al., 2002; Walton, Bannerman, Alterescu &  Introduction 
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Rushworth, 2003; Fellows, 2006; Rushworth, Walton, Kennerley, & Bannerman, 
2004) and the OFC (e.g. Wallis, 2007). 
Goldberg and Podell (1999) explored two different types of decision making in 
healthy individuals and in a variety of brain damaged patients. The first type 
was the so-called veridical decision making condition, in which the subject was 
required to look at a target and make a choice between two alternatives which 
were most similar or different to the target. In this condition the response of the 
subject was unambiguously defined by the target stimulus and the instruction. 
The second type was an adaptive decision making condition. In this condition it 
was up to the subject to make the choice and there was no correct or incorrect 
response. The authors found no differences in the decision making performance 
between patients with frontal lesions and healthy people in the first condition. 
But in the second condition, which required an actor-centered subjective 
selection between two equal options, Goldberg et al. (1999) found a difference 
between normal healthy subjects and patients with damages in the frontal lobe. 
These patients tended to choose the same alternative most of the time, while 
healthy subjects made arbitrary selections, and likewise patients with damages 
in other parts of the brain. The authors claimed that these findings suggest that 
some parts of the brain, especially the left DLPFC, play a crucial role in 
selection processes of equally appropriate alternatives. The activation in the 
DLPFC predicted monkey's (Kim et al., 1999) and human beings' (Heekeren et 
al., 2004) decisions in perceptual decision making tasks. Heekeren, Marret, 
Ruff, Bandettini, and Ungerleider (2006) found an abstract decision making 
network (left posterior DLPFC, left PCC, left inferior parietal lobe (IPL), and left 
fusiform/parahippocampal gyrus) responding more to high- than to low-
coherence stimuli independent of the motor system used to express a 
perceptual decision. The authors speculated that the left posterior DLPFC, 
which showed the greatest differences in activation, is a critical area in this 
decision making network and that this brain area appears to perform a 
comparison of signals from sensory processing areas during perceptual 
decision making processes. Even the decision directions in tasks requiring 
intentional decisions could be decoded from the neural activation of the 
posterior medial prefrontal cortex (Haynes et al., 2007). The DLPFC was also 
found to be involved in other kinds of decisions. Areas in the prefrontal cortex of  Introduction 
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monkeys were claimed to play a key role in optimizing decision-making 
strategies in mixed-strategy games (Barraclough, Conroy, & Lee, 2004). 
Frontopolar cortex and IPL were also activated during exploratory decisions 
(Daw, O'Doherty, Dayan, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006). The right DLPFC showed 
greater activity for low- than high-confidence decisions in episodic retrieval and 
visual perception tasks (Fleck, Daselaar, Dobbins, & Cabeza, 2006). 
Activations in the MFC of human beings and monkeys (Rushworth, 2008), 
especially the ACC, are often found in neuroimaging studies of decision making 
and action selection. The ACC is involved in effective action selection when the 
evaluation of other individuals is important (Rushworth, Buckley, Behrens, 
Walton, & Bannerman, 2007) and it plays a fundamental role in relating actions 
to their consequences (Rushworth et al., 2004). Walton et al. (2003) claimed 
that the ACC is implicated in evaluating how much effort is expended for a 
specific reward. 
In a study with patients with lesions in the OFC, Wallis (2007) suggested that 
the OFC plays a key role in processing rewards. The authors claimed that the 
OFC integrates information from other prefrontal areas regarding the reward 
outcome to generate the valence of a reward. 
In summary, areas in the MFC, OFC, and DLPFC were found activated in many 
different decision making contexts. The involvement of the MFC in decision 
making was also investigated in lesion studies showing that lesions in the 
ventral MFC can be associated with strikingly poor decision making (Eslinger & 
Damasio, 1985; Godefroy & Rousseaux, 1995; Harlow, 1999; Ackerly, 2000; 
Manes et al., 2002; Fellows, 2006). 
 
1.5.2 Decision making under uncertainty 
There are two different kinds of uncertain events. First, decisions are made on 
the basis of judged probabilities of their possible outcomes. Those decisions 
under a varying level of probability are called decisions under risk. Second, 
sometimes the probabilities are uncertain because of missing information. In 
this case decisions are subject to ambiguity/uncertainty. When we compare two 
persons with each other or with ourselves concerning the intelligence, we  Introduction 
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normally do not know an exact value of the intelligence of the other person 
and/or ourselves, and we have to estimate the intelligence on the basis of our 
knowledge about the person. Such a judgement would be a decision under 
uncertainty, thus it would belong to the second category. 
As mentioned in the paragraph above, the MFC has been pointed out as an 
important area in decision making processes. Therefore, decisions under 
uncertainty - as a special kind of decision making process - also involve the 
MFC, and human neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that decision under 
uncertainty evoked increased activation in dorsal MFC as compared to certain 
decisions (Volz, Schubotz, & von Cramon, 2003, 2004; Critchley, Mathias, & 
Dolan, 2001). Critchley et al. (2001) used a “nonface” card game with 0% 
(extreme cards) to 40% (medial cards) uncertainty of outcome, where subjects 
had to decide if the next card has a higher or lower value than the preceding 
one. Volz et al. (2003) used pairs of comic figures and let subjects judge which 
figure would win according to previously learned rules. In such uncertain 
decisions, activation was typically found in the MFC (Volz et al., 2003) and in 
the ACC (Critchley et al., 2001). The activation of the posterior parts of the MFC 
increased with increasing amount of uncertainty independent of the fact that the 
uncertainty is internally and externally attributed (Volz, Schubotz & von Cramon, 
2005). For the internally attributed uncertainty, i.e. uncertainty of knowledge, the 
authors found, additional to the posterior MFC, areas in the inferior frontal 
junction, middle frontal gyrus (MFG), and inferior parietal sulcus (IPS) co-
varying with increasing uncertainty. Patients with lesions in the ACC are 
impaired in behavioural control and the ability to evaluate risks involved in 
seeking rewards (Peru, Pavasi, & Campello, 2004; Walton et al., 2003). Van 
Veen, Cohen, Botvinick, Stenger, and Carter (2001) claimed that ACC is 
involved in the mechanisms that help control and select appropriate behaviours. 
Also or especially in decisions under uncertainty the reward anticipation is a 
crucial process, and the direction of the decision depends on it. Hence again 
the OFC is involved in such decision making processes and its activation occurs 
with and without combination with the ACC. Numerous studies have shown that 
the mOFC and the ACC are critically involved in the process of evaluating and 
choosing between decision options when the outcomes of those decisions are  Introduction 
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unknown or uncertain (Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000, 2003; Elliott, 
Newman, Longe, & Deakin, 2003; Krawczyk, 2002; O’Doherty, Kringelbach, 
Rolls, Hornak, & Andrews, 2001). Critchley et al. (2001) and Walton et al. 
(2003) could show that activity in OFC and ACC increases with increasing 
potential failure of effort associated with a potentially rewarding action. These 
two regions also show an increasing activation when increasing the risk in 
decisions (Cohen, Heller, & Ranganath, 2005). In an fMRI experiment Hsu, 
Bhatt, Adolphs, Tranel, and Camerer (2005) found positive correlations between 
the levels of ambiguity in a card game and the activation in the AMG and the 
OFC. Lesion studies support the hypothesis that the OFC is involved in reward 
anticipation in decision making processes. Patients with lesions or damages in 
the OFC show deficits or impairments in learning optimal decision making 
strategies to avoid long-term monetary losses (Bechara et al., 2000, 2003). 
Rolls (2000, 2004) found that those patients are also impaired in adapting 
decision making behaviour to changes in stimulus-reward contingencies. Based 
on these results, the author argued that the OFC maintains stimulus-reward 
associations. 
In summary primarily areas in the MFC and OFC are found to be activate in 
decision making tasks with different types of uncertainty. Especially the MFC is 
involved in uncertain decisions. Additionally the inferior frontal junction area, the 
MFG, and the IPS were activated in decision making when the uncertainty was 
internally attributed. Dorsal MFC was activated in uncertain decision making 
processes independent of the reason for the uncertainty. Areas in the OFC and 
the ACC are involved in ambiguity of decisions and in learning decision 
strategies. Furthermore, these areas are involved in different kinds of reward 
anticipation in uncertain and certain decisions. 
 
1.6 Imagery of person 
 
Comparing physical characteristics of persons may additionally involve 
imagining the person under comparison. If we have to decide which of two 
persons is taller than the other, we probably imagine the pictures of their bodies  Introduction 
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side by side to estimate the difference. This paragraph provides a short 
overview of mental imagery. 
In everyday life, mental imagery is a frequently occurring phenomenon. Who 
has never imagined being on holiday at a favourite location, sitting behind the 
steering-wheel of a favourite car or spending time with friends? The fact that 
anyone knows and uses the ability to imagine (consciously or unconsciously) is 
expressed in a number of colloquial terms like “seeing in the mind`s eye”, ”to 
see with the inner eye”, “visualisation”, etc. Imagery is not only associated with 
fantasy and the imaginary, but also, and perhaps more importantly, with 
prototypically cognitive functions such as memory, perception, and thought. 
Mental imagery refers to the experience of a perception in the absence of an 
external physical stimulus – it is a quasi-perceptual experience that can take 
place in all sensory modalities. Imagery has best been investigated for the 
visual modality. The processes that are involved in generating, examining, and 
manipulating visual images are usually referred to as visual imagery (Kosslyn, 
1996; Palmer, 1999; Richardson, 1999). Functional similarities between visual 
perception and visual imagery in terms of activation of common cortical regions 
have been demonstrated in brain imaging and psychophysical studies (Roland, 
Eriksson, Stone-Elander, & Widen, 1987; Farah, Peronnet, Gonon, & Giard, 
1988; Goldenberg et al., 1989; Ishai & Sagi, 1997; Mohr, Linder, Linden, Kaiser, 
& Sireteanu, 2009). In an fMRI study O'Craven and Kanwisher (2000) reported 
category-related activation in the fusiform face area (FFA) and in the ventral 
temporal cortex during visual imagery of faces and other objects. In addition to 
face-selective regions, visual imagery of famous faces activated a network of 
brain regions – bilateral calcarine sulcus, hippocampus, PCun, IPS, and the 
inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) – in long-term as well as short-term memory tasks 
(Ishai, Haxby, & Ungerleider, 2002). Focussing on details of the imagined face 
revealed increased activation of IFG. Two additional regions show selective 
activations for specific objects. The parahippocampal place area shows 
category-related activation for places and houses, and the extrastriate body 
area (EBA) is involved in the analysis of body-related information but not in the 
assignment of body identity (Hodzic, Muckli, Singer, & Stirn, 2009).  Introduction 
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Zacks, Gilliam, and Ojemann (2003a) showed in a single subject study that two 
classes of task-specific mental spatial transformation can be distinguished: 
object-based spatial transformation and egocentric perspective transformation 
(Zacks et al., 1999; Zacks, Mires, Tversky, & Hazeltine, 2000; Zacks, Ollinger, 
Sheridan, & Tversky, 2002; Zacks et al., 2003a; Zacks, Vettel, & Michelson, 
2003b). Object-based spatial transformations are imagined movements of 
objects, such as mental rotation. Egocentric perspective transformations are 
imagined changes in one’s viewpoint, such as imagining oneself in the position 
of another person. Electrical stimulation of the right parietal cortex results in 
interference in an object-based transformation task, while the perspective 
transformation task and the control for visual encoding and responding were 
unimpaired by the stimulation. In an fMRI study, Zacks et al. (2003b) found an 
increase of neural activation in the right parietal cortex and a decrease in the 
left parietal cortex in an object transformation task, where subjects had to rotate 
images mentally. On the other hand, the authors found an increase in the left 
temporal cortex in a perspective transformation task, in which subjects had to 
imagine themselves rotating around the array of objects. Additionally to 
secondary visual, premotor, and frontal lobe regions, the left posterior parietal 
lobe was found to be the most significant area in a self-rotation task (Creem et 
al., 2001). 
In summary, visual imagery results in the activation of category-selective visual 
areas (FFA, PPA, and EBA). Additionally, several medial and lateral parietal 
areas were found to be activated in diverse visual imagery tasks and show 
differences in spatial transformation, egocentric perspective transformation, and 
object-based transformation. 
 
1.7 Focus of interest 
 
Regardless of their remarkable psychological importance, little is known about 
the neural substrates of person comparison. This thesis was designed to fill this 
gap and delineate how, on a neural level, person comparisons (social 
comparison processes on specific person characteristics) differ from non- Introduction 
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comparative person judgements. It is still unclear if different types of person 
comparison call on different neural resources. For example, do comparisons on 
physical or psychological dimensions rely on the same neural mechanisms? A 
second principal aim of the experiments underlying this thesis is to find an 
answer to this question. Moreover, we are interested in the involvement of the 
self and its neural substrates in such social comparison tasks. Last but not 
least, the neural basis of decision directions in these social comparison tasks 
are a focus of interest here. 
In the first fMRI study, we investigated the neural correlates of comparative and 
non-comparative judgements on the same person material, where comparative 
judgements were made on both psychological and physical dimensions. In this 
experiment subjects had to give judgements when comparing two other persons 
with each other (Other vs. Other Comparison, referred to as OOC in the further 
text). We expected that the comparative and non-comparative social 
judgements in our tasks required different degrees of mentalizing/perspective 
taking, decisions under different levels of uncertainty, mental imagery, and 
autobiographical memory. Based on the results described earlier, we expect 
differences between comparative and non-comparative judgements in the areas 
of the core network described above and in decision- and imagery-specific 
areas. In addition, we expected ToM areas to be more activated during 
intelligence comparisons because the comparison of psychological 
characteristics (intelligence) involves taking the person’s own perspective into 
account. 
In the second fMRI study, we focused on the comparative judgements when 
subjects had to compare other persons with themselves (Self vs. Other 
Comparison, referred to as SOC in the further text). In this experiment we 
expected differences in the activation patterns between the two dimensions of 
comparative judgements to be similar to the first experiment. 
In the third fMRI study, we compared the SOC and the OOC. Additionally, we 
focused on the differences in the neural pattern of the decision directions. Here 
we expected the neural activation pattern of the MFC to differ in relation to the 
different involvement of the self. We further expected the decision directions to  Introduction 
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show differences in the MFC and the reward anticipation related areas in the 
OFC. 
Further details about the hypotheses of these three experiments are described 
in the short introduction to the experiments. 
  Experiment  1  Introduction 
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2. Experiment 1
1 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In the first fMRI study, we contrasted comparative and non-comparative 
judgements on the same person material, and comparative judgements on 
psychological and physical dimensions. Participants were presented with 
names of two celebrities from sports, politics, entertainment or music. In the 
non-comparative judgement, participants had to decide whether one of the two 
celebrities was a musician (or politician). In the two comparative judgements 
participants were to decide which of the two celebrities was more intelligent and 
which celebrity was taller (Other vs. Other  Comparison - OOC). We 
hypothesized that in comparative person judgement, along with the activation of 
regions representing semantic person knowledge, comparison specific brain 
activities should be found. In addition, the use of both psychological 
(intelligence) and physical (body height) person characteristics in the 
comparison tasks enabled us to probe our hypothesis of different degrees of 
activation of the ToM network with different levels of perspective taking. We 
expected that participants would need to mentalize to a higher degree when 
comparing intelligence rather than body height. As argued above, a comparison 
of psychological characteristics involves taking the persons’ own perspective 
into account, whereas the comparison of physical characteristics can be based 
on evoking mental images of the individuals concerned from long-term memory. 
As a consequence, ToM areas should be more activated during intelligence 
comparisons. Our design thus entailed a comparison task with different degrees 
of perspective taking and a purely semantic non-comparative task as control 
condition. We did not try to include a control condition with a social but non-
                                            
1 Parts of this experiment were published in: Lindner, M., Hundhammer, T., Ciaramidaro, A., 
Linden, D.E. & Mussweiler, T. (2008). The neural substrates of person comparison - An fMRI 
study. Neuroimage, 40(2), 963-971. 
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comparative task (e.g., how intelligent is X?), because comparisons are 
spontaneously engaged even if a person characteristic is judged without 
explicitly asking for comparison (Dunning et al., 1996; Mussweiler et al., 2004).  Experiment  1  Methods 
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2.2 Methods 
 
2.2.1 Participants 
Fourteen healthy male, right-handed participants were recruited from an 
academic environment (mean age 27.93 years, SD 4.67). The Ethics 
Committee of the Medical School of the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University 
approved of the study. Written informed consent was obtained from all 
participants prior to scanning. 
 
2.2.2 Stimuli 
Prior to the first fMRI experiment the surnames of 100 celebrities had been 
tested in a separate study for 100% familiarity on N = 20 male students by the 
research group of Prof. Mussweiler. (This rating was not part of my thesis.) Only 
47 celebrities which were rated as familiar from all students (see Appendix 9.1) 
were made available for the usage as stimuli in this first fMRI experiment.  
A set of 64 pairs of surnames of these 47 celebrities served as stimulus 
material. Pairs of names were presented in white font (font type: Arial, height: 
4.6°) against a black background above and below the centre of the screen. 
The distance between centre of word and centre of screen was 4.4°. The four 
cue stimuli had the same colour and font size. Stimulus presentation and 
recording of response time was controlled by the Presentation 0.9 software 
(Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc.). During scanning, the computer display was 
projected onto a mirror mounted on the head coil. 
 
2.2.3 Procedure 
The two experimental conditions required comparative judgements on 
intelligence or body height. Participants had to decide which of the two persons 
whose name appeared on the screen was more intelligent or taller. In the 
control conditions participants had to indicate whether the stimulus pair included 
the name of a musician/politician. In all three conditions, participants were  Experiment  1  Methods 
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asked to respond as quickly as possible by using a two button fiber-optic 
response box. 
Participants performed the experiment while undergoing fMRI. We used an 
event-related design. In event-related designs, single stimuli or trials are 
presented with an appropriate inter-trial interval (ITI). The ITI is necessary for 
the relaxation of the BOLD signal. Hence, event-related designs allow the 
description of the neural activation patterns which are induced by the single 
trials or stimuli. 
The experiment was divided into two runs of approximately 17 minutes. Each 
run started with a 20 s instruction on key-assignment, followed by 64 trials (16 
per condition) in a pseudo-randomized order. Each trial began with one of four 
cues (see Fig. 3) indicating the task instruction, presented for 1000 ms at the 
centre of the screen. After the cue had disappeared, an “x” was displayed as a 
fixation point for 1000 ms, a pair of stimuli followed for 1000 ms. The ITI was 10 
s (see Figure 3). The experiment was preceded by a training session with eight 
trials serving to familiarize participants with the timing of the task and the 
response box. 
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Figure 3: Paradigm design. Four different tasks containing two experimental conditions (body 
height and intelligence comparison) and two control conditions (musician/politician). Each trial 
began with the presentation of a cue (1000 ms), followed by a fixation point (1000 ms) and a 
pair of stimuli (1000 ms). After 10 s (ITI) a new trial began. In the experimental conditions 
subjects had to decide which person, indicated by the names, was taller or more intelligent. In 
the control condition they had to decide whether a politician or musician was presented. 
 
 
2.2.4 Imaging procedure 
We collected whole-brain MRI data on a 3T TRIO Magnetom (Siemens, 
Erlangen, Germany). We acquired echo-planar imaging data for fMRI using 
standard parameters (field of view, 200 mm; matrix: 64 x 64; 1 volume = 16 
axial slices, 5mm slice thickness; in-plane resolution, 3.128 mm; repetition time 
(TR): 1000 ms, echo time (TE): 30 ms; flip angle: 60°; 1006 volumes per run). 
We synchronized stimulus presentation with the fMRI sequence at the 
beginning of each trial, and acquired four dummy volumes before each run in 
order to reduce possible effects of T1-saturation. To minimize head motion, we  Experiment  1  Methods 
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used fixed head pads. We obtained a T1 weighted 3D anatomical scan (1x1x1 
mm
3 resolution) for each participant. 
 
2.2.5 Data analyses 
We pre-processed and analyzed the fMRI using BrainVoyager
TM QX (Brain 
Innovation, Maastricht, The Netherlands), applying the following pre-processing 
steps: slice-time correction, motion correction, linear trend removal, highpass 
temporal filtering with 3 cycles in time course and spatial smoothing using a 
Gaussian kernel of 8mm full-width at half-maximum. We manually coregistered 
the fMRI data with the anatomical scans. We transformed the 3D anatomical 
scans into Talairach space (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988) and subsequently 
used the parameters for this transformation to transform the coregistered 
functional data. We then re-sampled the 3D functional data set to a voxel size of 
3x3x3 mm
3. 
For the statistical analyses the physiological time course of the BOLD signal 
change of each voxel represents the dependent variable. The variance of the 
BOLD time-course is analyzed in dependence of the stimulation protocol, which 
consists of a set of predictors. Each voxel time course of the BOLD signal 
changes is correlated with a respective reference time course in simple 
correlation maps, measuring similarities between the physiological changes of 
the BOLD signal and the a priori conducted reference function, based on the 
stimulation protocol. 
For the stimulation protocol we defined each of the four conditions of the 
experimental design as a predictor. Owing to technical problems with the fiber-
optic response pad, reaction times were partly recorded by button press, and 
partly by button release. We were consequently unable to define the predictors 
individually in milliseconds, which would be preferable. Hence, we determined 
the length of the predictors by assuming a trial duration of one volume (1s) 
following stimulus onset. All cues and the following fixation points were set as a 
fifth (2 s per event) and the instruction as a sixth predictor (10 s). The remaining 
fixation volumes served as baseline. We convolved the predictors with a two-
gamma hemodynamic response function (HRF) in order to consider for the  Experiment  1  Methods 
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hemodynamic response of the measured BOLD signal (Boynton, Engel, Glover, 
& Heeger, 1996). The typical shape of the two gamma HRF is shown in Figure 
4. 
 
Figure 4: typical shape of a two-gamma hemodynamic response 
function (HRF) 
The principle of computing linear correlations between a set of hypothesis 
driven predictors and physiological signal change represents an application of 
the general linear model (GLM). This kind of application of the GLM and 
respective statistical analyses was introduced by Friston et al. (1995) for the 
first time. GLM turns out to be a statistical analysis that is highly flexible in 
analyzing multi-factorial design by determining the contribution of a defined set 
of predictors to the explanation of the BOLD signal variance. For this reason the 
statistical analysis of the variance of the BOLD signal was based on applying 
multiple regression analysis of the time series of task related functional 
activation. Within multiple regression analyses, a β-value is calculated for each 
predictor, and for each voxel time course. On the basis of these β-values, 
comparisons and contrasts between predictors or sets of predictors were 
calculated. 
Because subjects were treated as fixed effects in the standard GLM analysis, 
the significant results are strictly speaking only valid for the measured and  Experiment  1  Methods 
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analyzed group. For generalization of the obtained fMRI results to the 
population level, a random effects (RFX) analysis has to be performed. In this 
RFX, the sample of subjects is treated as a random selection from the 
population. Hence we computed a whole-brain RFX-GLM for group data from 
28 (2 for each subject) z-normalized volume time courses. 
We implemented comparisons of interest as linear contrasts. To find discrete 
local activation maxima in a large cluster, we identified voxels with minimal p-
values in sub clusters of voxels with p<0.0001. Around that putative activation 
maximum we defined a box with edge lengths of 10 voxels.  
In the second step of analyses we investigated differences between the two 
types of comparison. Therefore we defined all significant voxels of the whole-
brain RFX-GLM as a mask and performed a second RFX-GLM only for the 
masked regions. Here we contrasted the two experimental conditions versus 
the control condition separately and the two comparison conditions against 
each other. 
We used the False Discovery Rate (FDR) for correction of multiple comparisons 
of the whole-brain RFX-GLM as for the masked RFX-GLM. The results of the 
GLMs were then projected on the standard brain of the Montreal Neurological 
Institute (MNI). 
 
  Experiment  1  Results 
 
47 
2.3 Results 
 
2.3.1 Behavioural data 
Reaction times were highest for intelligence comparison 2125 ms (standard 
deviation (SD)=  656), followed by body height comparison 1921 ms (SD= 507) 
and the control condition 1543 ms (SD= 433). Reaction times revealed 
significant condition effects for comparison vs. control conditions (t (13) = 13.13, 
p<.0001), intelligence vs. body height comparison (t (13) = 12.101; p<.0001), 
and intelligence comparison vs. control condition (t (13) = 12.101; p<.0001) (see 
Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: Reaction times: mean reaction times of intelligence comparison (left) 
and body height comparison condition (centre). The reaction times of the two 
control condition were averaged (right). Error bars represent standard 
deviations of means. 
 
  Experiment  1  Results 
 
48 
2.3.2 fMRI data 
We used RFX-GLM for whole-brain and masked RFX-GLM analyses. Maps of 
both RFX-GLM were thresholded at a FDR < .05 and included only clusters 
exceeding a cluster size threshold of 50 voxels. 
2.3.2.1 Whole-brain GLM  
Contrast comparison versus control condition  
The t-map for the contrast between comparison and control condition was 
thresholded at a FDR < .05. Several areas emerged in this contrast with 
significantly higher activation for the comparison condition, including posterior 
portion of the right rostral medial frontal cortex (prMFC), left and right TPJ 
(TPJ), and left and right PCC (see Figure 6 and Table 1). Furthermore, this 
contrast showed a higher activation for comparison in left and right OFC, right 
frontal operculum (FO), left and right posterior hippocampus (pH), left AMG, left 
and right globus pallidus (GP), left MTG, right anterior middle temporal gyrus 
(aMTG), right occipital gyrus (OcG), and left part of substantia nigra (SN). The 
comparison conditions additionally revealed a higher activation of a large 
bilateral cluster in the medial prefrontal cortex including seven discrete local 
maxima. These maxima were left and right anterior paracingulate cortex 
(APCC), two areas in the left prMFC, an area in the anterior portion of the 
rostral medial frontal cortex (arMFC), and two areas in the mOFC. A 
significantly higher activation for the control condition than for comparison was 
only observed in left and right IPL and left MFG. Time course plots of some 
areas are shown in Figure 7. In summary, a network of medial prefrontal, 
parietal, and limbic areas seems to be recruited for comparing person 
characteristics.  Experiment  1  Results 
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Figure 6: (A): Group analysis of whole-brain GLM. Superposition maps (left: left hemisphere; 
right: right hemisphere; Top: lateral view; Bottom: medial view) of the contrast between 
comparison and control condition. Higher activation for comparison is shown in orange and for 
control condition in blue. Effects were only shown if the associated p-value yielded p<0.01 
(corrected for multiple comparisons with FDR). The 3D statistical maps were then projected on 
the folded surface reconstruction of the MNI template brain. Bilateral areas: arMFC, rMFC, TPJ, 
PCC, OFC, pH, mOFC. Left lateralized areas: FO and MTG, (B): Coronal slice showing areas 
which are not projected on folded brains in A (left Amg, bilateral pH, left SN and bilateral GP). 
Additionally a magnification of the activations in the brain stem is presented.  Experiment  1  Results 
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Table 1: Talairach coordinates, Brodmann areas (BA) and statistical details (cluster size, 
averaged t-values, and p-values for the cluster) of whole-brain RFX-GLM for areas with 
significant difference for the contrasts between experimental conditions vs. control conditions 
after correction for multiple comparisons with FDR (α<.05). 
Regions Left/ 
Medial/ 
Right 
Talairach coordinates BA Cluster 
size 
(voxel) 
t(avg) p-value
x                y                 z
Comparison > contol            
medial frontal cortex large bilateral cluster with 8 local maxima    30518   
   - prMFC  L  -11 29 50  8   5.49588  p < 0.01
 L  -12 48 42  9   6.35006  p < 0.01
 R  19 34 45  8/9   4.36786  p < 0.01
   - arMFC  L  -13 56 33  9   5.62926  p < 0.01
   - mOFC  M  0 42 -8  11   6.21955  p < 0.01
 R  2 56 -3  11   5.91280  p < 0.01
   - APCC  R  2 56  22  10   5.37478  p < 0.01
  L  -3 45 18  10   4.99269  p < 0.01
           
prMFC R  17 46 45  8  110 4.03567 p < 0.01
APCC R  2 32  11  10  49 3.94537 p < 0.01
MTG L  -60 -17  -8  21  251 4.11598 p < 0.01
aMTG R  56 -3 -11  21  34 3.91401 p < 0.01
TPJ L  -45 -63 25  39  1328 4.59237 p < 0.01
 R  50 -62 30  39  655 4.12683 p < 0.01
MFG L  -26 20 52  8  13 4.04457 p < 0.01
pH L  -23 -24  -7  35  805 4.31160 p < 0.01
 R  25 -24 -9  35  218 3.95269 p < 0.01
Amg/GP/hippocampal 
head 
 
L 
 
-12 
 
-5 
 
-7 
 
38 1562  4.52466 
 
p < 0.01
GP R  10 -4 -4    767 4.35991 p < 0.01
OFC/FO L  -32 24  -8  11/44  5888 4.61342 p < 0.01
OFC R  32 30 -6  11  3292 4.77588 p < 0.01
SN L  -4 -12  -10    92 3.89671 p < 0.01
medial pulvinar 
nucleus 
 
L 
 
-6 
 
-25 
 
1    35  3.86608  p < 0.01
OcG L  -9 -84 0  17  18 3.88615 p < 0.01
  R  11  -87  2  17  157  4.03777  p < 0.01
PCC  L/R  -1  -52  15  31  13757  5.10908  p < 0.01
            
Control > 
Comparison 
          
IPL  L  -56  -34  33  40  2097  -4.2472  p < 0.01
  R  55  -34  31  40  1900  -4.1284  p < 0.01
MFG  L  -33  36  37  9  65  -3.9477  p < 0.01
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Figure 7: BOLD time courses for all conditions (red=intelligence comparison, blue=body height 
comparison, dark and bright green=control conditions). Top: areas showing significant 
differences in comparison versus control (left pH, left PCC, and left OFC); center and bottom left 
and right: areas showing significant differences in intelligence comparison versus control and in 
intelligence versus body height comparison (center: left APCC, right prMFC, and left TPJ; 
bottom: left arMFC and mOFC); bottom right: left IPL showed significantly higher activation for 
control condition in contrasts intelligence comparison versus control condition and body height 
versus control condition. Error bars indicate the standard errors. 
 
2.3.2.2 Masked RFX-GLM 
In several areas with higher activation for the comparison condition, the time 
courses of the BOLD showed higher peaks in the intelligence than in the body 
height comparison condition (see Figure 7). This indicated that, although some 
neural processes are common to physical and intelligence comparison, the 
latter may draw on additional neural resources. Therefore, in order to examine 
the influence of the two comparison conditions separately, we computed a 
masked GLM including only all significant voxels of the regions of interest (ROI) 
of the whole-brain GLM (see Table 1). For the following contrasts we used a 
statistical threshold at a FDR < .05. 
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Intelligence comparison versus control condition: 
All of the areas showing significant differences in the contrast between 
comparison and control conditions of the whole-brain RFX-GLM also revealed a 
significant difference in the masked RFX-GLM contrast between intelligence 
comparison and control condition. 
 
Body height comparison versus control condition: 
Relative to the control condition, body height comparison yielded a significant 
difference of activation in all areas showing significant differences in the whole-
brain RFX-GLM. A significantly higher activation in the control condition was 
again observed bilaterally in the IPL. 
 
Intelligence versus body height comparison:  
Contrasting intelligence versus body height comparison revealed significant 
differences in activation in most of the areas (entire areas or at least portions of 
them) of the whole-brain RFX-GLM. Significantly higher activation for the 
intelligence comparison was found in most of the areas including left and right 
prMFC, left arMFC, mOFC, left APCC, left PCC, left  MTG, right aMTG, bilateral 
TPJ, left FO, right OFC, left GP, and left and right SN. Only the bilateral IPL 
showed a significantly higher activation for body height comparison in this 
contrast (see Figure 8 and Table 2). As expected, these differences between 
the two comparison conditions included classical ToM areas. 
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Figure 8: Group analysis with masked RFX-GLM. Superposition maps (left: left hemisphere; 
right: right hemisphere; Top: lateral view; Bottom: medial view) with areas of masked GLM 
coloured for significant differences between intelligence and body height comparison. Higher 
activation for intelligence comparison is shown in orange and for body height condition in blue. 
Effects were only shown if the associated p-value yielded p<0.05 (corrected for multiple 
comparisons with FDR). The 3D statistical maps were then projected on the folded surface 
reconstruction of the MNI template brain. Areas: prMFC, arMFC, OFC, mOFC, FO, APCC, 
PCC, TPJ, and IPL. 
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Table 2: Talairach coordinates, Brodmann areas (BA), and p-values of masked RFX-GLM for 
areas that showed a significant difference for the contrasts between intelligence and body 
height comparison. 
Regions Left/ 
Medial/ 
Right 
Talairach coordinates BA Cluster 
size 
(voxel) 
t(avg) p-value
x                y                 z
Comparison 
>Control 
            
medial frontal cortex large bilateral cluster with 6 local maxima    23872    
   - prMFC  L  -10 37 53  8   4.17835  p < 0.01
   - arMFC  L  -9 54 41  9   3.88115  p < 0.01
   - mOFC  M  0 57 4  11   3.59385  p < 0.01
 M  0 41 -9  11   3.13956  p < 0.01
   - APCC  L  -2 56 23  10   4.68213  p < 0.01
     L  -2 45 14  10   4.26309  p < 0.01
           
prMFC R  15 32 51  8  489 3,34104  p < 0.01
 R  14 45 47  8  25 2.80987  P < 0.05
MTG L  -63 -19  -8  21  123 3.10767  p < 0.01
aMTG R  60 -3 -16  21  7 2,94533  p < 0.01
TPJ L  -45 -61 28  39  790 3.57199  p < 0.01
 R  52 -61 29  39  858 3,82617  p < 0.01
FO L  -40 25  -6  44  3350 3,36472  p < 0.01
OFC R  31 30 -8  11  251 3,05594  p < 0.01
 R  45 31 -5  11  156 3,00819  p < 0.01
SN L  -7 -8 -6    154 2,96903  p < 0.05
 R  9 -10 -8    22 2,94409  p < 0.01
 L  -5 -22  -13    89 3,14278  p < 0.01
GP L  -14 -3  -1    10 2,82929  P < 0.05
PCC  L  -3  -52  27  31  2701  3,17537  p < 0.01
              
Control  > 
Comparison 
            
IPL  L  -54  -33  42  7  222  -2,9529  p < 0.01
  R  54  -37  38  7  369  -3,3224  p < 0.01
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2.4 Discussion 
 
The network of brain areas that are active during person comparisons seems to 
differ from that involved in comparisons of non-person stimuli, like numbers, or 
the size and luminance of physical objects (Cohen-Kadosh et al., 2005; Pinel et 
al., 2004), which mainly comprises parietal and dorsolateral prefrontal areas. 
Conversely, the tasks of person comparison discussed here were accompanied 
by activation in several medial frontal, orbitofrontal and limbic areas, and the 
TPJ. The activation of this network was largely driven by the comparison of 
mental characteristics (intelligence), with significantly higher activation for 
intelligence than height comparison in several areas in MFC. As expected, there 
was a striking overlap of the person comparison network and the one commonly 
described for classic ToM tasks. The difference between the activation pattern 
in these person comparison tasks and that observed during size comparisons of 
inanimate objects may at first seem surprising, because both classes of 
comparisons can be conceptualised as judgements of magnitudes (numerical 
values of intelligence quotients or body height in the case of the person 
comparisons). However, both our person comparison tasks differed from 
standard physical and numerical comparison tasks in two main respects. First, 
participants had to draw on their knowledge about the celebrity in question 
because they were unlikely to have specifically thought about their height or 
intelligence beforehand. Second, the participants could not be certain of the 
right answer. We would propose that the second characteristic of the task 
constituted a similarity to other tasks where participants have to make an active 
decision under uncertain conditions, whereas the first contributed to the 
engagement of areas involved in perspective taking and ToM. Several studies 
of decision making processes in ambiguous or otherwise uncertain situations 
have described the activation of several of the medial frontal and orbitofrontal 
areas that were also activated by our comparison tasks, including prMFC, 
arMFC, mOFC, and OFC (Manes et al., 2002; Bechara et al., 2000; Fellows & 
Farah, 2007; Haynes et al., 2007). OFC has traditionally been implicated in 
reward and punishment tasks (Rolls, 1996). Amodio et al. (2006) suggest that 
the OFC guides behaviour in terms of the value of possible outcomes.  Experiment  1  Discussion 
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Considering the processes participants had to engage in when solving the 
comparison tasks, it seems only plausible that areas were activated that 
typically are involved when facts and arguments are generated, retrieved, 
weighed, and integrated. Indeed, process models of comparison (Mussweiler, 
2003) have emphasized that comparison and decision making involve similar 
psychological processes. The brain activation pattern observed here provides 
converging evidence for the procedural similarity between comparison and 
decision making mechanisms. In accordance with our hypothesis, we found 
most of the areas that constitute the classical brain network for ToM tasks to be 
activated during the comparison tasks. These included the TPJ bilaterally, the 
anterior paracingulate, and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (Baron-Cohen et al., 
1999; Berthoz, Armony, Blair, & Dolan, 2002; Brunet et al., 2000; Calarge, 
Andreasen, & O'Leary, 2003; Calder et al., 2002; Castelli, Happe, Frith, & Frith, 
2000; Fletcher et al., 1995; Gallagher et al., 2000; Gallagher, Jack, Roepsdorff, 
& Frith, 2002; McCabe, Houser, Ryan, Smith, & Trouard, 2001; Saxe et al., 
2003; Vogeley et al., 2001; Walter et al., 2004). ToM research so far has 
demonstrated that people are most likely to mentalize in situations where their 
own outcomes depend on other intentional agents (Gallagher et al., 2002; 
Rilling et al., 2004). Our paradigm is different in that person targets are only 
mentioned via their name, without any further behavioural information, no 
interaction is anticipated and there is no direct prompt to try and take their 
perspective or read their minds. The neural evidence for the activation of ToM 
that can be derived from the present study may indicate that automatic 
processes of mentalizing occur in social judgements. Social judgements often 
involve a spontaneous activation of relevant self-knowledge (Dunning et al., 
1996), which in turn has been linked to perspective taking activities (Davis, 
Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). At the same time, 
our findings suggest that there are clear limits to mentalizing: Specifically, 
simple categorization tasks like answering questions about the profession of a 
person do not seem to activate a ToM network. 
We did not find any comparison-specific activation in the region around the 
posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), which is a key component of the 
putative ToM network. Recent research has implicated the pSTS in the 
understanding of intentional actions (Pelphrey, Violy, & McCarthy, 2004;  Experiment  1  Discussion 
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Schultz, Imamizu, Kawato, & Frith, 2004; Saxe, Xiao, Kovacs, Perrett, 
Kanwisher, 2004; Zacks et al., 2001), the interpretation of goal-directed 
movements of a human body (Grosbras & Paus, 2006) and the indirect 
observation of the effects’ actions (Ramnani & Miall, 2004). However, we did 
find activity in TPJ, which seems to be selective for attributions of mental states 
(Saxe et al., 2003; Saxe & Powell, 2006). Damage in TPJ causes selective 
deficits in judging the contents of others’ beliefs (Samson et al., 2004). In a 
study of personal characteristics, Mitchell et al. (2002) found activation in TPJ 
for the person judgements “assertive, energetic, nervous” but not for 
judgements on objects. The reason that we see activation of TPJ, but not STS, 
thus seems to be that participants made attributions of mental states, but there 
was no element of comprehension of goal directed actions where the 
recruitment of pSTS would have been fundamental. 
We found different degrees of activation of the ToM network for comparisons of 
psychological characteristics (intelligence) versus physical characteristics (body 
height). When comparing two persons concerning their intelligence, for 
example, participants have to understand other people’s behaviour in terms of 
their mental states, that is, they have to mentalize. This is the case because 
judgements about psychological characteristics are inherently subjective. The 
intelligence of a person, for example, cannot be read off directly. Rather, it has 
to be inferred from the behaviours and utterances of this person. Conversely, 
comparisons of physical characteristics of a person are more similar to judging 
inanimate objects (Mitchell et al. 2002), and accordingly we found less activity in 
ToM relevant areas in the body height comparison condition, particularly in 
prMFC. The neural network involved in person comparisons thus appears to 
vary flexibly according to the ToM required for the dimension of comparison. 
This finding is also consistent with recent evidence demonstrating that MFC is 
specifically involved in judgements about psychological states (Mitchell, Banaji, 
& Macrae, 2005). 
Our behavioural data can also be tentatively interpreted as being consistent 
with the assumption that person judgements about psychological characteristics 
involve more mentalizing activities. Specifically, the fact that judgements about 
psychological characteristics of others took longer than judgements about their  Experiment  1  Discussion 
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physical characteristics may be attributed to the added cognitive effort that 
mentalizing entails. Clearly, however, a variety of other psychological 
mechanisms may also contribute to this difference in processing time. For 
example, people tend to define psychological characteristics in a self-serving 
manner (Dunning & McElwee, 1995). In the present context, this implies that 
participants may have attributed a particular weight to their own strengths when 
constructing the definition of intelligence that builds the basis for their 
judgements of others. More generally speaking, ascribing a psychological 
characteristic to a person requires sophisticated attribution processes 
concerning the links between behavioural manifestations and potential causes 
(Kelley, 1973). This does not apply to physical characteristics, which can be 
more readily ascertained. As is true for mentalizing, such self-serving 
constructions of the critical characteristic as well as such attribution processes 
require an additional cognitive effort which ultimately leads to longer processing 
times. In light of this ambiguity, our behavioural data should only be interpreted 
in conjunction with the fMRI data. The bilateral IPL was the only region with 
higher activation in the control condition. IPL activity has consistently been 
implicated in semantic categorization, which is the core cognitive process 
required in the control task. However, many of the other areas found in the 
literature for semantic categorization (Devlin et al., 2002; Grossman et al., 2002; 
Koenig et al., 2005) were not differentially activated, probably because the 
comparison tasks, as well, required some degree of semantic categorization. 
The present findings have interesting implications for psychological research on 
social cognition and social judgement. Comparisons on all levels of complexity 
involve similar psychological mechanisms, many researchers assume 
(Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Mussweiler, 2003). The present findings, however, 
suggest that comparison activities may be more multifaceted. First, person and 
non-person comparisons seem to involve different neural activation patterns 
and hence probably different psychological processes. Second, person 
comparisons along psychological vs. physical dimensions involve different 
levels of perspective taking. These findings suggest that a more detailed 
analysis of the psychological mechanisms underlying comparisons may be 
required. In principle, this analysis may lead to one of two conclusions: One 
possibility is that different types of comparison involve the same core  Experiment  1  Discussion 
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mechanism of knowledge activation that has been identified in previous 
research (Mussweiler, 2003), but this mechanism is supplemented by different 
comparison-specific mechanisms such as mentalizing. Alternatively, no such 
common ground may exist, and different psychological processes underlie 
different types of comparison (e.g. person vs. non-person comparisons). 
There are some critical points and problems in this study: 
One possible limitation of the present design is that we did not independently 
manipulate comparison and mentalizing requirements. However, a great deal of 
evidence demonstrates the ubiquity and inevitability of comparison processes in 
social judgements (e.g., Dunning et al., 1996; Gilbert et al., 1995; Mussweiler et 
al., 2004). This suggests that it is impossible to construct a control condition 
requiring mentalizing but no comparison. If two processes cannot be 
dissociated on theoretical grounds, the design chosen here with a graded 
manipulation of the function in question, the mentalizing requirement in person 
comparison, is appropriate and it still allows for isolating the specific effects of 
the manipulated function. This research explored the neural substrates of 
person comparison — one of the most basic psychological tools that are used 
to judge ourselves and others. The considerable overlap between the activated 
areas and the networks commonly observed for ToM (medial prefrontal areas 
and TPJ) and emotion- and value based decision making (OFC, limbic areas) 
was the key finding of this study. Within the limitations of reverse inference 
(Poldrack, 2006), this finding suggests that person comparisons involve 
perspective taking, especially when psychological dimensions are concerned. 
Second, one might argue that we should have used a 2x2 factorial ANOVA to 
analyse the data but despite two experimental and two control conditions, we do 
not have a complete 2x2 design. Even though our design comes very close, it is 
not perfectly factorial, and we decided on performing separate GLMs instead of 
a 2 factorial ANOVA. The contrast of the whole-brain GLM for the comparison 
vs. control conditions yields essentially what would be the main effect of 
comparison in an ANOVA. The situation is slightly more difficult for the „internal 
states“ effect – it was impossible to design a control condition where subjects 
had to make a social judgement without comparison, because our theoretical 
position implies that any social judgement will involve a comparison. We could  Experiment  1  Discussion 
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therefore only assess the ”internal states“ effects in the comparison task, and 
the contrast “intelligence“ vs. “body height” comparison should reveal areas 
whose activity is related to these internal states. 
The third problem is that in spite of pretesting the names of the celebrities from 
the first experiment for 100% familiarity on a comparable sample, nearly all of 
the subjects did not know some of the presented celebrities or only knew them 
by name. In these cases the subjects reported that they had no idea about the 
intelligence and/or the body height of these celebrities. This implicates that our 
predictors include decisions under different conditions and different levels of 
uncertainty than expected with possibly an influence on the results in reducing 
the main and interaction effects because of a higher variance in the data. This 
should be born in mind when generating the stimuli for the further experiments. 
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3. Experiment 2 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The task in the first experiment was to compare two other persons. In our 
everyday life, we do not only compare other persons with each other but more 
often we compare other persons with ourselves. In the second fMRI study, we 
therefore focused on comparative judgements when subjects had to compare 
other persons with themselves (Self vs. Other Comparison - SOC). 
Once more, we used comparative judgements on the same psychological and 
physical dimensions as in the first experiment (intelligence and body height). 
Participants were presented with names of familiar persons from their social 
surroundings. By using persons who were familiar to the participants, we 
intended to reduce the variance of uncertainty in the social judgements that had 
occurred in the first experiment. 
The contents of the social comparison processes in this experiment were the 
same as in the preceding experiment. Hence, we hypothesized that the same 
network of brain areas as in the first experiment should be involved in the 
comparative person judgements and we did not use a semantic control 
condition here. 
We expected the activation of the ToM network with different levels of 
perspective taking to differ in the same way in the comparison tasks for 
psychological (intelligence) and physical (body height) person characteristics as 
in the first experiment. 
Different combinations of regions of the MFC with other areas in the brain (TPJ, 
Ins, NAcc, AMG) are involved in tasks requiring first-person perspective, self-
other comparison and self-descriptiveness (see Northoff et al. 2006). While the 
more dorsal parts of the MFC were activated in processes of reappraisal and 
evaluation of self-related stimuli, the more ventral parts of the MFC were 
involved in coding the self-relatedness of stimuli and the posterior parts of the  Experiment  2  Introduction 
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MFC are involved in tasks including self-referential stimuli (Northoff et al., 
2006). Therefore, in contrast to the first experiment we expected additional and 
different activation patterns especially in the dorsal MFC because the self is 
involved in different ways in the two tasks. 
Furthermore we are interested in the neural correlates of the decision 
directions. What activation differences occur when we judge ourselves to be 
more or less intelligent? These kinds of social decision influence our emotions, 
depending on our relation to the person we compare ourselves with and 
depending on the direction and the degree of the differences in intelligence. 
Hence, we expect differences in emotion-related areas (AMG and limbic 
structures), in the ventral MFC which is involved in emotional perspective 
taking, sympathy, emotional empathy (Gallagher et al., 2003) and social 
emotions (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007). Additionally, differences in the OFC 
which integrates information from other prefrontal areas regarding the reward 
outcome to generate the valence of a reward (Wallis, 2007) could be expected. 
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3.2 Methods 
 
3.2.1 Participants 
Fifteen healthy right-handed participants (9 male, 6 female) were recruited from 
an academic environment (mean age 29.73 years, SD 5.91, range: 23 – 39 
years). The Ethics Committee of the Medical School of the Johann Wolfgang 
Goethe University approved of the study. Written informed consent was 
obtained from all participants prior to scanning. 
 
3.2.2 Stimuli 
Prior to the experiment the participants had to compile a list of 40 names (first 
names and surnames) of persons they knew themselves. The minimum 
requirement for putting a name on the list was at least three face-to-face 
encounters with the respective person. These names served as stimulus 
material for the following fMRI-experiment. They were presented in white font 
(font type: Arial, height: 4.6°) against a black background in the centre of the 
screen. The cues indicating the task procedure had the same colour and font 
size. Stimulus presentation and recording of response time was controlled by 
the Presentation 10.3 software (Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc.). During 
scanning, the computer display was projected onto a mirror mounted on the 
head coil. 
 
3.2.3 Procedure 
The two experimental conditions again required comparative judgements on 
intelligence or body height, in analogy to the first experiment. 
While subjects had to compare two other Persons indicated by their names in 
the first experiment, in the second experiment subjects had to compare 
themselves with another person indicated by their name (SOC). This means 
that they had to decide if the person whose name appeared on the screen or 
the participant himself/herself was more intelligent or taller. Participants were  Experiment  2  Methods 
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asked to respond as quickly as possible by using a two button fiber-optic 
response box. 
Participants performed the experiment while undergoing fMRI. The experiment 
was divided into four runs of approximately 7 minutes containing 20 trials (10 
per condition) in a pseudo-randomized order. Each trial began with one of two 
cues (see Figure 9) indicating the task instruction, presented for 1500 ms at the 
centre of the screen. After the cue had disappeared, a “+” was displayed for 
1500 ms as a fixation point, followed by a stimulus appearing for 1000 ms. The 
ITI was jittered between 9 and 12 s (see Figure 9). 
 
 
Figure 9: Paradigm design. Two different experimental conditions (body height and intelligence 
comparison). Each trial began with the presentation of a cue (1500 ms), followed by a fixation 
point (1500 ms) and a stimulus (1500 ms). After a jittered inter trial interval (ITI) between 9 and 
12s a new trial began. The subjects had to decide if the other person, indicated by the names, 
or themselves was taller or more intelligent.  
 
3.2.4 Imaging procedure 
We collected whole-brain MRI data on a 3T ALLEGRA Magnetom (Siemens, 
Erlangen, Germany). We acquired echo-planar imaging data for fMRI using 
standard parameters (field of view, 210 mm; matrix: 64 x 64; 1 volume = 27 
axial slices, 3mm slice thickness; in-plane resolution, 3.3 mm; TR: 1500 ms, TE: 
30 ms; flip angle: 90°; 258 volumes per run). We synchronized stimulus  Experiment  2  Methods 
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presentation with the fMRI sequence at the beginning of each trial. We acquired 
four dummy volumes before each run in order to reduce possible effects of T1-
saturation. To minimize head motion, we used fixed head pads. We obtained a 
T1 weighted 3D anatomical scan (1x1x1 mm
3 resolution) for each participant. 
 
3.2.5 Data analyses 
We pre-processed and analyzed the fMRI data using BrainVoyager
TM QX (Brain 
Innovation, Maastricht, The Netherlands). We applied the following pre-
processing steps: slice-time correction, motion correction, and linear trend 
removal. For the highpass temporal filtering we used individual adjusted number 
of cycles in time course. The frequency obtained as the inverse of the time 
interval is that of the fundamental mode of the slowest BOLD-response 
(maximal distance between two neighbouring trials of the same condition in the 
run) in a given fMRI-experiment. This frequency must be preserved upon high-
pass filtering. Therefore the high-pass frequency has to chosen well below (see 
equation 1). This allowed us to filter out only the lower frequencies of the signal 
that are definitely not generated by the predictors. 
 
 
 
 
max_dist = maximal distance (in volume) between 
two neighbouring trials (j and j+1) of the same 
condition/predictors i in the run 
Equation 1: Calculation of the optimal number of cycles in time course for 
temporal high-pass filtering. 
Additionally we performed spatial smoothing using a Gaussian kernel of 8mm 
full-width at half-maximum. We manually coregistered the fMRI data with the 
anatomical scans. We transformed the 3D anatomical scans into Talairach 
space (Talairach et al., 1988) and subsequently used the parameters for this 
transformation to transform the coregistered functional data. We then 
           number of volumes per run 
                  max_dist 
cycles in time course  = 
            2  
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resampled the 3D functional data set to a voxel size of 3x3x3 mm
3. We defined 
each of the two experimental conditions of the experimental design as a 
predictor, using the individual reaction times of the trials following stimulus 
onset for defining the predictor. All cues and the following fixation points were 
defined as a third predictor (3 s per event). The remaining fixation volumes 
served as baseline. Again, we convolved the predictors with a two-gamma HRF 
(Boynton et al., 1996). 
In a first analysis we calculated a whole-brain RFX-GLM, using the FDR for 
correction of multiple comparisons and implemented comparisons of interest as 
linear contrast. 
In a second analysis we once more performed a masked RFX-GLM using the 
same mask from experiment 1 including only the significant v o x e l s  o f  t h e  
contrast between comparison conditions and the control conditions from the 
whole-brain RFX-GLM of experiment 1. We used the FDR for correction of 
multiple comparisons and implemented comparisons of interest as linear 
contrast. To find discrete local activation maxima in a large cluster we identified 
voxels with minimal p-values in sub clusters of voxels with p<0.0001. Around 
that putative activation maximum we defined a box with edge lengths of 10 
voxels. 
Afterwards we divided the intelligence and the body height predictor each into 
two separate predictors concerning the decision direction of the subjects 
(intelligence: myself>other and other>myself; body height: myself>other and 
other>myself). The cue predictor remained unchanged. With the new design we 
performed ROI-RFX-GLMs for each significant area from the previous whole-
brain and masked RFX-GLM separately. 
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3.3 Results 
 
3.3.1 Behavioural data 
Reaction times were longer for intelligence comparisons (myself>others: 3502 
ms, SD= 851; others>myself: 3633 ms, SD= 881) than for body height 
comparisons (myself>others: 3248 ms, SD= 858; others>myself: 3343 ms, SD= 
1006) (see Figure 10). We performed a 2x2 factorial ANOVA with the first factor 
"type of comparison" (intelligence and body height) and the second factor 
"direction of decision" (myself>others and others>myself). Reaction time 
revealed a significant main effect for the type of comparison (F(1,14)= 4.611, 
p<0.05). Reaction times did not show a significant main effect for the second 
factor (F(1,14)= 0.805, p= 0.38), and no significant interaction (F(1,14)= 0.024, 
p= 0.87). 
Subjects rated themselves more often as more intelligent (55.17%) or taller 
(52.83%) than the other person (see Figure 11). Regardless of these descriptive 
differences a 2x2 ANOVA showed neither significant main effects (type of 
comparison (F(1,14)= 1.672, p= 0.217); direction of decision (F(1,14)= 1.173, 
p=0.297)), nor a significant interaction (F(1,14)= 0.091, p= 0.767). 
 
Figure 10: Reaction times for the two types of comparison (red: intelligence; green: 
body height) and the two directions of decision (dark: myself>others; bright: 
others>myself). Error bars represent standard deviations of means.  Experiment  2  Results 
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Figure 11: Occurrence of decision direction for the two types of comparison (red: 
intelligence; green: body height) and the two directions of decision (dark: 
myself>others; bright: others>myself). Blue parts show the amount of misses, 
which are less than 3% in both conditions. 
 
3.3.2 fMRI data 
We used whole brain RFX-GLM, masked RFX-GLM (including significant areas 
from the contrast between comparison and control condition from experiment 1) 
and ROI analyses. Maps of both RFX-GLM were thresholded at a FDR < .05 
and included only clusters exceeding a cluster size threshold of 50 voxels. 
 
3.3.2.1 Whole-brain RFX-GLM 
Contrast intelligence comparison versus body height comparison 
The t-map for the contrast between the two comparison conditions was 
thresholded at a FDR < .05. Results are shown in Figure 12 and Table 3. A 
medial frontal cluster emerged in this contrast with significantly higher activation 
for the intelligence comparison condition, including discrete local maxima in left 
arMFC, APCC, ACC, and mOFC. OFC/FO, PCC, and MTG also showed a 
higher activation for the intelligence comparison than for the body height 
comparison.  Experiment  2  Results 
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We observed a significantly higher activation for the body height comparison 
condition in bilateral MFG, bilateral superior frontal gyrus (SFG), left inferior 
frontal gyrus (IFG), right inferior temporal gyrus (ITG), right Ins, medial 
supplementary motor area (SMA), right fusiform gyrus, and an anterior portion 
of right ventromedial OcG. Additionally, two parietal clusters revealed higher 
activation for the body height comparison. The left parietal cluster included 
three local maxima, i.e. two areas in lateral superior parietal lobe (SPL) and 
PCun. Three areas in the right SPL and an area in the IPL were local maxima in 
the larger right parietal cluster. 
In sum, a network of parietal and lateral frontal areas seems to be recruited in 
self comparison tasks while performing body height comparisons, whereas the 
intelligence comparison task activates medial frontal and parietal areas. 
 
Figure 12: Group analysis with whole-brain RFX-GLM. Superposition maps (left: left 
hemisphere; right: right hemisphere; Top: lateral view; Bottom: medial view) of the contrast 
between intelligence and body height comparison. Higher activation for intelligence comparison 
is shown in orange (areas: left MTG, PCC, right OFC/FO, and a huge medial frontal cluster with 
local maxima in left arMFC, ACC, APCC, and mOFC) and for body height comparison in blue 
(areas: bilateral MFG and SFG, right ITG, right OcG, and two parietal clusters – right cluster 
includes maxima in PCun and two areas in lateral SPL – left cluster includes IPL and three 
areas in SPL.). Effects were only shown if the associated p-value yielded p<0.01 (corrected for 
multiple comparisons with FDR). The 3D statistical maps were then projected on the folded 
surface reconstruction of the MNI template brain.  Experiment  2  Results 
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Table 3: Talairach coordinates (centre of ROIs), Brodmann areas (BA), and statistical details 
(cluster size and averaged t- and p-values for the cluster) of whole-brain RFX-GLM for areas 
that showed a significant difference for the contrasts between intelligence and body height 
comparison after correction for multiple comparisons with FDR (α<.05). 
Regions Left/ 
Medial/ 
Right 
Talairach coordinates BA Cluster 
size 
(voxel) 
t(avg) p-value
x                y                 z
intelligence > 
body height 
comparison 
              
medial frontal cluster with 5 local maxima     5023   
   - arMFC  L  -5 53 39  9   4.5523  p < 0.001
   - ACC  M  0 46 29  10   4.4055  p < 0.001
     R  2 40 13  10   4.4633  p < 0.001
   - APCC  M  0 56 23  10   4.5667  p < 0.001
   - mOFC  M  0 55  7  11   4.4010  p < 0.001
PCC  M  0  -61  22  31  779  5.3648  p < 0.001
arMFC  M  0 32 31  10  217  4.8644  p  <  0.001
OFC  R  39  26  -5  47  245  5.4448  p < 0.001
  L  -63 -13 -11  47  105  5.1357  p  <  0.001
            
body height > 
intelligence 
comparison 
          
left parietal cluster with 3 local maxima      6394   
   - SPL  L  -27  -63  38  7    -5.3660  p < 0.001
  L  -43 -49  45 7    -5.2785  p  <  0.001
   - PCun  L  -20  -69  20  31    -4.5423  p < 0.001
right parietal cluster with 4 local maxima      12355   
   - SPL  R  15  -67  43  7    -5.3260  p < 0.001
  R  36 -55  50 7    -5.6459  p  <  0.001
  R  28 -66  43 7    -4.7912  p  <  0.001
   - IPL  R  51  -43  43  40    -5.1889  p < 0.001
IPL  R  36  -37  28  40  135  -5.0219  p < 0.001
IPL  R  66  -40  25  40  177  -4,8831  p < 0.001
PCun  L  -9  -73  40  31  344  -5.3206  p < 0.001
SMA  M  3 -13  58 4  78  -4.4800  p  <  0.001
SFG  L  -21 -10  64 6  1279  -5.7156  p  <  0.001
  R  27  -4  52  6  1008  -5.5354  p < 0.001
FG  R  45 -43 -14  37  3107  -8.6443  p  <  0.001
OcG  R  15  -40  -8  37  139  -5.9025  p < 0.001
MFG  L  -36 35 28  9  1256  -5.6050  p  <  0.001
  R  42 35 22  9  1435  -6.8654  p  <  0.001
IFG  L  -36  5  22  9  126  -5.3712  p < 0.001
Ins  R  30  -10  13  13  56  -4.7422  p < 0.001
White matter  L  -24  -13  -37  -  170  -5.9590  p < 0.001
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3.3.2.2 Masked RFX-GLM 
Contrast intelligence comparison versus body height comparison 
We did not apply a control condition in this second experiment, hence  we were 
not able to show comparison specific areas with a contrast between the 
comparison and a control condition as we had done in the first experiment. 
Therefore, we examined the comparison specific areas we had found in 
experiment 1 using the same mask for this masked RFX-GLM. In this masked 
RFX-GLM, the contrast between the two comparison conditions (intelligence 
and body height comparison) revealed significant differences in almost all of the 
areas differing in the first experiment, too. Time course of BOLD signal showed 
higher peaks for intelligence comparison in left prMFC, APCC, PCC, left MTG, 
left FO, and right OFC. Again, a huge cluster in the medial prefrontal cortex 
showed higher activation for intelligence comparison including 5 local maxima in 
left arMFC, medial prMFC, ACC, APCC, and mOFC. In analogy to the first 
experiment, bilateral IPL and left MFG revealed a significantly higher activation 
for the body height comparison than for the intelligence comparison (see Figure 
13 and Table 4). 
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Figure 13: Group analysis with masked RFX-GLM. Superposition maps (left: left hemisphere; 
right: right hemisphere; top: lateral view; bottom: medial view) of the contrast between 
intelligence and body height comparison. Higher activation for intelligence comparison is shown 
in orange and for body height comparison in blue. Effects were only shown if the associated p-
value yielded p<0.01 (corrected for multiple comparisons with FDR). The 3D statistical maps 
were then projected on the folded surface reconstruction of the MNI template brain. Areas: left 
prMFC, APCC, PCC, left MTG, left FO, right OFC, bilateral IPL, and left MFG. Medial frontal 
cluster with local maxima in left arMFC, medial prMFC, ACC, APCC, and mOFC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Experiment  2  Results 
73 
Table 4: Talairach coordinates (centre of ROIs), Brodmann areas (BA), and statistical details 
(cluster size and averaged t- and p-values for the cluster) of masked RFX-GLM for areas that 
showed a significant difference for the contrasts between intelligence and body height 
comparison after correction for multiple comparisons with FDR (α<.05). 
Regions Left/ 
Medial/ 
Right 
Talairach coordinates BA Cluster 
size 
(voxel) 
t(avg) p-value
x                y                 z
intelligence > 
body height 
comparison 
              
medial frontal cortex large bilateral cluster with 5 local maxima   15515     
   - prMFC  M  -1 30 35  9   3.49059  p < 0.01
   - arMFC  L  -6 54 31  9   4.77017  p < 0.01
   - ACC  M  0 44  27  10   4.05574  p < 0.01
   - APCC  R  0 56  23  10   4.38284  p < 0.01
   - mOFC  M  0 55 6  11   3.41264  p < 0.01
           
 prMFC  L  -16 34 55  8 98  3.00322  p < 0.01
APCC M  0 35  12  10  25 3.09399  p < 0.01
MTG L  -60 -15 -10  21  138 3.78945  p < 0.01
FO L  -39 25  -3  44  457 3.25151  p < 0.01
OFC/FO R 39 27 -8  11/44  1151 4.15601  p < 0.01
PCC  M  -2  -56  23  31  1577  3.47120  p < 0.01
              
body height > 
intelligence 
comparison 
            
IPL  L  -54  -35  35  40  2056  -3.2964  p < 0.01
  R  56  -37  33  40  783  -3.7638  p < 0.01
MFG  L  -34  37  35  9  107  -3.4403  p < 0.01
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3.3.2.3 ROI GLMs 
Neither in the whole-brain nor in the masked RFX-GLMs did we find any 
specific areas showing significant differences between the two decision 
directions after surviving the correction of multiple comparisons. Hence, we 
performed fixed effects (FX) ROI GLMs for the contrast between the decisions 
“myself>others” and “others>myself” for each comparison type separately for 
the ROIs of the whole brain RFX-GLM and the masked RFX-GLM. 
 
ROI-GLMs of whole-brain RFX-GLM - Contrast between decision directions 
Two FX-ROI-GLMs for the two comparison types were performed on areas 
showing significant differences in the whole-brain RFX-GLM. For the 
intelligence comparison the contrast between the two decision directions 
revealed a significantly higher activationin ACC, left arMFC, PCC, left PCun, 
right SPL, right IPL, right SFG, and right Ins. The decision direction of body 
height comparison revealed a significantly higher neural activation in left and 
right SPL, right ITG, left SFG, and right MFG. The brain areas left arMFC, 
mOFC, right SPL, and right IPL showed significant differences between the 
decision directions in both intelligence and body height comparisons (see Table 
5). The decision for rating oneself as more intelligent than another person 
entailed higher activations in all the areas showing significant differences 
between the decision directions. While in the body height comparison only the 
areas found to be more activated for intelligence comparison entailed higher 
activation for the decision direction myself>others, the areas found to be more 
activated for body height comparison in general entailed a higher activation for 
the decision direction others>myself. 
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Table 5: Talairach coordinates (centre of ROIs) and cluster size of ROIs showing significant 
differences for the contrast between the direction of decisions (myself > others and others > 
myself) in intelligence and/or body height comparison of areas of the whole-brain RFX-GLM 
after correction for multiple comparisons with FDR (α<.05). 
Regions Left/ 
Medial/ 
Right 
Talairach coordinates Cluster
size 
(voxel) 
t- and p-values for contrast
(myself>others) vs. (others>myself) 
t-value (+)            t-value (-) 
   x y  z  Intelligence Body  Height
intelligence > 
body height 
comparison 
              
medial frontal cluster with 5 local maxima     5023   
   - arMFC  L  -5 53  39     1.975;  p < .05  3.182;  p < .01
   - ACC  M  0 46  29     -  -
     R  2 40  13     2.653;  p < .01  -
   - APCC  M  0 56  23     -  -
   - mOFC  M  0 55  7     1.980;  p < .05  2.298;  p < .05
PCC  M  0  -61  22    779  2.935;  p < .01  -
arMFC  M  0  32  31    217  4.070;  p < .01  -
OFC R  39  26  -5    245  - -
 L  -63  -13  -11    105  -  -
              
body height > 
intelligence 
comparison 
            
left parietal cluster with 3 local maxima      6394   
   - SPL  L  -27  -61  38      -  -
  L  -43  -51  45      -  -2.684; p < .01
   - PCun  L  -20  -69  20      2.634; p < .01  -
right parietal cluster with 4 local maxima      12355   
   - SPL  R  15  -67  43      3.072; p < .01  -
  R  36  -55  50      3.193; p < .01  -2.320; p < .05
  R  28  -66  43      -  -2.417; p < .05
   - IPL  R  51  -43  43      2.049; p < .05  -2.250; p < .05
IPL R  36  -37  28    135  -  -
IPL  R  66  -40  25    177  2.283; p < .05  -
PCun  L  -9  -73  40    344  -  -2.383; p < .05
SMA  M  3  -13  58    78  5.745; p < .01  -
SFG  L  -21  -10  64    1279  -  -4.050; p < .01
  R  27  -4  52    1008  2.121; p < .05  -
FG R  45  -43  -14    3107  -  -
OcG R  15  -40  -8    139  - -
MFG L  -36  35  28    1256  - -
  R  42  35  22    1435  -  -3.082; p < .01
IFG L  -36  5  22    126  -  -
Ins  R  30  -10  13    56  3.474; p < .01  -
White matter  L  -24  -13  -37    170  -  -
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ROI-GLMs of masked RFX-GLM - Contrast between decision directions 
In the FX-ROI-GLM for the areas of the masked RFX-GLM, significant 
differences between the decision directions for the intelligence comparison 
condition only were found in PCC, medial arMFC, and right IPL. For body height 
comparison, we could find significant differences between the decision 
directions only in the left IPL. In mOFC and left arMFC we found significant 
differences between the two directions of decision for intelligence comparison 
as well as for body height comparison (see Table 6). In the ROI-GLMs of the 
masked RFX-GLMs again all areas showing significant differences for 
intelligence comparison revealed a higher activation for the decision 
myself>others. While in the body height comparison only the areas showing a 
significant difference for both comparison types also revealed a higher 
activation for decision myself>others, the areas in left IPL entailed a higher 
activation for the decision direction others>myself. BOLD time course plots are 
shown for all areas with significant differences in these ROI-GLMs in Figure 14. 
 
Table 6: Talairach coordinates (centre of ROIs) and clustersize of ROIs showing significant 
differences for the contrast between the direction of decisions (myself > others and others > 
myself) in intelligence and/or body height comparison of areas of the masked RFX-GLM after 
correction for multiple comparisons with FDR (α<.05). 
Regions Left/ 
Medial/ 
Right 
Talairach ccordinates Cluster
size 
(voxel) 
 
t- and p-values for contrast
(myself>other) vs. (other>myself) 
t-value (+)            t-value (-) 
   x y z 
 
Intelligence Body  height
                
mOFC  M  0  52  3  527    2.071;  p < .05  2.052;  p < .05
PCC  M  -2  -56  23  1577    3.030;  p < .05  -
arMFC  M  -1  30  33  720    4 319; p < .01  -
  L  -16  30  54  119    -  1.980; p < .05
IPL  L  -54  -35  35  2056    -  -2.382; p < .05
  R  56  -37  33  1550    3.320; p < .05  -
MFG  L  -34  37  35  107    2.491; p < .05  -
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Figure 14: BOLD time courses for the two conditions and for both decision directions (dark red 
= intelligence comparison: myself>others, bright red = intelligence comparison: other>myself, 
dark green = body height comparison: myself>other, bright green = body height comparison: 
other>myself). Top: Areas showing significant differences in intelligence comparison between 
the decision directions myself>other and other>myself (arMFC, PCC, and mOFC); Bottom left: 
area showing significant differences in intelligence and body height comparison between the 
decision directions myself>other and other>myself (left MFG); Bottom right: left IPL showed 
significant differences only in body height comparison between the two decision directions. 
Error bars indicate the standard errors. 
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3.4 Discussion 
 
3.4.1 Physical vs. psychological person comparison 
This second experiment investigated whether the comparison between the self 
and another person recruit two distinct networks of brain activation for the 
comparative judgements on the psychological and physical dimensions 
(intelligence and body height) similar to the first experiment. 
The whole brain RFX-GLM revealed a large fronto-parietal network (including 
SPL, IPL, PCun, ITG, OcG, SFG, and MFG) for body height comparison. In 
contrast, the Intelligence comparison activated more left MTG, PCC, arMFC, 
ACC, OFC, and mOFC. 
Analogous to the first experiment, the network of brain areas which are involved 
in the comparison of the psychological dimension shows a striking overlap with 
areas described in ToM and perspective taking, especially ACC and PCC. 
Hence, we proposed that the social comparison tasks also require decision 
making under uncertainty, because an objective criterion to estimate the 
intelligence is missing. The participants had to draw on their knowledge about 
the respective person in their social environment because it was unlikely they 
would have specifically thought about their body height or intelligence 
beforehand and they could not be certain of the right answer. The areas we 
found in our comparison tasks in the medial frontal and orbitofrontal areas 
(prMFC, arMFC, mOFC, and OFC) are also found in decision making processes 
in ambiguous or otherwise uncertain situations (Manes et al., 2002; Bechara et 
al., 2000; Fellows et al., 2007). 
The MFC plays an important role in social comparison and self-related 
processes, it is considered to be associated with first-person perspective 
(Vogeley et al., 2003), serving the integration of social information and handling 
neural input from the dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex, the STS, the tempoparietal 
junction (Huey et al., 2006), person based knowledge (e.g., Mason et al., 2004; 
Mitchell et al., 2002), psychological trait judgements (Kircher et al., 2000), and 
self-relevant judgements (Macrae et al., 2004). The dorsal part of the MFC is 
involved in trait inferences of unfamiliar others especially in tasks requiring  Experiment  2  Discussion 
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judgements on enduring traits of actors based on single trait words, sentences, 
and short stories, whereas the ventral part of MFC is involved in self-reference 
and trait inferences about close others (familiar people like relatives or friends) 
and the self. The ventral MFC was also found to be involved in evaluative 
judgements of famous names (Van Overwalle, 2009). A Network including 
MFC, ACC, and PCun has been associated with self-processing (Northoff et al., 
2004) and social cognition (Schilbach et al., 2006). Furthermore, regions of the 
MFC are engaged in self-referential processes, which are suggested to be 
functionally dissociable from other forms of semantic processing within the 
human brain (Kelley et al., 2002). Given that the comparisons of psychological 
person characteristics included self-references and trait inferences about 
familiar others and the self, our results suggest that the activation of the ACC 
and the dorsal regions of the MFC (arMFC and prMFC) are related to these 
processes. 
The involvement of the OFC and mOFC in the intelligence comparison condition 
can be explained by the postulated involvement of similar psychological 
processes of comparison and decision making (Mussweiler, 2003) and by the 
recruitment of the OFC in reward calculation processes in social comparison 
together with ventral striatum (Fliessbach et al., 2007), in reward and 
punishment tasks (Rolls, 1996), and in guiding one's behaviour in terms of the 
value of possible outcomes (Amodio et al., 2006). In their fMRI study, Hare, 
O’Doherty, Camerer, Schultz, and Rangel (2008) showed that the OFC and the 
mOFC are recruited in different value-related processes in economic decisions. 
Goal values are correlated with activity in the mOFC, whereas decision values 
are correlated with activity in the central OFC. The ventral striatum was found 
(to be active) in tasks with prediction errors. Considering the processes 
participants had to engage in when solving the comparison tasks, it seems 
plausible that areas were activated which are typically involved when facts and 
arguments are generated, retrieved, weighted and integrated. 
Prior to making a decision in a social comparison, it can be helpful to generate a 
mental image of the compared person, for being certain about the other person 
independent of the comparison type. On the one hand, in the intelligence 
comparison task this mental image serves no further purpose regarding the  Experiment  2  Discussion 
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retrieval of specific information needed to estimate the intelligence as the basis 
of this kind of social judgements. On the other hand, in the body height 
comparison the mental image of the other person and perhaps a mental image 
of oneself represents the basis for deciding on differences in physical person 
characteristics and it therefore has to be much more intensive, and more 
detailed involving more imagery specific areas. The network (SPL, IPL, PCun, 
ITG, FG, OcG, SFG, and MFG), which we found for the comparison of physical 
person characteristics, includes areas of the classical fronto-parietal network of 
attention (see Posner & Petersen, 1990) as well as of ventral and dorsal visual 
stream which are evidently activated in visual imagery tasks, too (e.g. Lamm, 
Windischberger, Leodolter, Moser, & Bauer, 2001; Newman, Lee, & Bates, 
2007). The results of the study from Lamm et al. (2001), in which single-trial 
fMRI and event-related slow cortical potentials were used to achieve a relatively 
high spatial and temporal resolution, showed that the human lateral and medial 
premotor cortex (BA 6), the parietal cortex (BA 7), the occipital cortex (BA 
18/19), the DLPFC (BA 9), and the anterior Ins cortex are activated in relation to 
the task at hand approximately 550-650 ms after stimulus presentation in a 
dynamic visuospatial imagery task. These areas are quite similar to our own 
findings. Newman et al. (2007) investigated the neural differences and 
similarities of mental rotation and mental object inspection. While object 
inspection involved the inferior frontal cortex (BA 47), the left superior frontal 
cortex, right cerebellum, and the medial occipital cortex to a higher extent than 
mental rotation, mental rotation rather more involved inferior parietal and the 
intraparietal sulcal regions), bilateral occipital and temporal regions, the right 
prefrontal cortex, and premotor cortex as compared to object inspection 
(Newman et al., 2007). The authors found significant overlaps between object 
inspection and mental rotation in bilateral visual processing regions (both 
primary and secondary visual cortex) extending into the ITG, in a small region of 
the left parietal cortex, and in a region of the left frontal cortex. Knauff, Mulack, 
Kassubek, Salih, and Greenlee (2002) found a higher activation for relational 
visual imagery tasks than in conditional imagery tasks in the areas of the medial 
frontal gyrus (BA6), the superior parietal gyrus, the PCun, the inferior parietal 
cortex (BA 40), and the extrastriate cortex (BA 19), corresponding to most of the 
areas we found activated in the body height comparison. Wide areas of the SPL  Experiment  2  Discussion 
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are involved in coordinate and categorical judgements in spatial imagery with 
lateralisation to the left hemisphere for categorical tasks and to the right for 
coordinate tasks (Trojano et al., 2002). Furthermore, the SPL is involved in 2D 
and 3D mental rotations showing a lateralization to the right SPL for 3D mental 
rotation (Kawamichi, Kikuchi, Noriuchi, Senoob, & Uenoc, 2007). Imagining a 
person for comparison includes the imagination of his or her face. This is in line 
with the higher activation for the body height comparison in areas of the right 
ITG including FFA which was found specifically for the imagination of faces 
(Ishai, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 2000; O'Craven et al., 2000). The right IPL is 
involved in self-comparison processes including one's own body and it showed 
correlations with ACC, AMG, and lateral prefrontal areas (Friederich et al., 
2007). Furthermore, several medial and lateral parietal areas were found to be 
activated in diverse visual imagery tasks and show differences in spatial 
transformation, egocentric perspective transformation, and object-based 
transformation (Zacks et al., 1999; Zacks et al., 2000; Zacks et al., 2002; Zacks 
et al., 2003a; Zacks et al., 2003b). Especially the left and right parietal cortex is 
involved in object transformation tasks, where the subject has to rotate images 
mentally (Zacks et al., 2003b). In addition to secondary visual, premotor areas, 
frontal lobe regions, and the left posterior parietal lobe were also found as the 
most significant area in a self-rotation task (Creem et al., 2001). The results 
suggested that the comparison of physical person characteristics, in our case 
the comparison of body height, requires the retrieval and mental imagery of the 
compared person and perhaps of oneself. For the comparison itself, the image 
of the compared person and of oneself had to be born in mind. Participants had 
to inspect these mental images with respect to their size and decide which of 
them seems to extend more in the vertical dimension. This might be regarded 
as a more numerical or physical comparison. In the fMRI study concerning 
physical, luminance and numerical comparisons, Cohen-Kadosh et al. (2005) 
found an area in the IPL amongst other areas which was more activated in 
numerical than in physical and luminance comparisons. This area is also 
included in our activation pattern of the parietal cortex, indicating that the 
comparison of physical person characteristics in the SOC task may rely more 
strongly on numerical physical comparison rather than on social comparison 
processes, as already expected in the first experiment. The fact that the body  Experiment  2  Discussion 
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height comparison in this second experiment showed a larger network of areas 
than the body height comparison in the first experiment may result from the 
higher number of trials in the second experiment. This results in a more 
powerful analysis, which makes it possible to find smaller effects. 
We did not include a control condition in this second experiment, so we were 
not able to show comparison specific areas in a contrast between comparison 
and control condition for the SOC tasks. Since the two distinct networks found 
in the whole brain GLM largely overlap with the areas showing significant 
activation for the comparison tasks in the first experiment, we focused our 
second analysis on these "comparison specific areas", using the same mask 
from the first experiment for the masked RFX-GLM. In this reduced RFX-GLM 
we found a similar pattern of activation for the two comparison types as in the 
previous experiment. The IPL and the MFG showed a higher activation for the 
body height comparison and areas of the arMFC, prMFC, ACC, APCC, PCC, 
mOFC, MTG, OFC, and FO showed higher activation for the intelligence 
comparison. Only the TPJ did not reveal any significant differences in the 
contrast between the two comparison types. However, the results of the 
masked RFX-GLM of this second experiment clearly replicated the main 
findings of the first experiment concerning the distinct networks involved in the 
comparison of psychological and physical person characteristics. 
In summary, our results suggest that the participants used a ToM approach to 
figure out the intelligence-related information of the person under comparison. 
Additionally the results suggest that for the body height judgement, participants 
retrieved the body height related information (the image of the person) from 
their memory and then they tried to visualize mentally the person under 
comparison and possibly themselves to perform the comparison. In accordance 
with our first two hypotheses, we found that nearly the same networks of brain 
areas as in the first experiment are involved in the comparative person 
judgements, showing different degrees of activation of the ToM network related 
to different levels of perspective taking in psychological (intelligence) and 
physical (body height) person characteristics in the comparison tasks although 
again the two types of comparisons are performed on identical stimulus 
material. The network of brain areas involved in intelligence comparison  Experiment  2  Discussion 
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showed a particularly large overlap (except for the TPJ) with the results of the 
first experiment and consequently with the common network of autobiographical 
memory, prospection, navigation, ToM, default mode, and decision making 
under uncertainty. 
 
3.4.2 Decision directions 
In the decision direction hypothesis, we expected differences in the neural 
activation pattern of the ventral MFC and in emotion-related areas as regards 
the decision direction in the comparison tasks.  
We did not find any specific areas showing significant differences between the 
two decision directions after surviving the correction of multiple comparisons, 
neither in the whole-brain nor in the masked RFX-GLMs. In the FX-ROI-GLMs 
of areas found in the masked and the whole brain GLMs, we did not find any 
decision direction specific differences in the ventral MFC or emotion related 
areas either, but we found other areas revealing significant contrasts between 
the decision directions. 
For the contrast between the decision directions of the FX-ROI-GLMs (based on 
the whole-brain RFX-GLM), we found significant differences in specific areas for 
the intelligence comparison only (ACC, left arMFC, PCC, left PCun, right SPL, 
right IPL, right SFG, and right Ins), for body height comparison only (left and 
right SPL, right ITG, left SFG, and right MFG), and for both comparison types in 
common (left arMFC, mOFC, right SPL, and right IPL). Also, the FX-ROI-GLMs 
of the ROIs of the masked RFX-GLM revealed significant differences between 
the decision directions in specific areas for the intelligence comparison only 
(PCC, arMFC, right IPL, and left MFG), for body height comparison only (left 
IPL and a portion of left arMFC), and for both comparison types in common 
(mOFC). 
Interestingly, we found an additional decision direction specific effect in the FX-
ROI-GLMs of both RFX-GLMs: All areas showing significant differences in 
intelligence comparisons or in both comparison types revealed a higher 
activation for the decision myself>other, while the areas showing significant  Experiment  2  Discussion 
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differences in body height comparison in the opposite decision direction 
(other>myself) revealed a higher activation than the other decision direction.  
In the intelligence and body height comparison conditions the mOFC showed a 
higher activation when subjects rated themselves as more intelligent/taller than 
other persons. In our society, more intelligent and taller (at least to a certain 
point) persons enjoy higher prestige. Accordingly, the social comparisons in our 
experiment include high goal values for the decision myself>other in both 
respects. In line with our results, research has shown that goal values involve 
regions of the mOFC (see Hare et al., 2008). 
The more dorsal parts of the MFC are involved in processes of reappraisal and 
evaluation of self-related stimuli (Northoff et al., 2006) and in self-referential 
processes (Kelley et al., 2002) so it is not surprising that these dorsal parts of 
MFC including the arMFC showed a higher activation for the decision direction 
myself>other related to a self-referential process resulting in higher self-esteem. 
In the intelligence comparison condition, we found significant differences 
between the decision directions in brain areas (ACC, PCC, and PCun) which 
are classically related to perspective taking and ToM, these areas are also more 
activated in myself>other decisions. Hence, we suggested that perspective 
taking and ToM related areas do not only seem to be involved in this social 
comparison, but these areas also seem to play a role in the development of 
decision directions. 
The higher activation for the decision other>myself in the body height 
comparison in the imagination specific areas can be explained by a possibly 
stronger imagination of the other person than of oneself to access the 
information necessary to make the decision about the difference in body height. 
Because the differences in decision directions are only found in FX-ROI-GLMs 
we suggested that the GLM approach is not sensitive enough to investigate 
these small differences in the BOLD signal, as the differences in neural 
activation between the decision directions will not concern involvement and no 
involvement of specific areas or involving different areas. The existing but small 
differences in the BOLD time courses of the areas showing differences between 
the decision directions in the FX-ROI-GLMs lead us to expect that both decision  Experiment  2  Discussion 
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directions are involved and that they activate the same areas. We further 
postulate that the difference of the decision is calculated of slightly different 
inputs from several areas. In this case only extreme differences in the activation 
pattern of the decision directions can be found with the GLM approach. On the 
other hand, areas may be missed that show only small differences in neural 
activation while they possibly play an important role in social decision making in 
the one or the other direction. 
                                Comparison of Experiment 1 and 2  Introduction 
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4. Comparison of experiments 1 and 2 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In both preceding experiments subjects had to perform comparisons of 
psychological characteristics (intelligence) and physical characteristics (body 
height) of persons. It would be interesting to compare the two different social 
comparison types OOC and SOC, to investigate the neural similarities and 
differences of these two comparisons. This comparison of the two experiments 
was based on the masked RFX-GLMs of both experiments involving the social 
comparison specific areas found in experiment 1. 
While the participants had to compare two different other persons in the first 
experiment, participants in experiment 2 had to compare one other person with 
themselves. Hence, three major differences can be expected based on the 
differences between the tasks in the two experiments.  
First, different combinations of several regions of the MFC with other areas in 
the brain (TPJ, Ins, NAcc, AMG) are shown to be involved in tasks requiring 
first-person perspective, self-other comparison, and self-descriptiveness. 
Whereas the more dorsal parts of the MFC were activated in processes of 
reappraisal and evaluation of self-related stimuli, the more ventral parts of the 
MFC were involved in coding the self-relatedness of stimuli thereby 
representing them as self-referential. The posterior parts of the MFC were 
involved in tasks including self-referential stimuli. The comparative judgements 
in the first and the second experiment differ in the role of the self in these 
judgements. Therefore we expected additional and differential activation 
patterns for the contrast between the comparison of psychological (intelligence) 
and physical (body height) person characteristics in the MFC between the two 
experiments. 
Second, the task presented in experiment 1 could be expected to require a 
higher amount of mentalizing than the task performed in the second experiment, 
because the personal characteristics of two persons had to be estimated. This                                Comparison of Experiment 1 and 2  Introduction 
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could result in a higher and/or more widespread activation of the ToM related 
areas. 
Third, while the participants (students of psychology and graduates) of the first 
experiment had to compare celebrities which maybe represent a more dissimilar 
group of persons, the participants (also students of psychology and graduates) 
of the second experiment submitted their own list of stimuli. These lists include 
persons the participants knew themselves and included mostly family members, 
friends and colleagues, representing a more homogenous group of people. 
While mentalizing about a similar other engages a region of ventral MFC linked 
to self-referential thought, mentalizing about a dissimilar other engages a more 
dorsal subregion of MFC (Mitchell et al., 2006, Van Overwalle, 2009). 
Therefore, the comparison process of the first experiment should activate more 
dorsal regions of the MFC. In the second experiment more ventral regions of 
the MFC should be involved in the comparison process. Furthermore, the 
ventral part of the MFC is activated when people make trait inferences about 
familiar others or others similar to themselves (Van Overwalle, 2009). 
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4.2 Method 
 
For the comparison of the two different comparison types (SOC and OOC) of 
psychological characteristics (intelligence) and physical characteristics (body 
height) of persons, a 2x2 factorial ANOVA would be the preferred statistical 
analyses. 
We measured the two experiments in two different MRI-Scanners (first 
experiment: 3T TRIO Magnetom (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany); second 
experiment: 3T ALLEGRA Magnetom (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany)). In 
addition to the task, the predictors in an fMRI-experiment are linear dependent 
to the scanners. In case of measuring in two scanners, the effects which could 
possibly been found with a statistical analysis cannot be clearly assigned to the 
task itself or the different scanners. 
Hence, we only had a descriptive view on the masked-RFX-GLMs while 
comparing the contrasts between the intelligence and body height comparison 
from both experiments. Maps for areas showing significant contrasts between 
the intelligence and body height comparison of both experiments were placed 
on top of another. Both maps were thresholded at a FDR < .05 and included 
only clusters exceeding a cluster size threshold of 25 voxels. 
                               Comparison of Experiment 1 and 2  Results 
 
89 
4.3 Results 
 
The neural activation patterns of the intelligence comparisons in the SOC and 
the OOC experiment overlap in a huge medial frontal cluster including ACC, 
arMFC, mOFC, in several parts of arMFC, ACC, APCC, PCC, mOFC, bilateral 
OFC, and left STS. Nevertheless, each of the comparison types (SOC and 
OOC) seems to activate additional areas in its own right (see Table 7 and 
Figure 15). 
The intelligence comparison in the second experiment with the SOC task 
activated the anterior and dorsal edges of the MFC areas in the left arMFC, the 
prMFC, an anterior part of the ACC, and a ventral area of the MFC (mOFC). 
Further areas were activated in the bilateral (more in the right hemisphere) 
OFC, the superior part of the PCC, the STS, the SN, and anterior thalamic 
nucleus. Moreover, the bilateral TPJ only seemed to be activated in the OOC of 
the first experiment. 
The intelligence comparison of the OOC specifically activated the lower and 
posterior regions of the dorsal MFC and areas of the cingulate gyrus and sulcus 
in the central and ventral MFC including areas in the inferior parts of arMFC and 
prMFC and the superior parts of the mOFC. Furthermore, a more inferior part of 
the PCC, the bilateral (more in the left hemisphere) OFC, a region in the left 
STS, and an area in the medial OcG were involved in the OOC. 
The body height comparison showed a similar activation in the IPL for both 
SOC and OOC. The SOC in the second experiment seemed to show more 
activation in the IPL and left MFG. 
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Table 7: Talairach coordinates (centre of Cluster) and cluster size of areas showing similar 
activation (SOC = OOC) and dissimilar activation pattern (SOC > OOC or OOC > SOC) for both 
comparison types (intelligence and body height comparison) in the descriptive comparison of 
both experiments. 
Regions Left/  
Medial/  
Right 
Talairach coordinates  Cluster size 
(voxel)
x y z 
SOC = OOC         
         
intelligence comparison       
Cluster including 
arMFC,ACC,APCC M  -3  51  25  15719
PCC M  -3  -52  26  1902
OFC R  43  29  -6  128
 R  33  20  -10  64
 L  -33  26  -6  65
 L  -44  23  -3  405
mOFC M  -3  44  -3  27
STS  L  -62 -18 -11  43
         
body height comparison       
IPL R  54  -37  38  288
 L  -54  -34  41  173
         
OOC > SOC         
         
intelligence comparison       
Cluster including: 
ACC/arMFC/prMFC L  -13  42  42  4764
arMFC R  9  51  30  702
  R  12 52 18  47
mOFC R  4  54  -3  613
 M  -2  40  -9  437
prMFC  R  15 31 51  450
OFC R  26  20  -7  98
 L  -40  25  -8  2601
PCC M  -3  -56  31  347
 M  -2  -43  24  64
 R  -12  -52  28  40
TPJ R  51  -61  29  736
 L  -46  -62  27  689
STS L  -62  -21  -8  40
SN L  -5  -23  -14  87
anterior  thalamic  nucleus  L  -8 -10 -7  107
         
SOC > OOC         
         
intelligence comparison       
ACC M  1  32  11  130
arMFC R  4  58  30  2044
 L  -7  65  23  109
mOFC M  -2  43  1  1228
prMFC  R  20 37 46  177
 M  -3  34  33  3211
 L  -9  32  58  127
 L  -19  26  53  81
OFC R  36  26  -8  659
 R  45  28  -8  40
PCC M  -1  -57  20  1926
STS  L  -61 -14 -11  46
OcG R  12  -88  4  37
         
body height comparison        
MF G  L  -35  36  35  87
IPL R  56  -37  30  1283
 L  -56  -35  35  1703
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Figure 15: Comparison of group analysis of masked RFX-GLMs of experiments 1 and 2. 
Superposition maps with areas involved in both SOC and OOC (blue) and with areas showing 
specific differences. Red colours indicate areas only activated by SOC in the first experiment, 
green colours indicate areas only activated by OSOC in the second experiment (dark colours = 
intelligence; bright colours = body height). Effects were only shown if the associated p-value 
yielded p<0.05 (corrected for multiple comparisons with FDR). The 3D statistical maps were 
then projected on the flatmap reconstruction of the MNI template brain. Areas: arMFC, prMFC, 
ACC, mOFC, MFG, IPL, TPJ, OFC, STS, and PCC. 
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4.4 Discussion 
 
The similarities and the differences between the OOC and the SOC we found in 
the descriptive comparison of the data can only be interpreted very carefully, 
and cannot be generalized. 
In this comparison between the SOC and OOC we were mainly interested in the 
differences of neural substrates caused by the involvement of the self in the 
social comparison process in the second experiment. However, the 
comparisons of these two experiments are problematic for several reasons. 
First, knowledge of the participants about the celebrities and the familiar 
persons differed, i.e. participants can more easily estimate the intelligence and 
body height of personal acquaintances than of dissimilar celebrities. 
Furthermore, the comparison of familiar persons used as stimuli in the second 
experiment could be more self-relevant and the retrieval of the information 
about them may require a higher degree of autobiographical memory than the 
comparisons of two celebrities used as stimuli in the first experiment. Also, the 
participants’ knowledge about the celebrities differed as such, both with respect 
to the group of familiar persons as well as regards the celebrities as such – the 
participants were well acquainted with some of the celebrities, while they did not 
know others at all, or only by name. This results in different degrees of 
perspective taking and different levels of decision under uncertainty between 
the two groups of subjects as well as within the group of subjects taking part in 
the first experiment, comparing the celebrities. 
Nevertheless, the two social comparison processes showed similarities of 
neural activation for the physical as well as for the psychological person 
characteristics. 
Neural activation pattern in the two intelligence comparisons overlapped in 
arMFC, ACC, APCC, PCC, and OFC. 
The OFC is involved in reward calculation (Rolls, 1996; Fliessbach et al., 2007), 
in value-related processes (Hare et al., 2008), and in guiding one's behaviour in 
terms of the value of possible outcomes (Amodio et al., 2006). Hence, it could 
be expected that in both intelligence comparison processes value- and reward                               Comparison of Experiment 1 and 2   Discussion 
 
93 
processes are used. The SOC seems to activate a larger area of the right OFC. 
If this activation of the OFC is related to reward processes, this larger activation 
could be explained by a higher reward anticipation of the SOC task. The 
decision whether I am more or less intelligent than another person is more self-
relevant and therefore linked with a higher reward outcome than comparing two 
other persons with one another. On the other hand the OFC was found in 
decision making processes in ambiguous or otherwise uncertain situations 
(Manes et al., 2002; Bechara et al., 2000; Fellows et al., 2007). The OFC shows 
an increasing activation when increasing the risk in decisions (Cohen, Heller, & 
Ranganath, 2005) and shows positive correlations with the levels of ambiguity 
in a card game (Hsu, Bhatt, Adolphs, Tranel, & Camerer, 2005). Lesions in the 
OFC result in deficits or impairments in learning optimal decision making 
strategies to avoid long-term monetary losses (Bechara et al., 2000, 2003). 
Hence, it could be expected that in both intelligence comparison processes 
value- and reward processes are used and base upon ambiguity. The OOC 
seems to activate a larger area of the left OFC. If the activation of the OFC is 
related to the uncertainty, this larger activation could be explained by a higher 
uncertainty of the OOC task. It could be argued that these differences in the 
OFC are based on the different kinds of stimuli in the two experiments. The 
estimation of the intelligence of unfamiliar persons like the celebrities in the first 
experiment is based on less accurate information than for the personally known 
persons in the second experiment. It could be expected, that the differences in 
the activation of the OFCs between the two experiments rely on the different 
kinds of stimuli in the two experiments 
As expected in the intelligence comparison of both OOC and SOC, ToM related 
areas (ACC, APCC, and PCC) were involved. In both tasks the personal 
characteristics of at least one person had to be estimated but there is a major 
divergence in the neural activation pattern of psychological person comparison 
between the two experiments. Unlike the first experiment, the intelligence 
comparison in the second experiment did not show an involvement of the TPJ. 
Differences of activation in the TPJ may be due to a reduced amount of 
perspective taking in the second experiment. For two reasons, the SOC-task 
may require a lower degree of perspective taking and mind reading: First, the 
intelligence of only one other person has to be estimated and second, the                               Comparison of Experiment 1 and 2   Discussion 
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persons to compare with are familiar to the participants. Assuming that the 
estimation of intelligence is based on the knowledge about the other person, we 
may expect that it is much easier to estimate the intelligence of a familiar 
person than of a stranger as the knowledge about familiar persons is more 
present and comprehensive and we normally have no problem in judging 
whether someone we know well is intelligent or not. On the other hand, the 
information necessary to estimate the intelligence of a celebrity, as far as it is 
available, has to be assembled from different parts of memory which may be 
inadequate for an accurate estimation of their intelligence. 
More dorsal and ventral areas of the MFC were shown to be involved in self-
referential processing tasks (D’Argembeau et al., 2007). Hence, the higher 
activation for the more dorsal part of arMFC and prMFC and the more ventral 
part of the MFC including mOFC in SOC than in OOC could be explained by a 
higher number of self-referential processes in the SOC task. This higher 
number of self referential processes in the SOC task could be related to the 
involvement of the self in the comparison as well as to the familiar persons 
under comparison. Judging the intelligence of a familiar person can be more 
self-relevant because the social relationship with familiar persons is more 
important than relating to dissimilar celebrities. Depending on the decision 
direction, judging familiar persons’ intelligence can be related with different 
outcome perspectives and expected consequences while judging a celebrity 
normally has no consequences independent of the decision direction. 
Furthermore, while the activation of the inferior dorsal parts of MFC in OOC with 
respect to the SOC could be explained by the dissimilarity of the celebrities the 
subjects had to compare with (Mitchell et al., 2006), the activation in ventral 
parts of the MFC in SOC could also be explained by comparing with more 
similar others (Mitchell et al., 2006). 
The activation of the more superior part of the PCC in the OOC and the more 
inferior part of the PCC in the SOC are in accordance with the results from 
Seger et al. (2004). 
The body height comparison showed common activation in IPL which could be 
explained by the participants’ imagination of the persons under comparison                               Comparison of Experiment 1 and 2   Discussion 
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(e.g. Friederich et al., 2007; Knauff et al., 2002; Lamm et al., 2001; Newman et 
al., 2007; Zacks et al., 1999; Zacks et al., 2000; Zacks et al., 2002; Zacks et al., 
2003a; Zacks et al., 2003b; Zimmer, 2008). 
The differences of neural activation patterns especially in the comparison of 
psychological person characteristics cannot be unambiguously ascribed to an 
expected different amount of the "self" included in the SOC- and the OOC- 
tasks, but we used this descriptive comparison of the two experiments to 
formulate the following hypothesis for a new experiment, in which the stimulus 
material has to be identical for both comparison types: 
- The OOC and the SOC differ in their scope of mentalizing, resulting in higher 
activation in ToM related areas, spatially in the TPJ, in OOC. 
- The OOC and the SOC show differences in the activation of MFC which is 
related to the involvement of the self in the social comparison process of 
personal characteristics. 
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5. Experiment 3  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Based on the results and the comparison of the preceding experiments, this 
third experiment is designed to investigate the differences and similarities of 
neural activations between the two types of comparison (SOC and OOC) as 
well as the neural correlates of the decision directions in both comparison types. 
In addition to the classical analysis approach for fMRI (GLM), this study is 
designed to use a multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) approach. 
In this experiment, we investigate the neural substrates of intelligence 
comparison, because of methodological reasons regarding the combination of 
the used methods. On the one hand, we are once more using an event-related 
design. This results in trials of up to 3s and an ITI of 9-12 seconds after each 
trial for relaxation of the BOLD signal (see Excursus 1), so we have 
approximately 11 sec per trial. On the other hand, we want to use MVPA for 
analyzing the data concerning the decision directions of a participant's 
response. In general, this MVPA requires a vast number of trials, with a 
minimum of 60 trials per condition. However, we cannot explicitly define the 
decision directions of the subject prior to the experiment as it is up to the 
participants to decide, thus we need about 80 trials per condition. Two 
conditions (decision directions) in two comparison types (SOC and OOC) result 
in 320 trials and about 2 hours for the experiment. 
The following hypotheses are tested by this experiment : 
- OOC and SOC differ in the amount of mentalizing, resulting in higher 
activation in ToM related areas, spatially in the TPJ, in OOC? 
- The OOC and the SOC show differences in the activation of MFC which is 
related to the involvement of the self in the social comparison process of 
personal characteristics.  Experiment  3  Introduction 
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- The decision directions differ in the neural activation pattern especially in the 
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5.2 Methods 
 
5.2.1 Participants 
Six healthy right-handed participants were recruited from an academic 
environment (4 female; mean age 25.17 years, SD 4.17). The Ethics Committee 
of the Medical School of the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University approved the 
study. Written informed consent was obtained from all participants prior to 
scanning. 
 
5.2.2 Stimuli 
Prior to the experiment the participants had to rate a list of 250 names (first 
names and surnames) of celebrities. First they had to rate these names for 
familiarity using a rating scale with 4 levels (“I do not know the person”, “I have 
only heard the name of the person”, “I have an idea about the person” and “I 
know the person well”). If the participants had an idea about the respective 
persons or knew them well, the participants had to guess the person’s 
intelligence on the basis of their knowledge about the person. At the end of the 
rating scale, the participants had to estimate their own intelligence (see 
complete celebrity rating scale in Appendix 9.2). 
These names served as stimulus material for the following fMRI-experiment. 
The List was “analyzed” twice. For the SOC 80 names which were rated with a 
higher intelligence and 80 with a lower intelligence than the participants own 
self-rated IQ-value were used as stimuli. For the OOC the 80 names with 
highest and the 80 names with the lowest rated intelligence were used as 
stimuli. Additionally, eight names (one for each run) with an individually medium 
rated intelligence were used as a reference, where subjects had to compare all 
other stimuli with. 
Stimuli were presented in white font (font type: Arial, height: 4.6°) against a 
black background in the centre of the screen. The cues indicating the task 
procedure had the same colour and font size. Stimulus presentation and 
recording of response time was controlled by the Presentation 10.3 software  Experiment  3  Methods 
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(Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc.). During scanning, the computer display was 
projected onto a mirror mounted on the head coil. 
 
5.2.3 Procedure 
In this third experiment, the two experimental conditions required comparative 
judgements. In contrast to the first two experiments, only comparative 
judgements on intelligence had to be performed.  
Subjects had to perform both SOC and OOC. In the SOC condition, subjects 
had to compare themselves with one person indicated by their name, i.e. they 
had to decide whether the person whose name appeared on the screen or the 
participant himself/herself was more intelligent. In the OOC condition, subjects 
had to compare two other persons. Prior to each functional run, the name of a 
so-called reference person was presented. In the following run each person 
indicated by their name during the task had to be compared with this reference 
person, i.e. participants had to decide whether the person whose name 
appeared on the screen was more intelligent than the reference person 
('other>ref') or the reference person was more intelligent ('ref>other'). In both 
conditions, participants were asked to respond as quickly as possible by using a 
two button fiber-optic response box. 
Participants performed the experiment while undergoing fMRI. The experiment 
was divided into two sessions. Each of these sessions included eight runs of 
approximately 6 minutes containing 20 trials (10 per condition) in a pseudo-
randomized order. Each trial began with a cue (fixation cross turned red) 
presented for 1500 ms at the centre of the screen (see Figure 16). This 
attention capturing cue served only to denote that the next task was about to 
start. After the cue the fixation cross turned white again and appeared for 1500 
ms, followed by a stimulus appearing for 1000 ms. The ITI was jittered between 
9 and 12 s (see Figure 16). 
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Figure 16: Paradigm design. Two different experimental conditions of intelligence comparison: 
Top: self vs. other comparison. The subjects had to decide if another person, indicated by the 
names, or themselves was more intelligent. Bottom: other vs. other comparison. The subjects 
had to decide if another person, indicated by the names, or the “reference person”, which was 
presented prior to each run, was more intelligent. Each trial began with the presentation of a 
cue (1500 ms), followed by a fixation point (1500 ms) and a stimulus (1500 ms). After a jittered 
inter trial interval (ITI) lasting between 9 and 12s, a new trial began. 
 
 
5.2.4 Imaging procedure 
We collected whole-brain MRI data on a 3T TRIO Magnetom (Siemens, 
Erlangen, Germany). We acquired echo-planar imaging data for fMRI using 
standard parameters (field of view, 210 mm; matrix: 64 x 64; 1 volume = 28 
axial slices, 5mm slice thickness; in-plane resolution, 3.3 mm; TR: 1500 ms, TE: 
30 ms; flip angle: 90°; 237 volumes per run). We synchronized stimulus 
presentation with the fMRI sequence at the beginning of each trial. We acquired 
four dummy volumes before each run in order to reduce possible effects of T1-
saturation. To minimize head motion, we used fixed head pads. We obtained a 
T1 weighted 3D anatomical scan (1x1x1 mm
3 resolution) for each participant. 
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5.2.5 Data analyses 
For the analyses with GLM we pre-processed and analyzed the fMRI using 
BrainVoyager
TM QX (Brain Innovation, Maastricht, The Netherlands). We 
applied the following pre-processing steps: slice-time correction, motion 
correction and linear trend removal and highpass temporal filtering with 2 cycles 
in time course. Additionally we performed spatial smoothing using a Gaussian 
kernel of 8mm full-width at half-maximum. We manually coregistered the fMRI 
data with the anatomical scans. We transformed the 3D anatomical scans into 
Talairach space (Talairach et al., 1988) and subsequently used the parameters 
for this transformation to transform the coregistered functional data. We then 
resampled the 3D functional data set to a voxel size of 3x3x3 mm
3. 
We defined each of the two decision directions (myself>other and other>myself, 
respectively ref>other and other>ref) for the two experimental conditions (SOC 
and OOC) as four predictors. For defining the predictors, we used the individual 
reaction times of the trials following stimulus onset. All cues and the following 
fixation points were defined as a fifth predictor (3 s per event). The remaining 
fixation volumes served as baseline. Again, we convolved the predictors with a 
two-gamma HRF (Boynton et al., 1996). 
In a first GLM-analysis we calculated a whole-brain FX-GLM, using the FDR for 
correction of multiple comparisons and implemented comparisons of interest as 
linear contrast. 
In a second masked FX-GLM-analysis we again used the mask including the 
social comparison specific areas found in the first experiment. 
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5.3 Results 
 
5.3.1 Behavioural data 
Subjects rated the person under comparison more often as more intelligent than 
themselves (52.50%) or the reference person (50.10%) (see Figure 17). A 2x2 
ANOVA showed neither significant main effects (type of comparison (F(1,5)= 
1.689, p= 0.250); direction of decision (F(1,5)= 0.343, p= 0.584)) nor a 
significant interaction (F(1,5)= 0.273, p= 0.623). 
Reaction times were higher for OOC conditions (ref>other: 1687 ms, SD= 458; 
other>ref: 1734 ms, SD= 516) than for SOC conditions (myself>other: 1586 ms, 
SD= 410; other>myself: 1705 ms, SD= 526) (see Figure 18). 
We performed a 2x2 factorial ANOVA for repeated measurements with the first 
factor "type of comparison" (SOC and OOC) and the second factor "direction of 
decision" (myself>other and other>myself for the SOC conditions and ref>other 
and other>ref for the OOC conditions). Reaction time revealed no significant 
main effects (F(1,5)= 0.82, p= 0.141 and F(1,5)= 1.715, p= 0.255) and no 
significant interaction (F(1,5)= 1.172, p= 0.19). 
The directions of the participants’ decisions were consistent with the expected 
decision direction based on the relation between the individual ratings of the 
stimuli ranging from 76.04% to 81.66% (see Figure 19). A 2x2 factorial ANOVA 
did not show any significant main effects (F(1,5)= 0.40, p= 0.55) and F(1,5)= 
0.41, p= 0.55) and no significant interaction (F(1,5)= 0.24, p= 0.64)  for the 
decisions consistent with the hypothesis. 
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Figure 17: Occurrence of decision direction for the two types of comparison (red: 
SOC; green: OOC) and the two directions of decision (dark: SOC: myself>other; 
OOC: ref>other; bright: SOC: other>myself; OOC: other>ref). Blue parts show the 
amount of misses, which are less than 2% in both conditions. 
 
 
Figure 18: Reaction times for the two types of comparisons and the two decision 
directions (red: self vs. other comparison (SOC); green: other vs. other comparison 
(OOC)) and the two directions of decision (bright: myself>other in SOC respectively 
reference person>other in OOC; dark: other>myself in SOC respectively 
other>reference person in OOC). Error bars represent standard deviations of 
means. 
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Figure 19: Hypothesis-congruent decisions (in percent) for the two types of 
comparison and the two decision directions (red: self vs. other comparison (SOC); 
green: other vs. other comparison (OOC)) and the two directions of decision 
(bright: myself>other in SOC respectively reference person>other in OOC; dark: 
other>myself in SOC respectively other>reference person in OOC). Error bars 
represent standard deviations of means. 
 
 
5.3.2 fMRI data 
We used a whole brain FX-GLM and a masked FX-GLM to analyse the data. 
 
5.3.2.1 whole brain FX-GLM 
 
SOC vs. OOC 
The t-map for the contrast between the two comparison types was thresholded 
at a FDR < .05. A widespread of areas including large regions in the parietal, 
frontal, temporal and occipital lobes showed higher activation for the SOC than 
for OOC. OOC showed only higher activation in three clusters in bilateral IPL 
(Talairach-coordinates: 38,-73,28; -39,-74,34, and -51,-65,34). After 
thresholding the t-maps with Bonferroni <.05 and a cluster size threshold of 25  Experiment  3  Results 
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voxel several areas still show a significantly higher activation for SOC than for 
OOC (postcentral gyrus (PoCG), SMA, SFG, MFG, CC, ACC, OcG, 
supramarginal gyrus (SMG), OFC, MTG, STS, FO, hippocampus (Hi), a cluster 
including Hi, Tectum (Tec), and Pons. Results are shown in Table 8 and Figure 
20. BOLD time courses of some of these areas are shown in Figure 21. 
 
 
Figure 20: Results of the group analysis with a whole brain FX-GLM. Superposition maps (left: 
left hemisphere; right: right hemisphere; Top: lateral view; Bottom: medial view) of the contrast 
between SOC and OOC. Higher activation for SOC is shown in orange and for OOC in blue. 
Effects were only shown if the associated p-value yielded p<0.01 (corrected for multiple 
comparisons with FDR). Green colours in the SOC areas represent significant contrast 
corrected for multiple comparisons with Bonferroni correction. The 3D statistical maps were 
then projected on the folded surface reconstruction of the MNI template brain. Areas: PoCG, 
SMA, SFG, MFG, CC, ACC, OcG, SMG, OFC, MTG, STS, FO, Hi, a cluster including Hi, Tec, 
and Pons.  Experiment  3  Results 
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Figure 21: BOLD time courses for areas showing significant differences between the SOC 
(dark blue) and the OOC (light blue) after correction for multiple comparison with Bonferroni 
(<.05). The time courses of the SOC and the OOC each represent averages of both decision 
directions. Error bars indicate the standard errors. 
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Table 8: Talairach coordinates (centre of ROIs) and statistical details (cluster size and 
averaged t- and p-values for the cluster) of FX-GLM for areas that showed a significant 
difference for the contrasts SOC and OOC after correction for multiple comparisons with 
Bonferroni (α<.05). 
Regio
ns 
Left/ 
Medial/ 
Right 
Talairach coordinates Cluster
size 
(voxel) 
Averaged t- and p-values for
contrast (myself>others) vs. 
(others>myself) 
t-value                             p-value
x                y                 z
SOC > OOC           
        
PoCG R  37 -36 56  370 5.227851  <  0.0001
SMA M  0 -29  50  65 4.952286  <  0.0001
 M  0 -19  39  127 4.941959  <  0.0001
SFG L  -24 44 40  107 4.969591  <  0.0001
arMFC R  15 52 29  661 5.120808  <  0.0001
 L  -5 46 31  1756 5.204811  <  0.0001
prMFC L  -4 54 18  411 5.161613  <  0.0001
CC M  -3 16 29  424 5.121597  <  0.0001
ACC M  1 39 8  302 5.090835  <  0.0001
OcG R  6 -87  18  65 4.928834  <  0.0001
 L  -32 -73  -1  3391 5.373530  <  0.0001
 R  39 -68 -3  96 4.953944  <  0.0001
SMG R  45 -46 17  91 5.006118  <  0.0001
OFC R  26  36  -1  49 4.976359  <  0.0001
MTG L  -45  -38  7  172 5.040084  <  0.0001
STS L  -60  -10  -2  271 5.113631  <  0.0001
FO R  52  15  5  109 5.073191  <  0.0001
Hi L  -27  -17  -11  48 4.990326  <  0.0001
Hi/Tec
/Pons 
R 17  -22  -7  693 5.249225  <  0.0001
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Contrast between the decision directions 
The contrast between the decisions ref>other and other>ref in the OOC 
condition revealed no significant differences. However, the contrast between 
myself>other and other>myself yielded a higher activation in mOFC for the 
decision myself>other and a higher activation in PoCG, SPL, IPL, precentral 
gyrus (PreCG), SMA, inferior frontal gyrus opercular part (IFGOp), OcG, Ins, 
and cerebellum for the decision other>myself (see Table 9 and Figure 22). 
Again, a cluster size threshold of 25 voxels was used. 
 
 
Figure 22: Group analysis with FX-GLM. Superposition maps (left: left hemisphere; right: right 
hemisphere; Top: lateral view; Bottom: medial view) of the contrast between myself>other 
decisions and other>myself decisions for the SOCs. Higher activation for myself>other 
decisions is shown in orange and for other>myself decisions in blue. Effects were only shown if 
the associated p-value yielded p<0.01 (corrected for multiple comparisons with FDR). The 3D 
statistical maps were then projected on the folded surface reconstruction of the MNI template 
brain. Areas: mOFC, PoCG, SPL, PreCG, SMA, SMG, OcG. 
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Table 9: Talairach coordinates (centre of ROIs) and statistical details (cluster size and 
averaged t- and p-values for the cluster) of FX-GLM for areas that showed a significant 
difference for the contrasts between myself>other and other>myself in the SOC condition. 
Regions Left/ 
Medial/ 
Right 
Talairach ccordinates Cluster
size 
(voxel) 
Averaged t- and p-values
for contrast 
(myself>others) vs. 
(others>myself) 
   x y z  t-value p-value
myself>other                
        
mOFC M  2 54 4  250  3.807730  < 0.001
              
Other>me              
        
PoCG L  -32  -34  61  76 -3.796959  <  0.001
 L  -34  -42  53  140 -3.759390  <  0.001
 R  23  -39  61  220 -3.801840  <  0.001
SPL M  -3  -58  59  1659 -4.026281  <  0.001
IPL R  49  -38  33  53 -3.723143  <  0.001
PreCG R  39  -19  53 400 -3.844350  <  0.001
SMA M  -3  -16  41  410 -3.841588  <  0.001
IFGOp R  40  10  16  33 -3.730503  <  0.001
OcG M  -7  -87  1  100 -3.727480  <  0.001
 R  19  -44  -9  87 -3.713447  <  0.001
Ins R  49  5  4  205 -3.738062  <  0.001
Ins R  35  7  -6  61 -3.671982  <  0.001
Cerebellum  L  -17 -55 -14  41 -3.728268  <  0.001
              
 
 
 
5.3.2.2 Masked FX-GLM 
 
When contrasting SOC and OOC, all areas showed a higher activation for SOC. 
The contrast between the decision directions in the OOC did not reveal any 
significant differences but the contrast between the decision directions in the 
SOC showed a higher activation for the decision myself>other in arMFC and 
mOFC and a higher activation for the decision other>myself in IPL (see Table 
10 and Figure 23). 
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Table 10: Talairach coordinates (centre of ROIs) and statistical details (cluster size and 
averaged t- and p-values for the cluster) of masked FX-GLM for areas that showed a significant 
difference for the contrasts between myself>other and other>myself in the SOC condition. 
Regions Left/ 
Medial/ 
Right 
Talairach ccordinates Cluster
size 
(voxel) 
Averaged t- and p-values
for contrast 
(myself>other) vs. 
(other>myself) 
   x y z  t-value p-value
myself>other                
        
arMFC M  5 48  38  83  3.67416  < 0.001
mOFC M  2  54  3  871 4.18137  <  0.001
              
Other>myself              
        
IPL R  51  -38  33  72 -3.48448  <  .001
              
 
 
Figure 23: BOLD time courses of the areas showing significant differences between the two 
decision directions of the SOC in the masked FX-GLM (red=myself>other, green=other>myself, 
dark and bright green=control conditions). Top: mOFC and arMFC shows higher activation for 
the decision myself>other; Bottom: IPL shows higher activation when another person was rated 
as more intelligent than oneself. Error bars indicate the standard errors. 
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5.4 Discussion 
 
5.4.1. OOC vs. SOC 
Referring to the hypothesis generated from the descriptive comparison of the 
neural activation pattern between the OOC in the first experiment and the SOC 
in the second experiment, we first investigated the neural differences between 
the SOC and the OOC using the same stimulus material and stimulus 
presentation for both comparison types. As we only analyzed preliminary data 
of 6 subjects, using a FX-GLM, the results can not be generalized to the 
population. We therefore focus on the areas revealing significant differences 
after correction for multiple comparisons with Bonferroni. Further measurements 
of up to 20 more subjects are planned to perform RFX-GLMs of the group data. 
We found a higher activation for SOC in several areas including PoCG, SMA, 
SFG, arMFC, prMFC, CC, ACC, OcG, SMG, OFC, MTG, STS, FO, Hi, and a 
small cluster including Hi/Tec/Pons. 
The decision and lateralization of the button presses did not show any 
significant differences between the decision directions nor between the OOC 
and SOC. Moreover, the numbers of button presses were equal for SOC and for 
OOC. Hence, the higher activation of the SMA is not related to the button 
presses. The SMA has shown to be involved in decision making; Ikeda et al. 
(1999) concluded that pre-SMA is involved in
  cognitive motor control which 
involves sensory discrimination
 and decision making or motor selection for the 
action after
  stimuli, whereas SMA-proper is one of the main generators of
 
readiness potential preceding self-paced, voluntary movements. Readiness 
potential was found by (Libet et al. 1983) describing the effect of an activation of 
the SMA during the preparation of a motor task preceding the actual movement. 
Because the samples of the third and the preceding experiments are recruited 
from an academic environment, intelligence assumingly plays an important role 
in the ideal self of these participants. We could further generally expect these 
persons to prefer a decision for rating oneself as more intelligent than another 
person. This can cause a readiness potential in the SOC leading to an 
activation of the SMA and the hand-related areas in the motor cortex in the task  Experiment  3  Discussion 
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preceding the button press. This additional activation in these areas can cause 
the difference between the SOC and the OOC in the SMA and motor areas. In 
this case, the ipsilatersal motor cortex of the hand used for the prefered 
response should show a higher activation because of a response conflict 
(Cohen-Kadosh et al., 2007). This could be tested by calculating the 
lateralization index of the motor areas. Since we counterbalanced the key 
assignment of the button presses over the subjects, it is not possible to perform 
this test in this group analysis. Therefore the lateralization index of the motor 
areas should be calculated after increasing the sample size of this experiment 
by splitting the group concerning the key assignment.  
A network including the lateral fusiform gyrus on both sides, the right inferior 
parietal lobule, the right lateral prefrontal cortex and the left ACC was found to 
be activated in self-comparison processes concerning the (own) body shape 
(Friederich et al., 2007). The two different comparison tasks of our experiment 
include a direct comparison with oneself only in the SOC. Therefore the areas 
found activated in self-comparison processes about the (own) body shape 
should be only or more activated in the SOC than in the OOC. In fact, areas of 
the network showed higher activation for SOC than for OOC. The lateral 
fusiform gyri and the left ACC revealed a significantly higher activation for the 
SOC even after Bonferroni correction; the right lateral prefrontal cortex showed 
significant differences only after correction for multiple comparison using FDR 
(<.05). Only the right IPL did not show any higher activation in the SOC. 
Again, in analogy to the preceding experiments, we proposed that the social 
comparison tasks require decision making under uncertainty, perspective taking 
and ToM. The participants had to draw on their knowledge about particular 
persons from their social environment because they would have been unlikely 
specifically to have thought about their height or intelligence beforehand and 
they could not be certain of the right answer. The regions we found in our 
comparison tasks in the medial frontal and orbitofrontal areas (prMFC, arMFC, 
and OFC) were also found in decision making processes in ambiguous or 
otherwise uncertain situations (Manes et al., 2002; Bechara et al., 2000; 
Fellows et al., 2007). The comparison between the two preceding experiments 
has already revealed a stronger activation of the OFC/FO in the right  Experiment  3  Discussion 
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hemisphere for the OOC overlapping with the cluster in the right lateral OFC 
(including FO), showing differences between the SOC and the OOC in this third 
experiment. The differences in the activation of the OFC between the two 
preceding experiments seem to be based on the different stimuli and especially 
the different amount of uncertainty and reward anticipation in the two 
experiments. In the third experiment we used the same stimulus material for 
both comparison types SOC and OOC, hence the differences in the OFC 
cannot be explained by different amount of ambiguity/uncertainty. As the OFC is 
recruited in reward calculation processes in social comparisons, together with 
ventral striatum (Fliessbach et al., 2007), in reward and punishment tasks 
(Rolls, 1996), and in guiding one's behaviour in terms of the value of possible 
outcomes (Amodio et al., 2006) in value related processes (Hare et al., 2008), 
we conclude that the higher activation of the OFC is related to the more reward-
related process in the SOC. The decision whether I am more or less intelligent 
than another person is more self-relevant and therefore linked with a higher 
reward outcome than comparing two other persons with one another. 
The posterior dorsal MFC was also found to be involved in decision making as 
well as in the process of adopting another person’s perspective and the left part 
of the dorsal MFC showed an interaction between perspective taking and self-
referential processes (D’Argembeau et al., 2007). The authors suggested that 
this region may be involved in decoupling one’s own from other persons’ 
perspectives on the self. The left dorsal MFC actually showed a higher 
activation for the SOC and also belong to the core network including the MFC, 
medial temporal lobes, medial parietal regions, and the TPJ which are activated 
in autobiographical memory, prospection, navigation, ToM, and default mode 
(Buckner et al., 2007). As mentioned above, the authors suggested that all 
these processes rely on memory systems, because past experiences serve as 
the foundation for alternative perspective taking and thinking about the future. 
Hence, Buckner et al. (2007) postulated that all these processes are best 
understood as part of a larger class of functions that enables flexible forms of 
self-projection. 
Based on the differences in the ToM-areas in the preceding experiment, we 
hypothesized that the OOC and the SOC differ in the amount of mentalizing,  Experiment  3  Discussion 
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resulting in higher activation in the ToM related areas in the OOC. The results of 
this third experiment showed that the medial-temporal lobes and the medial 
parietal areas (PCC and PCun) did not show any significant differences 
between the SOC and the OOC. Based on the differences in the activation of 
the TPJ in the preceding experiments, we expected the TPJ to show a higher 
activation in the OOC. But on the contrary, the TPJ revealed a higher activation 
for the SOC after thresholding with FDR.  
Why then did we find a higher activation in the ToM-related areas for SOC than 
for OOC, especially in the TPJ and parts of the MFC? 
One might suggest that the differences in the activation of the ToM-related 
areas are related to the differences in the two comparison tasks. The decisions 
in the SOC are assumingly more important and self-relevant than decisions 
made in the OOC. The pure comparison of two celebrities in our task has 
normally no effect or consequences on the participant whereas the SOC 
includes a comparison with oneself. Hence, the self-reference is much stronger 
in the SOC than in the OOC. In addition to this self-reference, the decisions in 
the SOC entail reward expectations such as being content, satisfied, 
encouraged to be more intelligent than another or dissatisfied, disappointed, 
crestfallen, etc. about the decision to be less intelligent than another person. 
Reward-related areas in the OFC showed a higher activation in the SOC. This 
higher self-relatedness of the decision in the SOC may lead to more effort in 
performing the task that comes along with a higher degree or more detailed 
perspective taking. This stronger effort could be the reason for the higher 
activation of the SOC in widespread areas. Also, the higher activation of the 
OcG in the SOC may result from this stronger effort and from a more detailed 
imagery of the person under comparison. 
Our second prediction was that the OOC and the SOC would show differences 
in the activation of the MFC relating to the involvement of the self in the social 
comparison process of personal characteristics. Although the same stimulus 
material was used in both comparison types, the third experiment showed 
higher activation in dorsal and posterior regions of the MFC (arMFC and 
prMFC) for the SOC in relation to the OOC. A more considerable difference 
between the SOC and the OOC was found in the ACC. While the ACC showed  Experiment  3  Discussion 
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an increase of activation for the SOC, a decrease of activation was found for the 
OOC in this area. The ACC has been associated with self-processing (Northoff 
et al., 2004), social cognition (Schilbach et al., 2006), and in self-related 
processes (Modinos, Ormel, & Aleman, 2009). Hence, the higher activation of 
ACC in the SOC seems to indicate a higher involvement of the self or a higher 
self-related process of the SOC. Therefore, as expected in our second 
hypothesis, one might also suggest that the differences regarding the 
involvement of these medial frontal areas in the two tasks result from the 
different degree of self involvement in these comparison processes. 
 
5.4.2 Decision directions 
In a second step of our analysis, we investigated neural differences in the 
decision directions in both comparison tasks. While the whole brain FX-GLM did 
not reveal any significant differences between the decision directions in the 
OOC, the decision directions in the SOC differed in several brain areas. The 
decision myself>other showed higher activation in the mOFC. The common 
activation of the ventral area of the MFC and the mOFC could be explained by 
the combination of the stronger involvement of the self and a higher expected 
reward for this decision (Wallis, 2007; Van Overwalle, 2009). As explained 
above, the participants (especially those from an academic environment, 
chosen for these experiments) may prefer the decision as to be more intelligent 
than another person, relating to a higher degree of self-reference or rather self-
relatedness and a higher reward expectation. The contrary decision direction 
other>myself revealed a higher activation in SMG, SPL, OcG, MFG, IFGOp, 
and Ins. The higher activation of the SPL and the OcG could be explained by a 
stronger imagination of the other person in relation to a process of controlling or 
checking the decision. 
The results of the masked FX-GLM are in accordance with the whole brain FX-
GLM and with the comparison of the two preceding experiments. The contrast 
between the two decision directions of the SOC revealed a higher activation for 
the decision myself>other in the arMFC and the mOFC, whereas the opposite 
decision direction other>myself showed a higher activation in IPL only. In 
accordance with the whole brain FX-GLM results, we explained the higher  Experiment  3  Discussion 
 
116 
activation of the mOFC and additionally of the arMFC for the decision 
myself>other with a higher degree of self-reference or self-relatedness and a 
higher reward expectation. The BOLD time course of the IPL showed two 
peaks. While the first peak is identical with the BOLD time course of the SOC, 
the second peak showed a slightly higher activation for the OOC and therefore 
these differences drive the significant contrast between the two comparison 
types in this area. It could be argued that the two peaks represent the 
imagination of the two persons under comparison. The first peak being identical 
in both conditions, it could represent the imagination of the participants’ own 
body, whereas the second peak may represent the imagination of the other 
person. The decision other>myself in SOC could implement a more intensive or 
enduring imagination process related to a control process of the decision. A 
probably more enduring imagination could also result in the (not significantly) 
longer reaction time for this decision direction in SOC. 
Keeping in mind that the results are based on a FX-GLM, a further discussion of 
the results has to be postponed until the sample of participants has been 
increased and the calculation of an RFX-GLM has been performed. 
As mentioned in the introduction, this experiment was designed for using a 
multivariate pattern analysis to analyze the data. Despite obtaining results with 
the classical analysis approach with GLM, we assumed that the GLM is not 
sufficient or sensitive enough to detect differences in the brain pertinent to 
decision direction. Assumingly, the decision directions of the social comparison 
processes investigated in this experiment are not calculated in form of 
involvement or lack of involvement of evolutionary developed brain areas, which 
are specified for these kinds of comparison. Rather, the decision directions are 
assumed to be "calculated" by a combination of activations and non-activations 
of several areas relating to comparison, self and reward. Information from these 
areas is integrated in a social context and handled in the MFC (see Amodio et 
al., 2006), resulting in a kind of "decision direction pattern" in one or more 
discrete areas in the MFC. A difference in the activation pattern within the areas 
involved in these comparison processes, which are relevant for forwarding the 
information to the MFC and therefore necessary for the calculation of the 
decision direction, is also conceivable. In both cases, it is equally impossible to  Experiment  3  Discussion 
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perform a GLM to find the areas responsible for the decision direction. An 
approach such as the MVPA will be more sensitive regarding these kinds of 
differences in neural activation pattern because it is designed to find pattern 
differences. Further developments of the algorithms are required for its use with 
our data, which will go beyond the scope of this doctoral thesis. 
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6. General discussion 
 
In this doctoral thesis, the neural correlates of social comparison processes 
were investigated by three experiments. 
 
6.1 Physical vs. psychological person comparison 
 
The first main result of these three experiments was that neural activation 
patterns differ in the contrast between comparing physical and psychological 
person characteristics. Even though it has often been assumed that 
comparisons on all levels of complexity involve similar psychological 
mechanisms (Kahneman et al., 1986; Mussweiler, 2003), they recruit 
significantly different networks at the brain level. 
The results suggest that the comparison of physical person characteristics, in 
our case the comparison of body height, requires the retrieval and mental 
imagery of the person being compared and perhaps an imagery of oneself. The 
comparison of physical person characteristics showed a higher activation 
mainly in the IPL (experiments 1 and 2) and additional areas in SPL, PCun, 
ITG, FG, OcG, SFG, and MFG (experiment 2). These areas (especially the IPL) 
were found to be activated in several visual imagery tasks (e.g. Lamm et al., 
2001; Newman et al., 2007) showing differences in spatial transformation, 
egocentric perspective transformation, and object-based transformation (Zacks 
et al., 1999; Zacks et al., 2000; Zacks et al., 2002; Zacks et al., 2003a; Zacks et 
al., 2003b), in mental rotation (Newman et al., 2007), in spatial transformations 
and mental rotation (Zimmer, 2008), in images of slim-idealized bodies 
(Friederich et al., 2007), and in relational visual imagery (Knauff et al., 2002). 
Frontopolar cortex and IPL were also found to be activated during exploratory 
decisions (Daw et al., 2006). On the other hand, the comparison of 
psychological person characteristics involves areas of the core network (MFC, 
PCC, TPJ, OcG) which were activated in autobiographical memory,  General  discussion  
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prospection, navigation, ToM, and default mode (Buckner et al., 2007; Spreng 
et al., 2009). The activation of these areas in our tasks was not surprising as the 
social comparison tasks, especially the comparison of psychological person 
characteristics, in our experiment involved perspective taking by drawing on 
knowledge about the celebrity in question, since it was unlikely that they would 
have thought about their height or intelligence beforehand, as well as 
autobiographical memory in terms of retrieving information about the person 
under comparison from long-term memory. Spreng et al. (2009) argue that 
complex social processes needed for social selection such as perspective 
taking require the ability to remember specific social encounters and the 
changing social conditions which are mainly part of autobiographical memory. 
Furthermore, the MFC is suggested to serve the integration of social information 
and to handle the neural input from the DLPFC, the STS, and the TPJ (Huey et 
al., 2006). 
The comparison of psychological person characteristics seemed to include a 
higher degree of decision making under uncertainty and reward anticipation 
than the body height comparison and it is attended by a higher activation of the 
mOFC and the lateral OFC. These areas are related with reward calculation 
processes in social comparison together with ventral striatum (Fliessbach et al., 
2007), in reward and punishment tasks (Rolls, 1996; Wallis, 2007), and in 
guiding one's behaviour in terms of the value of possible outcomes (Amodio et 
al., 2006). Additionally, combinations of the activation of the OFC and the MFC 
(especially the ACC) are found in decision making tasks with different types of 
uncertainty (e.g. Critchley et al., 2001; Walton et al., 2003; Cohen et al., 2005). 
The tasks in our experiment, particularly the intelligence comparison, include 
decisions under uncertainty because the intelligence of the persons under 
comparison is not explicitly known and thus had to be estimated on the basis of 
the participants’ knowledge. 
Another account for an increase in the recruitment of the ToM network in 
response to intelligence comparison is that intelligence comparison is more 
relevant and more socially meaningful than body height particularly for the 
participants we assessed as participants of all three experiments were recruited 
from an academic environment. It can be assumed that intelligence plays a  General  discussion  
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more important role for the professional career of academics than body height 
(e.g. Albert Einstein), whereas perhaps for other occupational groups the body 
height is much more important than for academics (e.g. basketball players). 
This second explanation cannot be investigated in these experiments. Further 
experiments would have to be conducted in the future to investigate possible 
different influences of personal importance regarding social comparisons and 
judgements. 
 
6.2 SOC vs. OOC 
 
A second interesting finding is that the neural activation patterns differ between 
the SOC and OOC. As discussed in chapter 4, despite fundamental differences 
between the used stimuli (experiment 1: dissimilar, possibly unknown 
celebrities; experiment 2: more similar, familiar persons), the two social 
comparison processes showed similarities of neural activation for the physical 
as well as for the psychological person characteristics. The overlap in the 
comparison of the physical person characteristics is strictly limited to the IPL 
which probably refers to the more imagery based comparison process 
discussed above. The intelligence comparison showed more widespread 
overlaps mainly in parts of the core network and respectively the OFC, which 
may represent the involvement of perspective taking, the usage of 
autobiographical memory and respectively decision making and reward 
anticipation. A wide range of differences occurred in the activation pattern 
including ventral and dorsal parts of the MFC, the PCC, and the TPJ. 
Notwithstanding the possibility that these differences of activation may result 
from using two different MR-scanners, the differences show meaningful and 
interpretable activation patterns referring to the content of the involved cognitive 
processes. The SOC seems to activate more dorsal areas of the MFC. The 
descriptive results of the comparison between the first two experiments are 
supported by the Bonferroni corrected preliminary results of the third experiment 
also showing more activation in widespread brain areas including dorsal parts of 
the MFC (arMFC). Northoff et al. (2006) suggested that these dorsal regions of 
the MFC are implicated in processes of reappraisal and evaluation of self- General  discussion  
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related stimuli. It could be suggested that the comparison concerning the 
intelligence of one person with oneself is more important and self-relevant than 
a comparison of two other persons. Hence, the more self-relevant judgements 
of the SOC may imply more evaluation processes activating the dorsal MFC. 
This is in line with the results of Northoff et al. (2006). The higher activation of 
the ACC for the SOC than for the OOC task also points to a higher involvement 
of the self (Craik et al., 1999; Frith et al., 1999; Kelley et al., 2002; Vogeley et al. 
2001). The ACC in combination with the anterior MFC is involved in self-related 
processes (Modinos et al., 2009). One might further argue that these more 
important intelligence comparisons also imply more reward anticipating 
processes than an unimportant comparison or judgement. More reward 
anticipation processes involve OFC (see Wallis, 2007); we correspondingly 
found a higher activation in SOC than in OOC in both the descriptive 
comparison of the first two experiments and in the third experiment. The results 
of the three experiments lead to the conclusion that the SOCs are more 
important and self-relevant in general. The comparison of two celebrities in our 
task has normally no effect or consequences on the participant, whereas the 
comparison of oneself with another person entails reward and self-evaluation 
processes. 
In chapter 4 we discussed that the differences in the activation of the TPJ 
between the SOC and the OOC of the first two experiments may rely either on 
the degree of mentalizing in the two comparison types or on the differences in 
the used stimuli. While in the first experiment celebrities were used as persons 
to compare with, in the second experiment the participants had to compare 
themselves with familiar persons and again celebrities in the third experiment. 
In this latter experiment we did not find any differences in the activation of the 
TPJ between the SOC and the OOC using the same stimulus material. 
Although the results of the third experiment concern preliminary data only using 
an FX-GLM, it can be assumed that the differences between the activation of 
the TPJ in the first two experiments rely on the differences of the used stimuli or 
rather on the induced cognitive process. Retrieving the information about 
strange and unfamiliar persons like celebrities may require stronger mentalizing 
than retrieving information about familiar persons. It could be argued that the 
information about a familiar person is more present, whereas the comparison  General  discussion  
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specific information about unfamiliar others must be extracted in a more 
exhausting way. This would also be consistent with Schall's (2001) point of view 
about decisions of familiar and non-familiar alternatives. Schall (2001) claimed 
that you can choose one of several familiar alternatives, but when you are 
confronted with new alternatives you first have to understand them, the 
differences between them and how the alternatives relate to your own goals, 
desires and preferences. Consequently, decisions are more effortful, take more 
time, require attention and deliberation, and are more error prone than simple 
choices. 
 
6.3 Decision directions 
 
The contrast between the two decision directions of the SOC in the third 
experiment revealed a higher activation for the decision myself>other in the 
arMFC and the mOFC; and the opposite decision direction other>myself 
showed a higher activation only in IPL. In accordance with the suggested 
involvement of the arMFC in self-relatedness and of the OFC in reward-related 
processes, we explained the higher activation of the mOFC and additionally of 
the arMFC for the decision myself>other with a higher self-reference or rather 
self-relatedness and a higher reward expectation. 
 
6.4 Future Perspective 
 
As only preliminary data are available for the third experiment, a more detailed 
discussion of the data should be deferred to the time after increasing the 
sample and reanalyzing the data with an RFX-GLM. 
Additional analyses with MVPA are required as the MVPA is more sensitive to 
finding differences in neural activation patterns. In recent years, MVPA 
approaches have been used in a widespread of neuroscientific studies. In 
functional brain mapping, pattern recognition methods allow detecting 
multivoxel patterns of brain activation which are informative with respect to a  General  discussion  
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subject's perceptual (e.g. Haxby et al., 2001) or cognitive state (e.g. Polyn, 
Natu, Cohen, & Norman, 2005). In addition to decoding and categorization of 
neural activity inferred from stimulus inspection in various perceptual tasks (e.g. 
orientation of striped pattern, categorization of objects, direction of movements), 
MVPA approaches can also be used to characterize these cognitive states as to 
how they are presented in the brain. Therefore, the MVPA is based on the 
assumption that cognitive states consist of multiple aspects and different values 
of these aspects or dimensions are represented by different patterns of neural 
activation (Norman, Polyn, Detre & Haxby, 2006). MVPA has also been used in 
mind reading tasks, and to investigate intentional decision making processes. In 
an fMRI experiment, neural differences related to the decision directions in 
intentional decision making tasks could be found with MVPA, but not with the 
classical GLM approach (Haynes et al., 2007). By using MVPA to analyze the 
data in experiment 3, we expect to decode more detailed information about the 
social comparison process and especially about the directions of the related 
decisions. 
Further experiments will have to be conducted in the future to investigate 
possible different influences of personal importance attributed to social 
comparisons and judgements. Further experiments would also have to 
investigate the influence of the persons under comparison on the induced 
cognitive processes and therefore on the neural activation pattern. Personality 
traits should be included by means of corresponding questionnaires and/or 
psychological test batteries, in order to investigate the individual decision 
behavior of participants and the influence of the stimuli used for the social 
comparison tasks, and of the differences between SOC and OOC. 
The process to infer the engagement of a specific cognitive process on basis of 
a particular neural activation pattern is called “reverse inference” (Poldrack, 
2006). The author showed that the usefulness of this approach is limited by the 
selectivity of the neural activation. If a specific region is only activated by one 
cognitive process the reverse inference is relatively powerful. The common 
network described above is involved in several cognitive processes 
(autobiographical memory, prospection, navigation, ToM, and default mode) 
and therefore it does not fulfill the condition of being selectively activated.  General  discussion  
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Furthermore, selective neural activations are absent in most complex cognitive 
processes and also in social processes. Hence the strategy of reverse inference 
should be used with caution. Due to the fact, that our task - like most of all 
social cognitive processes - included several low- and high-level cognitive 
processes (e.g. low-level: perception, attention, memory, etc; high-level: 
comparison, decision making, perspective taking, etc) the activation of particular 
brain regions cannot be taken as a marker of engagement of a particular 
cognitive process. In general, reverse inference should not be used as an ad 
hoc means to explain the occurrence of an activation pattern (Poldrack, 2004). 
Rather it should be used to generate new hypotheses that are tested in new 
experiments, like we did in the comparison of the experiments 1 and 2. Well-
designed psychological neuroimaging experiments should be performed in 
which the reverse inference approach may be justified such as in our third 
experiment. Further to our last experiment, future studies should investigate the 
particular influences of the different cognitive processes involved in the social 
comparison process separately and by manipulating the amount of these 
processes in the task to get more precise information about the coherency 
between the cognitive processes and their neural correlates. 
In the first experiment we measured only male subjects, because the stimuli 
were rated only by male subjects on familiarity in a preceding experiment by the 
group of Prof. Mussweiler. Thus, a generalization of the results to women is not 
possible, and therefore we measured only male subjects. In the second and the 
third experiment we measured both female and male subjects. This was 
possible, because here the stimuli were chosen or adaptive individually for each 
subject. It could be argued that the gender of the subjects and that gender of 
the persons to compare with could have an influence on the comparison and 
decision processes and hence on the neural activation patterns. For example: If 
we assume that the mean body height of women is lower than of men, the 
comparison and the associated decision direction on the body height could be 
systematically influenced by the usage of male and female subjects in form of a 
higher amount of decisions that the other person is taller than the subject. 
However, we did not find significant differences in the neural activation between 
female and male subjects in our experiments. However our experiments were 
not designed to investigate gender differences. In future experiments a possible  General  discussion  
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gender effect on the comparisons and the decisions should be explored in 
detail. For such studies the gender of the participants and the persons to 
compare with should be counterbalanced. Furthermore the expected decision 
directions should also be counterbalanced. For the example above: the stimuli 
sample should be individually selected (concerning the body height) for each 
subject choosing an equivalent number of taller and of smaller persons to 
compare with than the subject. 
Social cognitive neuroscience is an interdisciplinary field combining the well 
established models, theories and methods from the social psychology with the 
methods of neuroscience. Whereas social psychology studies the social 
interaction between and within groups on the social and the cognitive level, 
social cognitive neuroscience additionally tries to find the neural correlates of 
the social processes. Identifying the neural bases of social processes will help 
social psychology research to define and understand social processes and to 
generate new ideas and hypotheses (Lieberman, 2007). Furthermore, the 
integration of neurophysiological, cognitive and social levels of research and 
analysis provided by the social cognitive neuroscience is important to develop 
more comprehensive explanations of the human mind and behavior. This is 
exemplified in the current study: We showed that the two seemingly similar 
comparison processes of two person characteristics we investigated here 
involve two different neural networks. Only with the further knowledge of the 
social psychology that the comparison of psychological person characteristics is 
seen as a social comparison, whereas the comparison of physical person 
characteristics is a more non-social one, the neural differences between the two 
types of comparisons can be ascribed to their different contents – the two 
different kinds of person characteristics. The example of our study shows that 
the interdisciplinary perspective of social cognitive neuroscience combining the 
research methods of neuroscience and the theories and constructs of social 
psychology complementary enables a better understanding of the brain 
activation as well as of the underlying social cognitive process.  References  
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8. Lists 
 
8.1 List of abbreviations 
In alphabetical order: 
ACC  anterior cingulate cortex 
AMG amygdala 
aMTG  anterior medial temporal gyrus 
APCC  anterior paracingulate cortex 
arMFC 
 
anterior portion of the rostral  
medial frontal cortex 
BA Brodmann  area 
BOLD blood-oygen-level  dependent 
signal 
CC cingulate  cortex 
CMS  cortical midline structures 
DLPFC  dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
EBA  extrastriate body area 
FDR False  Discovery  Rate 
FFA fusiform  face  area 
fMRI 
 
Functional Magnetic Resonance  
Imaging 
fMRT funktionelle 
Magnetresonanztomographie 
FO frontal  operculum 
FX fixed  effects 
GLM  general linear model 
GP globus  pallidus 
Hi hippocampus 
HRF  hemodynamic response function  
IFGOp  inferior frontal gyrus opercular part
Ins insula 
IPL  inferior parietal lobe 
IPS  Inferior parietal sulcus 
ITG  inferior temporal gyrus 
ITI  inter trial interval 
MFC  medial frontal cortex 
MFG  middle frontal gyrus 
mOFC  medial orbitofrontal cortex 
MNI  Montreal Neurological Institue 
MTG  middle temporal gyrus 
NAcc Nucleus  accumbens 
OcG occipital  gyrus 
OFC orbitofrontal  cortex 
OOC  other vs. other comparison 
PCC  posterior cingulate cortex 
PCun Precuneus 
pH posterior  hippocampus 
PoCG postcentral  gyrus 
PreCG precentral  gyrus 
prMFC 
 
posterior portion of the rostral  
medial frontal cortex 
pSTS  posterior superior temporal sulcus 
RFX random  effects 
ROI  region of interest 
SD standard  deviation 
SFG  superior frontal gyrus 
SMA  supplementary motor area 
SMG supramarginal  gyrus 
SN substantia  nigra 
SOC  self vs. other comparison 
SPL  superior parietal lobe 
STS  superior temporal sulcus 
TE echo  time 
Tec tectum 
ToM  Theory of Mind 
TPJ temporo-parietal  junction 
TR  repetition time  
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8.2 List of tables 
 
Table 1: Talairach coordinates, Brodmann areas (BA) and statistical details 
(cluster size, averaged t-values, and p-values for the cluster) of whole-
brain RFX-GLM for areas with significant difference for the contrasts 
between experimental conditions vs. control conditions after correction 
for multiple comparisons with FDR (α<.05).  ............................................ 50 
Table 2: Talairach coordinates, Brodmann areas (BA), and p-values of masked 
RFX-GLM for areas that showed a significant difference for the contrasts 
between intelligence and body height comparison. ................................ 54 
Table 3: Talairach coordinates (centre of ROIs), Brodmann areas (BA), and 
statistical details (cluster size and averaged t- and p-values for the 
cluster) of whole-brain RFX-GLM for areas that showed a significant 
difference for the contrasts between intelligence and body height 
comparison after correction for multiple comparisons with FDR (α<.05).70 
Table 4: Talairach coordinates (centre of ROIs), Brodmann areas (BA), and 
statistical details (cluster size and averaged t- and p-values for the 
cluster) of masked RFX-GLM for areas that showed a significant 
difference for the contrasts between intelligence and body height 
comparison after correction for multiple comparisons with FDR (α<.05).73 
Table 5: Talairach coordinates (centre of ROIs) and cluster size of ROIs 
showing significant differences for the contrast between the direction of 
decisions (myself > others and others > myself) in intelligence and/or 
body height comparison of areas of the whole-brain RFX-GLM after 
correction for multiple comparisons with FDR (α<.05). ........................... 75 
Table 6: Talairach coordinates (centre of ROIs) and clustersize of ROIs showing 
significant differences for the contrast between the direction of decisions 
(myself > others and others > myself) in intelligence and/or body height 
comparison of areas of the masked RFX-GLM after correction for 
multiple comparisons with FDR (α<.05). ................................................. 76 
Table 7: Talairach coordinates (centre of Cluster) and cluster size of areas 
showing similar activation (SOC = OOC) and dissimilar activation pattern 
(SOC > OOC or OOC > SOC) for both comparison types (intelligence  Lists  
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and body height comparison) in the descriptive comparison of both 
experiments. ........................................................................................... 90 
Table 8: Talairach coordinates (centre of ROIs) and statistical details (cluster 
size and averaged t- and p-values for the cluster) of FX-GLM for areas 
that showed a significant difference for the contrasts SOC and OOC after 
correction for multiple comparisons with Bonferroni (α<.05). ................ 107 
Table 9: Talairach coordinates (centre of ROIs) and statistical details (cluster 
size and averaged t- and p-values for the cluster) of FX-GLM for areas 
that showed a significant difference for the contrasts between 
myself>other and other>myself in the SOC condition. .......................... 109 
Table 10: Talairach coordinates (centre of ROIs) and statistical details (cluster 
size and averaged t- and p-values for the cluster) of masked FX-GLM for 
areas that showed a significant difference for the contrasts between 
myself>other and other>myself in the SOC condition. .......................... 110 
 
 
8.3 List of figures 
 
Figure 1: Schematic diagram of the appearance of the BOLD-signal. TOP: 
BOLD-characteristics and firing rate, BOTTOM: (1): inactive neuron with 
normal amount of glucose and oxygen, (2): active neuron – glucose and 
oxygen were spent - shortfall refilled from the blood circulation, (3): 
Because of vascular dilatation more blood and therefore more glucose 
and oxygen is delivered in the immediate surrounding of the active 
neuron, which refills the deficit, (4): neuron is again in inactive state with 
normal amount of glucose and oxygen. ................................................. 10 
Figure 2: The selective accessibility process (according to Mussweiler, 2003) 15 
Figure 3: Paradigm design. Four different tasks containing two experimental 
conditions (body height and intelligence comparison) and two control 
conditions (musician/politician). Each trial began with the presentation of 
a cue (1000 ms), followed by a fixation point (1000 ms) and a pair of 
stimuli (1000 ms). After 10 s (ITI) a new trial began. In the experimental 
conditions subjects had to decide which person, indicated by the names,  Lists  
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was taller or more intelligent. In the control condition they had to decide 
whether a politician or musician was presented. ................................... 43 
Figure 4: typical shape of a two-gamma hemodynamic response function (HRF)
 .............................................................................................................. 45 
Figure 5: Reaction times: mean reaction times of intelligence comparison (left) 
and body height comparison condition (centre). The reaction times of the 
two control condition were averaged (right). Error bars represent 
standard deviations of means. ............................................................... 47 
Figure 6: (A): Group analysis of whole-brain GLM. Superposition maps (left: left 
hemisphere; right: right hemisphere; Top: lateral view; Bottom: medial 
view) of the contrast between comparison and control condition. Higher 
activation for comparison is shown in orange and for control condition in 
blue. Effects were only shown if the associated p-value yielded p<0.01 
(corrected for multiple comparisons with FDR). The 3D statistical maps 
were then projected on the folded surface reconstruction of the MNI 
template brain. Bilateral areas: arMFC, rMFC, TPJ, PCC, OFC, pH, 
mOFC. Left lateralized areas: FO and MTG, (B): Coronal slice showing 
areas which are not projected on folded brains in A (left Amg, bilateral 
pH, left SN and bilateral GP). Additionally a magnification of the 
activations in the brain stem is presented. .............................................  49 
Figure 7: BOLD time courses for all conditions (red=intelligence comparison, 
blue=body height comparison, dark and bright green=control conditions). 
Top: areas showing significant differences in comparison versus control 
(left pH, left PCC, and left OFC); center and bottom left and right: areas 
showing significant differences in intelligence comparison versus control 
and in intelligence versus body height comparison (center: left APCC, 
right prMFC, and left TPJ; bottom: left arMFC and mOFC); bottom right: 
left IPL showed significantly higher activation for control condition in 
contrasts intelligence comparison versus control condition and body 
height versus control condition. Error bars indicate the standard errors. 
 .............................................................................................................. 51 
Figure 8: Group analysis with masked RFX-GLM. Superposition maps (left: left 
hemisphere; right: right hemisphere; Top: lateral view; Bottom: medial 
view) with areas of masked GLM coloured for significant differences  Lists  
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between intelligence and body height comparison. Higher activation for 
intelligence comparison is shown in orange and for body height condition 
in blue. Effects were only shown if the associated p-value yielded p<0.05 
(corrected for multiple comparisons with FDR). The 3D statistical maps 
were then projected on the folded surface reconstruction of the MNI 
template brain. Areas: prMFC, arMFC, OFC, mOFC, FO, APCC, PCC, 
TPJ, and IPL. ......................................................................................... 53 
Figure 9: Paradigm design. Two different experimental conditions (body height 
and intelligence comparison). Each trial began with the presentation of a 
cue (1500 ms), followed by a fixation point (1500 ms) and a stimulus 
(1500 ms). After a jittered inter trial interval (ITI) between 9 and 12s a 
new trial began. The subjects had to decide if the other person, indicated 
by the names, or themselves was taller or more intelligent. .................. 64 
Figure 10: Reaction times for the two types of comparison (red: intelligence; 
green: body height) and the two directions of decision (dark: 
myself>others; bright: others>myself). Error bars represent standard 
deviations of means. ..............................................................................  67 
Figure 11: Occurrence of decision direction for the two types of comparison 
(red: intelligence; green: body height) and the two directions of decision 
(dark: myself>others; bright: others>myself). Blue parts show the amount 
of misses, which are less than 3% in both conditions. ........................... 68 
Figure 12: Group analysis with whole-brain RFX-GLM. Superposition maps (left: 
left hemisphere; right: right hemisphere; Top: lateral view; Bottom: medial 
view) of the contrast between intelligence and body height comparison. 
Higher activation for intelligence comparison is shown in orange (areas: 
left MTG, PCC, right OFC/FO, and a huge medial frontal cluster with 
local maxima in left arMFC, ACC, APCC, and mOFC) and for body height 
comparison in blue (areas: bilateral MFG and SFG, right ITG, right OcG, 
and two parietal clusters – right cluster includes maxima in PCun and two 
areas in lateral SPL – left cluster includes IPL and three areas in SPL.). 
Effects were only shown if the associated p-value yielded p<0.01 
(corrected for multiple comparisons with FDR). The 3D statistical maps 
were then projected on the folded surface reconstruction of the MNI 
template brain. ....................................................................................... 69  Lists  
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Figure 13: Group analysis with masked RFX-GLM. Superposition maps (left: left 
hemisphere; right: right hemisphere; top: lateral view; bottom: medial 
view) of the contrast between intelligence and body height comparison. 
Higher activation for intelligence comparison is shown in orange and for 
body height comparison in blue. Effects were only shown if the 
associated p-value yielded p<0.01 (corrected for multiple comparisons 
with FDR). The 3D statistical maps were then projected on the folded 
surface reconstruction of the MNI template brain. Areas: left prMFC, 
APCC, PCC, left MTG, left FO, right OFC, bilateral IPL, and left MFG. 
Medial frontal cluster with local maxima in left arMFC, medial prMFC, 
ACC, APCC, and mOFC.  ....................................................................... 72 
Figure 14: BOLD time courses for the two conditions and for both decision 
directions (dark red = intelligence comparison: myself>others, bright red 
= intelligence comparison: other>myself, dark green = body height 
comparison: myself>other, bright green = body height comparison: 
other>myself). Top: Areas showing significant differences in intelligence 
comparison between the decision directions myself>other and 
other>myself (arMFC, PCC, and mOFC); Bottom left: area showing 
significant differences in intelligence and body height comparison 
between the decision directions myself>other and other>myself (left 
MFG); Bottom right: left IPL showed significant differences only in body 
height comparison between the two decision directions. Error bars 
indicate the standard errors. .................................................................. 77 
Figure 15: Comparison of group analysis of masked RFX-GLMs of experiments 
1 and 2. Superposition maps with areas involved in both SOC and OOC 
(blue) and with areas showing specific differences. Red colours indicate 
areas only activated by OOC in the first experiment, green colours 
indicate areas only activated by SOC in the second experiment (dark 
colours = intelligence; bright colours = body height). Effects were only 
shown if the associated p-value yielded p<0.05 (corrected for multiple 
comparisons with FDR). The 3D statistical maps were then projected on 
the flatmap reconstruction of the MNI template brain. Areas: arMFC, 
prMFC, ACC, mOFC, MFG, IPL, TPJ, OFC, STS, and PCC. ................ 91  Lists  
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Figure 16: Paradigm design. Two different experimental conditions of 
intelligence comparison: Top: self vs. other comparison. The subjects 
had to decide if another person, indicated by the names, or themselves 
was more intelligent. Bottom: other vs. other comparison. The subjects 
had to decide if another person, indicated by the names, or the 
“reference person”, which was presented prior to each run, was more 
intelligent. Each trial began with the presentation of a cue (1500 ms), 
followed by a fixation point (1500 ms) and a stimulus (1500 ms). After a 
jittered inter trial interval (ITI) lasting between 9 and 12s, a new trial 
began. ................................................................................................. 100 
Figure 17: Occurrence of decision direction for the two types of comparison 
(red: SOC; green: OOC) and the two directions of decision (dark: SOC: 
myself>other; OOC: ref>other; bright: SOC: other>myself; OOC: 
other>ref). Blue parts show the amount of misses, which are less than 
2% in both conditions. ......................................................................... 103 
Figure 18: Reaction times for the two types of comparisons and the two 
decision directions (red: self vs. other comparison (SOC); green: other 
vs. other comparison (OOC)) and the two directions of decision (bright: 
myself>other in SOC respectively reference person>other in OOC; dark: 
other>myself in SOC respectively other>reference person in OOC). Error 
bars represent standard deviations of means. ..................................... 103 
Figure 19: Hypothesis-congruent decisions (in percent) for the two types of 
comparison and the two decision directions (red: self vs. other 
comparison (SOC); green: other vs. other comparison (OOC)) and the 
two directions of decision (bright: myself>other in SOC respectively 
reference person>other in OOC; dark: other>myself in SOC respectively 
other>reference person in OOC). Error bars represent standard 
deviations of means. ............................................................................  104 
Figure 20: Results of the group analysis with a whole brain FX-GLM. 
Superposition maps (left: left hemisphere; right: right hemisphere; Top: 
lateral view; Bottom: medial view) of the contrast between SOC and 
OOC. Higher activation for SOC is shown in orange and for OOC in blue. 
Effects were only shown if the associated p-value yielded p<0.01 
(corrected for multiple comparisons with FDR). Green colours in the SOC  Lists  
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areas represent significant contrast corrected for multiple comparisons 
with Bonferroni correction. The 3D statistical maps were then projected 
on the folded surface reconstruction of the MNI template brain. Areas: 
PoCG, SMA, SFG, MFG, CC, ACC, OcG, SMG, OFC, MTG, STS, FO, 
Hi, a cluster including Hi, Tec, and Pons. ............................................ 105 
Figure 21: BOLD time courses for areas showing significant differences 
between the SOC (dark blue) and the OOC (light blue) after correction for 
multiple comparison with Bonferroni (<.05). The time courses of the SOC 
and the OOC each represent averages of both decision directions. Error 
bars indicate the standard errors. ........................................................ 106 
Figure 22: Group analysis with FX-GLM. Superposition maps (left: left 
hemisphere; right: right hemisphere; Top: lateral view; Bottom: medial 
view) of the contrast between myself>other decisions and other>myself 
decisions for the SOCs. Higher activation for myself>other decisions is 
shown in orange and for other>myself decisions in blue. Effects were 
only shown if the associated p-value yielded p<0.01 (corrected for 
multiple comparisons with FDR). The 3D statistical maps were then 
projected on the folded surface reconstruction of the MNI template brain. 
Areas: mOFC, PoCG, SPL, PreCG, SMA, SMG, OcG. ....................... 108 
Figure 23: BOLD time courses of the areas showing significant differences 
between the two decision directions of the SOC in the masked FX-GLM 
(red=myself>other, green=other>myself, dark and bright green=control 
conditions). Top: mOFC and arMFC shows higher activation for the 
decision myself>other; Bottom: IPL shows higher activation when 
another person was rated as more intelligent than oneself. Error bars 
indicate the standard errors. ................................................................ 110  Appendix  
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9. Appendix 
 
9.1 Stimuli of experiment 1  
9.1.1 Stimuli of experiment 1 in alphabetical order 
 
Surnames of celebrities for the trainings session: 
Clinton 
Clooney 
DeVito 
Eminem 
Goethe 
Jagger 
Sinatra 
Struck 
Tappert 
Wussow 
 
Surnames of celebrities for the main experiment: 
Agassi 
Becker 
Biolek 
Blair 
Bohlen 
Brandt 
Bush 
Carrell 
Chirac 
Cruise 
Drews 
Einstein 
Elvis 
Falko 
Fischer 
Gates 
Genscher 
Ghandi 
Grass 
Hanks 
Heino 
Hoeneß 
Jackson 
Jauch 
Jordan 
Juhnke 
Kahn 
Kohl 
Lenin 
Lennon 
Loriot 
Maffay 
Mozart 
Otto 
Pitt 
Powell 
Putin 
Raab 
Rau 
Schröder 
Schumacher
Sting 
Strauß 
Trittin 
Tyson 
Vogts 
Völler 
  Appendix  
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9.1.2 Stimuli pairs of the 4 conditions 
Training session 
intelligence body  height  musician  politian 
Wussow Clinton  DeVito  Jagger  Sinatra Wussow DeVito Tappert 
Clooney Eminem Clinton  Clooney  Goethe Eminem Struck  Jagger 
 
Main Experiment 
intelligence body  height  musician  politian 
Bohlen Putin  Becker  Drews  Vogts  Ghandi Jackson  Lenin 
Putin Lennon  Juhnke  Heino  Brandt  Genscher  Cruise  Biolek 
Bush Schröder  Cruise  SchumacherHeino Jordan  Agassi  Elvis 
Sting Hanks  Bohlen  Becker  Ghandi  Mozart  Cruise  Carrel 
Carrel Schumacher  Brandt  Kohl  Becker Rau Lennon  Genscher 
Hoeneß Juhnke  Kahn  Juhnke  Heino  Kahn  Heino  Juhnke 
Heino Einstein  Kohl  Schröder  Bohlen  Becker  Agassi  Völler 
Grass Falko  Biolek  Trittin  SchumacherCarrel Falko  Pitt 
Agassi Völler  Fischer  Gates  Raab  Hanks Trittin  Biolek 
Hanks Raab  Loriot  Grass  Grass  Falko  Bush  Tyson 
Juhnke Gates  Elvis  Maffay  Powell Trittin  Powell  Biolek 
Trittin Powell  Sting  Raab  Schröder  Kohl  Kahn Kohl 
Mozart Einstein  Genscher Brandt  Drews  Becker Hoeneß  Fischer 
Genscher Lennon  Vogts  Jordan  Mozart Vogts  Heino  Schröder 
Pitt Drews Maffay  Jordan  Bush Otto  Hoeneß  Juhnke 
Drews Chirac  Raab  Lenin  Strauß  Chirac Strauß  Jauch 
Pitt Falko  Maffay  Völler Bush  Schröder Drews  Chirac 
Maffay Ghandi  Elvis  Agassi  Pitt  Sting  Fischer  Gates 
Bohlen Jackson  SchumacherVogts  Sting Hanks  Cruise  Schumacher
Fischer Brandt  Carrel  Powell  Maffay  Ghandi Chirac  Jauch 
Mozart Vogts  Chirac  Strauß  Drews Pitt Jackson  Bohlen 
Völler Elvis  Ghandi  Grass  Einstein Heino Tyson  Kahn 
Biolek Cruise  Pitt  Sting  Strauß  Blair  Vogts Schumacher
Kahn Tyson  Kahn  Heino  Agassi  Falko Juhnke  Gates 
Jauch Strauß  Putin  Genscher  Ghandi  Grass Juhnke  Kahn 
Agassi Grass  Cruise  Powell  Brandt  Fischer  Lenin  Raab 
Fischer Hoeneß  Carrel  Cruise  Hoeneß  Jackson  Loriot  Grass 
Rau Becker Hoeneß  Jackson  Vogts  Jordan  Maffay  Elvis 
Vogts Ghandi  Heino  Jordan  Maffay  Jordan  Putin Lennon 
Schröder Heino  Ghandi  Mozart  Mozart  Einstein  Elvis  Völler 
Lenin Jackson Rau  Chirac  Fischer  Kohl  Genscher  Gates 
Kohl Kahn  Tyson  Bush  Putin  Genscher  Carrel  Powell 
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9.2 Celebrity rating scale from experiment 3 
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10. Deutsche Zusammenfassung 
 
Einleitung 
Da bisher wenig über die zugrunde liegenden neuronalen Korrelate von 
sozialen Vergleichen bekannt ist, bestand das Ziel dieser Doktorarbeit darin, 
Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede der neuronalen Aktivierungsmuster bei 
sozialen Vergleichen von Personeneigenschaften mit Hilfe funktioneller 
Magnetresonanztomographie (fMRT) zu untersuchen. Weiterhin gibt es keine 
Befunde darüber ob und inwiefern sich Vergleiche unterschiedlicher 
Personeneigenschaften auf neuronaler Ebene unterscheiden, z.B. wie 
unterscheiden sich Vergleiche von physikalischen und psychologischen 
Personeneigenschaften voneinander. Auch die Beantwortung dieser Frage war 
ein Ziel dieser Doktorarbeit. Außerdem interessierte uns die Frage, ob es für die 
unterschiedliche Involvierung des Ichs bei den verschiedenen Arten von 
sozialen Vergleichen unterschiedliche neuronale Korrelate gibt. Abschließend 
sollte untersucht werden, ob es neuronale Unterschiede zwischen den 
Entscheidungsrichtungen bei den oben genannten sozialen Vergleichen gibt. 
 
Experiment 1 
Im ersten fMRT-Experiment haben wir komparative und nicht-komparative 
Urteile miteinander verglichen. Für die komparativen Urteile wurden zwei Arten 
verwendet – der Vergleich von psychologischen und physikalischen 
Personencharakteristika. Es wurde die Hypothese überprüft, ob komparative 
Urteile über Personen im Rahmen sozialer Vergleichsaufgaben zu 
Aktivierungen von vergleichsspezifischen Arealen und Arealen, die mit dem 
Abruf von personenbezogenem semantischem Wissen in Verbindung gebracht 
werden, führen. Darüber hinaus erwarteten wir, dass der Vergleich von 
psychologischen Personencharakteristiken eine Perspektivenübernahme der zu 
vergleichenden Personen ("mentalizing") beinhaltet. Die Fähigkeit, eine 
Annahme über Bewusstseinsvorgänge in anderen Personen vorzunehmen, wird  Deutsche  Zusammenfassung  
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in der Psychologie und anderen Kognitionswissenschaften mit dem Begriff 
Theory of Mind (ToM) bezeichnet. 
Der Vergleich von physikalischen Personencharakteristiken basiert mehr auf 
einem Vergleich von mentaler Imagination der Personen. Folglich sollten die 
ToM Areale bei dem Intelligenzvergleich stärker aktiviert werden. 
Zu Beginn jeder Versuchsaufgabe wurde den Probanden die Aufgabe mit 
einem von vier, je eine Sekunde langen, Schlüsselreizen ("Intelligenz", 
"Körpergröße", "Musiker" oder "Politiker") angekündigt. Nach einer weiteren 
Sekunde wurden den Probanden jeweils zwei Namen berühmter Personen aus 
den Bereichen Sport, Politik, Musik und Unterhaltung präsentiert. Diese 47 
berühmten Personen wurden mir von Prof. Mussweiler als das Ergebnis (100% 
Bekanntheit bei 20 männlichen Sudenten) eines Ratings von 100 berühmten 
Personen als Stimuli zur Verfügung gestellt. Dieses Rating war nicht Teil meiner 
Doktorarbeit. Bei den nicht-komparativen Urteilen sollten die Probanden 
entscheiden, ob einer der beiden berühmten Personen ein Politiker (oder 
Musiker) war. Bei den komparativen Urteilen sollten die Probanden 
entscheiden, welche der beiden Personen intelligenter oder größer war - Other 
vs. Other Comparison (OOC). Die Probanden sollten ihr Urteil bzw. 
Entscheidung mittels eines Knopfdruckes so schnell wie möglich bekannt 
geben. 
 
Ergebnisse von Experiment 1 
Die Ergebnisse des RFX-GLMs (korrigiert für multiple Vergleiche mit False 
Discovery Rate (FDR) < .05) zeigten, dass bei den komparativen Urteilen viele 
Areale des medial frontal cortex (MFC) – vor allem der anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC), die anterioren und posterioren Teile des rostralen medial frontal cortex 
(arMFC und prMFC) und der medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC) eine stärkere 
Aktivierung aufwiesen als bei den nicht-komparativen Urteilen. Weiterhin 
zeigten sich stärkere Aktivierungen für die sozialen komparativen Vergleiche in 
folgenden Arealen: posterior cingulate coretex (PCC), temporo-parietal junction 
(TPJ), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), rechtes frontal operculum (FO), posterior 
hippocampus (pH), linke amygdala (Amg), globus pallidus (GP), middle  Deutsche  Zusammenfassung  
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temporal gyrus (MTG), occipital gyrus (OcG) and substantia nigra (SN). Nur der 
inferior parietal lobe (IPL) zeigte eine stärkere Aktivierung für die nicht-
komparative Aufgabe. 
Im zweiten Analyseschritt – maskiertes GLM über alle signifikanten Areale aus 
dem ersten RFX-GLMs – kontrastierten wir die beiden Dimensionen der 
sozialen Vergleiche (psychologische vs. physikalische Personeneigenschaften). 
Alle Areale, die eine stärkere Aktivierung für die komparativen Bedingungen im 
ersten RFX-GLM zeigten, zeigten hier eine stärkere Aktivierung für den 
Vergleich psychologischer Personeneigenschaften (Intelligenz). Nur der IPL 
zeigte eine stärkere Aktivierung für den Vergleich physikalischer 
Personeneigenschaften. 
 
Diskussion Experiment 1 
Das neuronale Netzwerk, das bei sozialen Vergleichen involviert war, 
unterscheidet sich anscheinend von dem Netzwerk, dass bei nicht-sozialen 
bzw. nicht personenbezogen Vergleichen wie z.B. Nummern, Größen oder 
Helligkeiten physikalischer Objekte (Cohen-Kadosh et al., 2005; Pinel et al., 
2004) involviert ist. Das neuronale Netzwerk für nicht personenbezogene 
Vergleiche beinhaltete überwiegend parietale und dorsolaterale präfrontale 
Areale. Im Gegensatz dazu aktivierte der Personenvergleich medial frontal, 
orbitofrontale und limbische Areale als auch den TPJ. Die Aktivierung dieses 
Netzwerkes kam hauptsächlich durch den Vergleich der psychologischen 
Personencharakteristik (Intelligenz) zustande. Wie erwartet, zeigten sich 
Unterschiede zwischen den beiden Arten des Vergleichs von 
Personencharakteristika (Intelligenz und Größe). Obwohl man beide Vergleiche 
konzeptuell als Vergleich von Werten ansehen könnte (Intelligenzquotient bzw. 
Körpergröße als Zahlen), unterscheiden sie sich dennoch in ihren neuronalen 
Aktivierungsmustern. 
Gemäß unserer Hypothese fanden wir bei den Personenvergleichen - speziell 
bei den Intelligenzvergleichen - Areale, die zu dem klassischen ToM-Netzwerk 
gezählt werden. Zu diesen gehören der TPJ, der ACC und dorsale MFC (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1999; Berthoz et al., 2002; Brunet et al., 2000; Calarge et al.,  Deutsche  Zusammenfassung  
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2003; Calder et al., 2002; Castelli et al., 2000; Fletcher et al., 1995; Gallagher et 
al., 2000; Gallagher et al., 2002; McCabe et al., 2001; Saxe et al., 2003; 
Vogeley et al., 2001; Walter et al., 2004). Die ToM-Forschung konnte bisher 
zeigen, dass Menschen sich Perspektivenübernahmen in Situationen bedienen, 
in denen die eigenen Folgen von anderen Personen und deren Intentionen 
abhängen, (Gallagher et al., 2002; Rilling et al., 2004). In dieser Studie wurden 
keine Situationen sondern nur die Namen von Personen dargeboten - ohne 
weitere Angaben über das Verhalten, ohne die Erwartung einer Interaktion und 
ohne eine direkte Aufforderung zur Perspektivenübernahme. Unsere 
Ergebnisse der Involvierung der ToM-Areale bei sozialen Vergleichen deuten 
darauf hin, dass soziale Urteile automatisch mentalizing-Prozesse beinhalten. 
Soziale Urteile involvieren oft die spontane Aktivierung von relevantem 
Selbstwissen (Dunning et al., 1996), was wiederum mit der 
Perspektivenübernahme in Verbindung gebracht wird (Davis et al., 1996; 
Galinsky et al., 2000). Unsere Resultate zeigen jedoch auch klare Grenzen für 
mentalizing. Einfache Kategorisierungen, wie die Frage nach den Berufen von 
Personen, aktivierten nicht das ToM-Netzwerk. 
Da die Probanden die genauen Angaben über Intelligenz und Körpergröße der 
berühmten Persönlichkeiten nicht explizit kannten und diese somit schätzen 
mussten, basierten die Vergleiche in unserem Paradigma auf Unsicherheit über 
die Vergleichsinhalte. Einige Studien über Entscheidungen unter Unsicherheit 
oder in unsicheren Situationen beschreiben Aktivierungen im MFC und OFC 
(Manes et al., 2002; Bechara et al., 2000; Fellows et al., 2007; Haynes et al., 
2007). Unsere Ergebnisse (stärkere Aktivierung des prMFC, arMFC, mOFC und 
OFC bei den komparativen Bedingungen) konnten die Befunde bestätigen. Eine 
Aktivierung des OFC wurde bei Belohnungs- und Bestrafungsaufgaben 
gefunden (Roll, 1996). Amodio und Frith (2006) gehen davon aus, das der OFC 
bei der Verhaltensregulierung auf Basis der Werte für mögliche Folgen beteiligt 
ist. In Anbetracht der in sozialen Vergleichen beteiligten Prozesse, macht es 
Sinn, dass Areale aktiviert werden, die typischerweise involviert sind, wenn 
Fakten und Argumente generiert, erinnert, gewichtet und integriert werden. Das 
von Mussweiler (2003) erstellte Prozessmodell von Vergleichen hebt hervor, 
dass Vergleiche und Entscheidungsfindungen die gleichen psychologischen  Deutsche  Zusammenfassung  
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Prozesse involvieren. Die Ergebnisse dieser Studie liefern interessante 
Implikationen für die psychologische Forschung im Bereich sozialer Kognition 
und sozialer Urteile. Es wurde oft angenommen, dass bei allen 
Komplexitätsgraden von Vergleichen die gleichen psychologischen Prozesse 
beteiligt sind (Kahneman et al., 1986; Mussweiler, 2003). Unsere Resultate 
lassen vermuten, dass Vergleiche vielfältiger sind als angenommen. Erstens 
unterscheiden sich personenbezogene und nicht-personenbezogene Vergleiche 
hinsichtlich ihrer neuronalen Aktivierungsmuster und somit wahrscheinlich auch 
hinsichtlich der involvierten psychologischen Prozesse. Zweitens, beinhalten die 
Vergleiche von psychologischen und physikalischen Personeneigenschaften 
einen unterschiedlichen Grad an Perspektivenübernahme der zu 
vergleichenden Personen. 
Trotz der Vortestung der Stimuli erkannten die Probanden die eine oder andere 
berühmte Persönlichkeiten nicht oder nur deren Namen. Dies impliziert, dass in 
den Entscheidungen ein unterschiedlicher Grad an Unsicherheit vorhanden 
war. Dies kann Auswirkungen auf unsere Ergebnisse haben und sollte in 
folgenden Experimenten kontrolliert werden. 
 
Experiment 2 
Im zweiten fMRT-Experiment untersuchten wir komparative Urteile, in denen die 
Probanden sich selbst mit einer anderen Person vergleichen sollten - Self vs. 
Other Comparison (SOC). Wir verwendeten wiederum die gleichen 
komparativen Urteile über psychologische und physikalische 
Personeneigenschaften (Intelligenz und Körpergröße) wie im ersten 
Experiment. Die 15 Probanden in diesem Experiment sollten vor dem 
Experiment eine Liste von 40 Namen ihnen persönlich bekannten Personen 
erstellen. So wurde sichergestellt, dass die Probanden alle zu vergleichenden 
Personen kennen. Diese Namen wurden als Stimuli für das Experiment 
verwendet. Zu Beginn jeder Aufgabe wurde einer der beiden Schlüsselreize 
("Intelligenz" und "Körpergröße") präsentiert, der die Art des Vergleiches für die 
folgende Aufgabe ankündigte. Nach einer Pause von 1,5 Sekunden wurde den 
Probanden einer der Namen präsentiert. Die Probanden hatten die Aufgabe, die  Deutsche  Zusammenfassung  
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Person mit sich selbst bzgl. der Intelligenz oder der Körpergröße zu vergleichen 
und zu entscheiden wer intelligenter bzw. größer war. Da die Inhalte der 
sozialen Vergleiche in diesem Experiment die gleichen wie im vorhergehenden 
Experiment waren, erwarteten wir, dass das gleiche Netzwerk von Hirnarealen 
bei den komparativen Personenurteilen involviert ist und verzichteten auf eine 
semantische Kontrollbedingung in diesem Experiment. Weiterhin erwarteten wir 
die gleichen Unterschiede in der Aktivierung des ToM-Netzwerkes mit einem 
höheren Grad an Perspektivenübernahme bei den Intelligenzvergleichen als bei 
den Körpergrößenvergleichen. 
Areale im MFC und weitere Areale (TPJ, insula (Ins), nucleus accumbens 
(NAcc), AMG) wurden bei Aufgaben gefunden, die Ich-Perspektive, Vergleiche 
zwischen selbst und anderen und Selbstbeschreibungen enthalten (z.B. 
Northoff et al. 2006). Während die dorsalen Areale des MFC vermehrt bei 
Prozessen der Neubewertung und Evaluation von selbstbezogenen Stimuli 
aktiviert werden, sind die ventralen Areale bei der Bestimmung der 
Selbstreferenz oder Selbstbezuges von Stimuli involviert. Zudem sind 
posteriore Areale des MFC bei Aufgaben mit selbstreferentiellen Stimuli 
involviert (Northoff et al., 2006). Wir erwarteten für den Kontrast zwischen den 
beiden sozialen Vergleichen (psychologisch vs. physikalisch) unterschiedliche 
Aktivierungsmuster im dorsalen und ventralen MFC. 
In diesem Experiment waren wir zusätzlich an den neuronalen Korrelaten der 
Entscheidungsrichtungen interessiert. Abhängig von der Beziehung, zu der wir 
zu der zu vergleichenden Personen stehen, hat diese Art von Vergleich Einfluss 
auf unsere Emotionen. Demzufolge war ein Unterschied in der Aktivierung 
sowohl in emotionsbezogenen Arealen (AMG und limbisches System), als auch 
im ventralen MFC, der bei emotionalen Perspektivenübernahmen und 
emotionaler Empathie (Gallagher et al., 2003) und sozialen Emotionen 
(Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007) beteiligt ist, zu erwarten. 
Weiterhin waren Unterschiede im OFC, der für die Integration von 
Informationen aus anderen präfrontalen Arealen hinsichtlich der Valenz von 
Belohnungen der zu erwarteten Folgen einer Entscheidung beteiligt ist, zu 
erwarten (Wallis, 2007).  Deutsche  Zusammenfassung  
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Ergebnisse Experiment 2 
Der Kontrast zwischen den beiden Arten von Vergleichen (psychologische vs. 
physikalische Personeneigenschaften) in dem RFX-GLM über das ganze 
Gehirn zeigte eine stärkere Aktivierung für den Körpergrößenvergleich in einem 
Netzwerk von parietalen und lateralen frontalen Arealen (SPL, IPL, PCun, ITG, 
OcG, SFG und MFG). Für den Intelligenzvergleich wurden mediale frontale und 
mediale parietale Areale stärker aktiviert (linker MTG, PCC, arMFC, ACC, OFC 
und mOFC). 
Da wir keine Kontrollbedingung verwendeten, war es nicht möglich für diesen 
Vergleich (SOC) spezifische Areale zu identifizieren. Deshalb untersuchten wir 
die vergleichsspezifischen Areale die wir im ersten Experiment gefunden 
haben, indem wir die gleiche Maske für ein maskiertes RFX-GLM verwendeten. 
Der Kontrast zwischen den beiden Dimensionen der Vergleiche 
(psychologische vs. physikalische Personeneigenschaften) in diesem 
maskierten RFX-GLM zeigte eine stärkere Aktivierung für die 
Intelligenzvergleiche in den Arealen arMFC, prMFC, ACC, PCC, mOFC, linker 
MTG, linker FO und rechter OFC. Die bilateralen IPL und der linke MFG zeigten 
eine stärkere Aktivierung für die Körpergrößenvergleiche. 
In den Entscheidungsrichtungen der Intelligenz- bzw. Körpergrößenvergleiche 
zeigten sich für die FX-ROI-GLMs signifikante Unterschiede in den Arealen der 
maskierten RFX-GLM. Für die Entscheidungsrichtungen der 
Intelligenzvergleiche wurden signifikante Unterschiede im PCC, medialen 
arMFC und rechten IPL gefunden. Im mOFC und linken arMFC zeigten sich 
sowohl für die Entscheidungsrichtung der Intelligenz- als auch der 
Körpergrößenvergleiche signifikante Unterschiede. Für die 
Entscheidungsrichtung der Körpergrößenvergleiche zeigte sich nur im linken 
IPL ein Unterschied. Alle Areale, die einen Unterschied für die 
Intelligenzvergleiche zeigten, wiesen eine stärkere Aktivierung für die 
Entscheidung "ich bin intelligenter/größer als der/die Andere" auf. Nur der linke 
IPL zeigte ein stärkere Aktivierung für die Entscheidung "ich bin größer als 
der/die Andere" bei den Körpergrößenvergleichen. 
  Deutsche  Zusammenfassung  
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Diskussion Experiment 2 
Analog zum ersten Experiment aktivierten die Vergleiche von psychologischen 
Personencharakteristika wiederholt Areale die auch bei Aufgaben mit ToM und 
Perspektivenübernahme zu finden sind (ACC und PCC). 
Wir gehen auch im zweiten Experiment von einer Unsicherheit in der 
Entscheidungsfindung aus, da auch hier den Probanden keine genauen 
Angaben über Intelligenz und Körpergröße der zu vergleichenden Personen zur 
Verfügung standen. Hierzu passend fanden wir auch Areale, die bei 
Entscheidungen mit Unsicherheit gefunden wurden - prMFC, arMFC, mOFC 
und OFC (Manes et al., 2002; Bechara et al., 2000; Fellows et al., 2007). 
Der MFC spielt eine wichtige Rolle bei sozialen Vergleichen und wurde mit 
Erste-Person-Perspektive (Vogeley et al., 2003), mit der Integration sozialer 
Informationen aus anderen Arealen (Huey et al., 2006), mit 
personenbezogenem Wissen (e.g., Mason et al., 2004; Mitchell et al., 2002), mit 
Urteilen über psychologische Eigenschaften (Kircher et al., 2000) und mit 
selbstrelevanten Urteilen (Macrae et al., 2004) in Bezug gebracht. Weiterhin 
wurden Teile des MFC mit sozialen Kognitionen (Schilbach at al., 2006), mit 
selbstreferentiellen Prozessen (Kelley et al., 2002), mit Rückschlüssen über 
Personeneigenschaften anderer Personen – dorsaler MFC und mit 
bewertenden Urteilen über bekannte Personen – ventraler MFC (Van 
Overwalle, 2009) in Verbindung gebracht. 
Da der Vergleich von psychologischen Personeneigenschaften 
selbstreferentielle Urteile und Rückschlüsse über Personeneigenschaften 
anderer Personen und sich selbst beinhaltet, lassen unsere Ergebnisse 
vermuten, dass die Aktivierungen im ACC und im dorsalen MFC mit diesen 
Prozessen in Verbindung stehen. 
Die Aktivierungen im OFC und mOFC bei den Intelligenzvergleichen können 
äquivalent zum ersten Experiment mit Belohnungsantizipation (Fliessbach et 
al., 2007; Rolls, 1996; Amodio et al., 2006) und Generierung, Gewichtung und 
Integration von Fakten und Argumenten erklärt werden (Hare et al., 2008).  Deutsche  Zusammenfassung  
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Vor dem eigentlichen Vergleich der Personen in unserem Task kann, 
unabhängig von der Vergleichsaufgabe, eine visuelle Imagination der zu 
vergleichenden Personen hilfreich sein, um Gewissheit über diese Person zu 
haben. Während bei Intelligenzvergleichen die Imagination von Personen allein 
nicht für den Vergleich und die Entscheidung ausreicht, erfolgt der 
Körpergrößenvergleich  auf Grundlage der Imagination von Personen. Die 
Aktivierungen des Netzwerkes (SPL, IPL, PCun, ITG, FG, OcG, SFG and 
MFG), welches wir bei den Körpergrößenvergleichen gefunden haben, 
beinhalten sowohl Areale des fronto-parietalen Aufmerksamkeitsnetzwerkes 
(z.B. Posner et al., 1990) als auch Areale, die bei diversen visuellen 
Imaginationen gefunden wurden (z.B. Lamm et al., 2001; Newman et al., 2007), 
z.B. bei mentaler Rotation (Kawamichi et al., 2007), relationaler visuelle 
Imaginationen (Knauff et al., 2002) und räumlicher Transformationen 
(egozentrische vs. objektbasierte) der visuellen Imaginationen (Creem et al., 
2001, Zacks et al., 1999; Zacks et al., 2000; Zacks et al., 2002; Zacks et al., 
2003a; Zacks et al., 2003b). Die Ergebnisse lassen vermuten, dass der 
Vergleich von physikalischen Personeneigenschaften wie erwartet visuelle 
Imaginationen der zu vergleichenden Personen erfordert. 
Außerdem konnten wir mit dem Kontrast zwischen den beiden Vergleichsarten 
des maskierten GLMs die Hauptergebnisse des ersten Experimentes bzgl. der 
distinkten Netzwerke für die beiden Vergleichsarten replizieren. 
 
Vergleich von Experiment 1 und 2 
Ein inferenzstatistischer Vergleich in Form einer 2x2 ANOVA der beiden 
Experimente wäre wünschenswert, um die neuronalen Unterschiede zu 
untersuchen, die auf die unterschiedliche Involvierung des Ichs in den beiden 
Vergleichen zurückzuführen ist. Da die Experimente an zwei verschiedenen 
Magnetresonanztomographen gemessen wurden und die BOLD-Signale der 
Versuchsbedingungen von den Messgeräten abhängig sind, kann das Ergebnis 
einer Inferenzstatistik nicht eindeutig auf die Aufgaben und deren Unterschiede 
zurückgeführt werden. Aus diesem Grund haben wir die Ergebnisse der beiden  Deutsche  Zusammenfassung  
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Experimente nur deskriptiv miteinander verglichen, um Hypothesen für ein 
weiteres Experiment zu generieren. 
Die neuronalen Aktivierungsmuster der Intelligenzvergleiche von OOC und 
SOC zeigten Überlappungen in einem großen medial frontalen Cluster (ACC, 
arMFC, mOFC) und weiteren Arealen (arMFC, ACC, APCC, PCC, mOFC, OFC 
und linker STS). 
Unterschiede zwischen OOC und SOC waren für die Intelligenzvergleiche in 
folgenden Arealen zu finden: Für OOC waren zusätzlich Areale im ventralen 
und anterioren dorsalen MFC (linker arMFC, prMFC, anteriorer Teil des ACC, 
mOFC), im OFC, im superioren Teil des PCC, im STS, in der SN und im 
anterioren nucleus talamicus involviert. Zusätzlich waren die bilateralen TPJs 
nur bei OOC aktiviert. Für SOC waren mehr Areale im zentralen MFC (inferiore 
Teile des arMFC und prMFC und superiorer mOFC), im inferioren PCC, im 
lateralen OFC, im linken STS und Areale im medialen gyrus occipitalis 
involviert. 
Für den Körpergrößenvergleich zeigten sich zwischen OOC und SOC 
Überlappungen im IPL, die wie oben beschrieben auf die für den Vergleich 
verwendete Imagination zurückgeführt werden können, wobei SOC größere 
Teile des IPL und zusätzlich ein Areal im linken MFG involvierte. 
Die beiden Intelligenzvergleiche zeigten Überlappungen der neuronalen 
Aktivierungsmuster im arMFC, ACC, APCC, PCC and OFC, die wie bereits 
oben beschrieben mit Perspektivenübernahmen und Belohnungsantizipationen 
in den Aufgaben erklärt werden können. 
Sowohl SOC als auch OOC aktivierten ToM-Areale, da in beiden Vergleichen 
Personeneigenschaften anderer Personen geschätzt werden mussten. 
Allerdings zeigte SOC keine Aktivierungen im TPJ. Dies kann damit erklärt 
werden, dass sich die Stimuli bzw. die zu vergleichenden Personen in beiden 
Experimenten unterschieden. Einerseits mussten im Experiment 2 die 
Eigenschaften nur einer Person geschätzt werden. Andererseits ist es 
vorstellbar, dass der Vergleich der persönlich bekannten Personen im zweiten 
Experiment einfacher war als bei den berühmten Personen im ersten 
Experiment, da die für den Vergleich notwendigen Informationen leichter  Deutsche  Zusammenfassung  
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verfügbar waren und deshalb weniger Perspektivenübernahme nötig war. 
Weiterhin können die Vergleiche mit uns bekannten Personen eine höhere 
Selbstrelevanz aufweisen als Vergleiche mit fremden Personen, einhergehend 
mit mehr Belohnungsantizipationen und einer stärkeren Involvierung des Ichs. 
Dies kann eine Erklärung für die stärkeren Aktivierungen im anterioren dorsalen 
arMFC und prMFC im SOC sein. 
Wir verwendeten den deskriptiven Vergleich zur Formulierung folgender 
Hypothesen für ein weiteres Experiment: (1) OOC und SOC unterscheiden sich 
in dem Bedarf an Perspektivenübernahme, einhergehend mit stärkeren 
Aktivierungen in ToM spezifischen Arealen, vor allem im TPJ. (2) Durch die 
unterschiedliche Involvierung des Ichs in den beiden Vergleichsarten 
unterscheiden sich OOC und SOC in ihren Aktivierungsmustern im MFC. 
 
Experiment 3 
Basierend auf den Ergebnissen des Vergleichs der ersten beiden Experimente 
führten wir ein drittes Experiment durch, um OOC und SOC als „within“-Faktor 
und die Entscheidungsrichtungen bei Intelligenzvergleichen zu untersuchen. 
Folgende Arbeitshypothesen wurden untersucht: 
(1) OOC bedarf mehr Perspektivenübernahmen, einhergehend mit einer 
höheren Aktivierung in ToM-Arealen. (2) OOC und SOC zeigen Unterschiede in 
den Aktivierungsmustern im MFC, die auf die unterschiedliche Involvierung des 
Ichs in den Vergleichen zurückzuführen sind. (3) Die Entscheidungsrichtungen 
zeigen ebenfalls ein unterschiedliches Aktivierungsmuster im MFC. 
 
Ergebnisse 
Es handelt sich hier nur um vorläufige Daten mit einer kleinen Stichprobe von 6 
Versuchspersonen. In einem FX-GLM über das ganze Gehirn zeigten eine 
Vielzahl von Arealen eine stärkere Aktivierung für SOC als für OOC (PoCG, 
SMA, SFG, MFG, CC, ACC, OcG, SMG, OFC, MTG, STS, FO, Hi, Tec und 
Pons). Bei SOC wies die Entscheidungsrichtung „ich > andere“ stärkere  Deutsche  Zusammenfassung  
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Aktivierungen im mOFC auf, während für die entgegengesetzte 
Entscheidungsrichtung stärkere Aktivierungen im PoCG, SPL, IPL, PreCG, 
SMA, IFGOp, OcG, Ins und Cerebellum beobachtet wurde. 
Im maskierten GLM, bei Verwendung der gleichen Maske wie in den beiden 
vorherigen Experimenten, zeigten alle Areale stärkere Aktivierungen für SOC. 
Der Kontrast zwischen den Entscheidungsrichtungen zeigten bei OOC keine 
Unterschiede. Bei SOC wies die Entscheidungsrichtung „ich > andere“ stärkere 
Aktivierungen im arMFC und mOFC auf und für die entgegengesetzte 
Entscheidungsrichtung eine erhöhte Aktivierung im IPL. 
 
Diskussion Experiment 3 
SOC aktivierte zum einen Areale die bei der Imagination des eigenen Körpers 
involviert sind. Weiterhin zeigten sich bei SOC stärkere Aktivierungen in 
Arealen, die ebenfalls bei Belohnungsantizipationen (OFC), bei 
Perspektivenübernahmen und bei unsicheren Entscheidungen (arMFC, prMFC 
und ACC) involviert werden. 
Entgegen der Erwartung, dass der TPJ eine stärkere Aktivierung bei OOC 
haben sollte, wie man aus dem Vergleich der beiden ersten Experimente hätte 
schließen können, zeigte der TPJ hier eine stärkere Aktivierung für SOC. Dies 
kann dadurch erklärt werden, dass die Entscheidungen in der SOC Bedingung 
ein deutlich höhere Selbstrelevanz hat als in der OOC Bedingung. Folglich kann 
es sein, dass die Probanden sich hier deutlich mehr angestrengt haben, und 
somit auch mehr detailierte Perspektivenübernahmen durchgeführt haben. Die 
stärkeren Aktivierungen im dorsalen MFC sprechen auch für unsere zweite 
Hypothese, in der wir einen Unterschied in der Aktivierung im MFC in Relation 
zur Involvierung des Ichs in SOC postulierten. 
Die stärkeren Aktivierungen im mOFC und arMFC für die Entscheidung „ich 
>andere“ lassen sich wiederum mit einer höheren Involvierung des Ichs und 
einer höheren Belohnungserwartung erklären. Die Aktivierungen der 
entgegengesetzten Entscheidungsrichtung lassen sich durch einen höheren  Deutsche  Zusammenfassung  
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Bedarf an Imaginationen der anderen Person erklären, z.B. der zur Kontrolle 
der Entscheidung nötig ist. 
 
Zusammenfassende Diskussion 
Die Hauptbefunde der drei Experimente sind zum einen die Unterschiede der 
involvierten neuronalen Netwerke zwischen den Vergleichen von physikalischen 
und psychologischen Personeneigenschaften. Während der Vergleich von 
physikalischen Personeneigenschaften mehr auf der Basis von Imaginationen 
vorgenommen wird, erfolgen die Vergleiche der psychologischen Eigenschaften 
durch Perspektivenübernahmen und unterliegen einer größeren Unsicherheit 
bei den Entscheidungen. 
Ein weiterer interessanter Befund ist der Unterschied der involvierten 
neuronalen Areale zwischen SOC und OOC, der durch eine höhere 
Selbstrelevanz und den damit einhergehenden stärkeren Anstrengungen bei 
der Bearbeitung in Form von Perspektivenübernahmen und höheren 
Belohnungsantizipationen zu erklären ist. 
Das dritte wichtige Ergebnis dieser Studie ist der Unterschied zwischen den 
Entscheidungsrichtungen. Die Entscheidung, dass man selbst intelligenter ist 
als ein anderer weist ebenfalls eine höhere Selbstrelevanz auf und führt zu 
einer höheren Belohnungserwartung als die entgegengesetzte 
Entscheidungsrichtung. 
Im ersten Experiment haben wir nur männliche Versuchspersonen gemessen, 
da die Stimuli nur an Männern bzgl. der Bekanntheit eingestuft wurden. Eine 
Generalisierung der Ergebnisse auf Frauen ist hier nicht möglich. Im zweiten 
und dritten Experiment haben wir sowohl Männer als auch Frauen gemessen, 
da wir hier individuelle Stimulisets verwendet haben. Man könnte annehmen, 
dass das Geschlecht der Versuchspersonen und das Geschlecht der zu 
vergleichenden Personen einen Einfluss auf die Vergleichs- und 
Entscheidungsprozesse und damit auch auf die neuronalen Aktivierungsmuster 
haben. Z.B. Wenn wir von einer kleineren Körpergröße bei Frauen als bei 
Männern ausgehen, könnten die Vergleiche und die dazugehörigen  Deutsche  Zusammenfassung  
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Entscheidungsrichtungen bzgl. der Körpergröße einem systematischen Einfluss 
des Geschlechts der Versuchsperson unterliegen. Wir haben keinen 
Unterschied zwischen der neuronalen Aktivität von Männern und Frauen in 
unseren Experimenten gefunden - vielleicht weil unsere Experimente nicht 
explizit für den Vergleich zwischen Männern und Frauen ausgelegt wurde. In 
weiteren Experimenten sollte der mögliche Einfluss des Geschlechts auf die 
Vergleiche und Entscheidungen detailiert untersucht werden. In solchen 
Experimenten sollte sowohl die Anzahl von weiblichen und männlichen 
Versuchspersonen als auch die Anzahl von verwendeten weiblichen und 
männlichen Vergleichspersonen (Stimuli) gleichverteilt sein. Für das oben 
genannte Beispiel sollten die Vergleichspersonen individuell für jede 
Versuchsperson bzgl. der Körpergröße ausgewählt werden – eine gleiche 
Anzahl kleinerer und größerer Vergleichspersonen als die Versuchsperson. Curriculum  Vitae  
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